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SUMMARY 
Research on import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) in Latin America continues to 
portray it as an aberration of state-led development inevitably condemned to failure and 
held up as an example of the mistakes scholars and policymakers must avoid. In this 
thesis, however, I show that this misunderstanding of a “model” that lasted several 
decades and brought gains to a wide array of socioeconomic actors is due to an inability 
of leading approaches – those that focus on institutions, ideas, and class – to understand 
the role of labour. Drawing on detailed primary and secondary empirical evidence on 
leading sectors in Chile and Argentina, my central claim is that workers determined the 
trajectories of ISI by contesting the effect of strategies pursued by firms and the state 
within the workplace. I show that ISI was no aberration, but that it comprised an 
intrinsically purposive set of strategies aimed at ameliorating or suppressing the real and 
potential resistance mobilised by workers. Through a novel theoretical synthesis, 
bringing into IPE innovations from critical labour relations theory, Marxist development 
studies, institutional theories of ideas, and Latin American labour history, I overcome 
the predominant perspective on labour that conceptualises workers’ as inherently 
disruptive, but institutionally far weaker than other societal actors. The problem with 
such a view, I argue, is not that labour is absent, but rather that the way in which it has 
been understood leaves workers with little or no influence over a process that simply 
unfolded beyond their control. In this thesis, the result is a counter-narrative on the 
history of ISI in Chile and Argentina, with the relationship between measures aimed at 
establishing control over labour and the resistance this engendered firmly at the fore. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Tejedor – L. H. L 
“Tejedor” que con hilos de tristezas 
y con los hilos de illusion 
vas tejendo la tela de tu vida 
sin poder alcanzar, tu ambición. 
 
Seguiras tejendo día a día 
esta tela interminable de dolor 
y en una “lucha” sin fin de metro a metro 
para ese “capital” sin corazón. 
 
“Tejedor” por que sufres en silencio 
tu cabeza inclinada ante el telar. 
Tejes para ganarte el sustento 
para tu hambre que apenas alcanzas a mitigar. 
 
“Cese” tejedor de ese silencio 
busca tus derechos, que lo hallarás. 
Unete a tus hermanos que te esperan 
y junto lucharemos por la felicidad 
 
(Poem published in Obrero Textil, 3rd April 1937) 
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Introduction 
Import-Substitution Industrialisation and the Working Class 
 
Import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) has long provided a cautionary tale for 
scholars and policymakers proclaiming the limits of twentieth century state-led 
development in Latin America. From the “familiar leviathan” of an overbearing state 
apparatus supporting bloated and inefficient domestic manufacturing, to an indefensible 
“aberration” of bad timing, rapidly rising inflation, and closed economies, to, in the 
bluntest terms, the predilection of “predatory or rent-seeking governments”, ISI 
continues to be the subject of widespread condemnation (Coatsworth and Williamson 
2004: 224; Bulmer-Thomas 2003: 279; Sapelli 2003: 3). The ubiquity of this view, 
moreover, pervades even leading examples from the international political economy 
(IPE) literature. For scholars in this field ISI “exemplified the costs of the elusive quest 
for national autonomy” and inadvertently reproduced inflexible political and economic 
institutions that stymied any potential for rapid, long-term industrial growth (Haggard 
1990: 2; Taylor 1998: 3-9; Lin 1988: 154-161). The cautionary tale of ISI, understood 
as a model riven by intrinsic contradictions in design and implementation, is the starting 
point for analysis of twentieth century economic development in Latin America. 
One of the most significant themes in these analyses of ISI is the trajectory towards 
“exhaustion”, a view emphasising various limitations contained within the model itself. 
Interestingly, it was initial advocates of ISI who were the first to draw attention to this 
“internal” characteristic. Leading Latin American development economists in the 1960s 
pointed to a variety of structural inefficiencies resulting from the ostensibly skewed 
priorities of policymakers and firms in the region. A continued reliance on exports of 
raw materials and capital goods, the failure to improve incomes in non-industrial 
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sectors, the persistent concentration of income, problems of productivity and 
profitability, low rates of investment, and the small size of domestic markets were all 
raised as serious causes for concern (Kay 1989: 41-46). Within this theme, however, it 
is the exhaustion of the “early phase” that has become most prominent in contemporary 
literature. This is where the story begins and also, for many, where it ends, providing 
scholars with much of the answer as to why ISI in Latin America was doomed to fail. In 
response to the economic crises of the 1930s, it is argued, manufacturing was free to 
boom, with small-scale establishments proliferating to replace declining consumer 
goods imports in the domestic market (Haggard 1990: 24-26). Yet once domestic 
consumption became saturated, and as the incentives to raise productivity were 
nullified, ISI entered into a path of low investment and growth from which it would 
never recover. Attempts at redistribution, in particular, provided little solace as 
economic stagnation took hold (Taylor 1998: 20-21; Hirschman 1968: 11-12). Instead, 
with any early dynamism rapidly grinding to a halt, this redistribution, and the populist 
politics it was associated with, came to provide a new intractable burden.  
It is this starting point, the early exhaustion of the model and the search for solutions in 
extensive growth and redistribution, which are understood as characterising the next 
phase of the model’s consolidation. Despite emerging critiques and the ostensible 
weaknesses of ISI, policymakers across the region are understood as having taken the 
irrational decision of expanding, with some caveats, the combination of state protection 
and limited redistribution that was moving the model closer to its collapse. Most 
importantly for this cautionary tale, the motivation for these strategies derived from the 
need to sustain the support of an “urban political constituency” comprised of domestic 
firms and industrial labour, a support that, in turn, could only be maintained by 
subsidised growth in manufacturing output and ever increasing wages (Haggard 1990: 
38-42; Bulmer-Thomas 2003: 299; Sheahan 1987: 78-84). Yet the inability of domestic 
production to compete with multinational firms, the stagnation of private investment, 
and mounting public debts meant these measures did little to arrest the slide into 
decline, whilst ongoing selective state support exacerbated the inefficient “hierarchical” 
relations being established (Haggard 1990: 26; Coatsworth 2005: 128-129; Schneider 
2009: 10-11). It was, in this view, decisions taken in support of those already benefitting 
from ISI that were reproducing and deepening the model’s underlying exhaustion. 
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For advocates of the cautionary tale of ISI, the final phase was a violent breakdown. 
The “violence” of this breakdown occurred both in terms of the sudden and relatively 
comprehensive rejection of ISI as a viable economic model and in terms of the 
combined political and economic violence of military takeovers and economic crises 
that heralded the end of this period. Those advocates of the cautionary tale argue that 
this breakdown resulted from those core features of ISI that had been established and 
that consolidated inefficiencies throughout the economy. There was, in this perspective, 
a pervasive irrationality behind the continuation of ISI by policymakers of the time. 
Increasingly unmanageable public debt, the proliferation of small, inefficient 
establishments, and the growing capital intensity of investment, for example, provided 
warning signs that were either accidentally missed or wilfully ignored (Bulmer-Thomas 
2003: 242 & 276; Haggard 1990: 241-246 & 217). Most significantly, earlier wage 
concessions and populist social policies that had ensured support for ISI from industrial 
labour are claimed to have created intractable economic and political constraints. For 
example, it is claimed that attempts at wage compression, ostensibly necessary for 
addressing low levels of profitability and investment in the region, were stymied by the 
intensifying political conflict (Haggard 1990: 38). In this view of ISI as a cautionary 
tale, therefore, it was the very aspects that had enabled its earlier emergence and the 
measures taken to ensure its consolidation that had mutated into conditions that ensured 
its breakdown into economic crisis and, in many instances, violent political upheaval. 
The failure of ISI, in this perspective, was the failure to ensure a rational transition to a 
more appropriate model, with the decisions of the state taken to placate domestic 
demands producing deep-rooted political tensions and contributing to the violence that 
accompanied the model’s demise (Haggard 1990; Taylor 1998: 7-9; Huber 2002). The 
two cases I examine in this thesis, Chile and Argentina, are, alongside Brazil and 
Mexico, used to exemplify this archetypical trajectory of ISI and to demonstrate how, 
regardless of the context, it was destined to this end. Argentina, on the one hand, 
ostensibly provides a clear case supporting the cautionary tale. Its frequent upheavals in 
political leadership, explicitly politicised context of policymaking, and overbearing state 
apparatus made collapse, from this view, all but inevitable. Chile, on the other hand, 
appears initially as a challenge. Its domestic political stability and buoyant primary 
export sector seems to contradict much of the cautionary tale, inasmuch as limits on 
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state expenditures and capabilities had, to an extent, been overcome. Yet Chile too faced 
rampant inflation, a dysfunctional manufacturing sector, and widespread social conflict, 
an experience that only reinforces the view that Latin American ISI was destined to fail.  
However, this understanding of ISI has led us only to the point of it being only “roundly 
condemned but perhaps poorly understood” (Love 2005: 103). It is the reason for the 
persistence of ISI, despite the ostensible limitations, and for the timing and violence of 
its breakdown in so many cases across the region that remain unclear. Two questions, I 
will argue, remain unanswered. First, if ISI was so irrational and disruptive, then why 
did it persist in many countries across the region for over four decades? Second, after 
continuing in various guises for so long, why did its breakdown occur when it did and 
with such violence? The central claim I will make in this thesis is that it is only by 
understanding worker’s determining role in the trajectory of ISI that these questions can 
be adequately addressed. Workers’ significance to these questions, in the view I adopt, 
is neglected all too often and too easily. After all, they appear very distant from the 
decisions of policymakers and the strategies of firms. Moreover, whilst their struggles 
over wages and redistribution are seen to be necessarily disruptive, as political actors 
they are understood as being institutionally weak (Haggard 1990: 37). Yet as I will 
demonstrate, this paradox of institutional weakness is belied by workers’ influence as 
political subject exercised from within the workplace. Crucially, it was workers’ 
collective ability to confront strategies of firms and the state in their pursuit of industrial 
transformation that determined the emergence and consolidation of ISI and its collapse. 
 
The Politics of Import-Substitution Industrialisation 
 
The cautionary tale and its explanatory limits have been addressed by three alternative 
perspectives that seek to answer these questions and explain, respectively, the decisions 
of the state to support and protect inefficient forms of industrial manufacturing, the 
instabilities that arose from the consolidation of these measures, and the intractability of 
political tensions that engendered their breakdown. The first approach emphasises the 
continuity and steady evolution of economic institutions that determined the emergence 
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of ISI around the proliferation of inefficient industrial structures (Cárdenas et al 2000a 
& 2000b; Thorp 2000). The second approach explores the prominent ideas that sought 
to consolidate ISI within these institutions through relatively progressive visions of 
redistribution and growth (Sikkink 1991; Hira 1998). The third approach shows how the 
dynamics of class conflict imposed fundamental contradictions that could only be 
overcome through a radical overhaul of ISI (Cardoso & Faletto 1979; Weaver 2000; 
Stallings 1978; Silva 2007). Each of these responses to the cautionary tale provides 
important insights into how ISI came to be established in its “inefficient” forms, how it 
failed to ensure a stable consolidation, and why the deepening tensions around the 
model could not be overcome. Nevertheless, each perspective leaves unanswered 
questions about the significance of workers in determining these outcomes, which, in 
turn, raises further problems for the explanation of how ISI persisted and why it 
collapsed. Most significantly, workers are not neglected, but are, instead, rendered 
external to the unfolding of ISI by persistent conceptual limitations of these approaches.  
 
Institutions and the Evolutionary Trajectories of ISI 
One of the most important contributions aimed at overcoming the cautionary tale comes 
from New Economic History (NEH), which, in particular, explains the historical origins 
and evolution of the ostensible inefficiencies that characterised ISI. In this perspective, 
ISI is not a useful label. Instead the terms “state-led industrialisation” or “accelerated 
industrialisation” more accurately capture the dynamics of “a process accompanied by a 
thorough transformation of the particular economies and societies” that began long 
before the 1930s (Cárdenas et al 2000c: 2). The main impetus for industrialisation was 
not the growth in demand triggered by redistribution or the closing off of the economy 
by external crises, but rather a series of supply-side phases that gave it increasing 
impetus. First, there was a natural process of export expansion that increased the 
capacity for investment in non-traditional activities. Second, there was an evolution of 
protection resulting from institutional intuition and changing external constraints. Third, 
international balance of payments crises after the Second World War exacerbated and 
consolidated these protectionist measures. Fourth, manufacturing exports were 
promoted to strengthen the domestically-oriented manufacturing that had emerged (ibid: 
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9-11). Thus, rather than the Depression engendering a necessarily limited “easy phase”, 
the crises it produced simply exacerbated this ongoing evolution of industrialisation.  
Most significantly, rather than there being a dramatic change in the institutional and 
industrial structures of manufacturing during the 1930s, there was a strong degree in 
continuity across three key aspects of “accelerated” industrialisation. First, modern 
manufacturing was relatively widespread throughout the region prior to 1930. Important 
household names in Argentina, such as Bunge y Born and SIAM Di Tella, had already 
been established, whilst in Chile the world’s fifth largest cement works was in operation 
alongside various multinational subsidiaries (Bulmer-Thomas 2003: 40; Katz & 
Kosacoff 1989: 48; Palma 2000a: 44-45). Second, much of the impetus for 
industrialisation in the aftermath of the Depression was derived from the continued 
success and recovery of various export sectors. In Argentina, protection for textile 
production was continually blocked by the British during the 1930s, but still continued 
to grow at an increasing pace, whilst in Chile, earlier successes meant manufacturing 
had developed an autonomy from the export cycle that rendered it the new “engine of 
growth” (Bulmer-Thomas 2003: 127-128; O’Connell 2000: 185; Palma 2000a: 63). 
Third, economic institutions of the state had already begun to stimulate industrial 
manufacturing. Tariff revisions in 1897, 1916 and 1928 were the origins of 
protectionism in Chile, whilst, in Argentina, policymakers inadvertently boosted 
manufacturing in the early twentieth century by supporting rural producers and using 
tariff policy as a means to keep down consumer costs (Thorp 1998: 121; Palma 2000b: 
240; Palma 2000a: 48; Díaz Alejandro 2000: 31; Cortés Conde 2000: 284). 
This perspective, then, makes a highly significant contribution to understanding the 
emergence of ISI across the region. The weaknesses associated with ISI did not emerge 
as a model but rather they represented the culmination of a series of incentives and 
imperatives derived from global and domestic political economies with origins deep 
within the nineteenth century. As such, the emergence of an “easy phase”, the main 
locus around which much condemnation of the period focuses, is belied by the long-run 
institutional continuities that engendered particular contexts for the emergence of ISI 
throughout the region. NEH offers a stark critique of the “monoeconomics” that 
pervades these interpretations and offers space for the historical diversity that was 
experienced throughout the twentieth century (Kuntz Ficker 2005: 159). In different 
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cases throughout the region, the evolving institutional configurations in the state and the 
structures of industrial manufacturing led to the emergence of distinctive trajectories of 
ISI. Such a perspective, as such, moves away from ISI as a “model” with inherent 
limitations and refocuses on the historical constitution of distinctive policy responses. 
However, in making this shift away from the intractable and inevitable contradictory 
tendencies of Latin American ISI to the diverse and historically-determined institutional 
configurations of specific countries, NEH encounters familiar problems. Deriving its 
theoretical heritage from the institutionalist models created by Douglass North, it 
emphasises the steady and cumulative character of social change contained within a 
relatively stable political-institutional context (Thorp 1992: 188). Thus, whilst it does 
well to displace the predominant monoeconomics, it tends only to replace it with a 
relatively stable mono-institutional domestic context, in which economic and political 
institutions accumulated rather than constituted growing political tensions. For NEH, 
the determinants of the establishment of ISI and its limitations are delimited to 
engagements within and around these institutions. Labour, then, is part of the collection 
of actors whose interests build pressure on prevailing institutions, as one amongst a 
plethora of “other” social actors (Thorp 1998: 10). Workers’ role, therefore, is reduced 
to little more than a constraint over the process of institutional change and evolution. 
This perspective, as such, does not explain how the political tensions that placed limits 
on ISI accumulated beyond the institutions themselves. Instead, these tensions are seen 
to be the inadvertent consequences of irrational decisions seeking to meet the varying 
demands of groups acting outside, rather than within, the unfolding of ISI.  
 
Ideas and the Institutionalised Meaning of ISI 
A second perspective that challenges the narrative of the cautionary tale seeks, instead, 
to situate these tensions in the consolidation of ISI around the articulation and 
implementation of ideas characterised by their remarkable similarity and consistency 
throughout the region. ISI represented “maybe for the first time, a theoretical paradigm 
[that] became a development program, consciously followed by national governments” 
(Kuntz Ficker 2005: 149). One of the driving forces behind this was the Economic 
Commission for Latin America (CEPAL), the organisation in which many of the policy 
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measures implemented by national governments were articulated in theory. Several 
influential government officials first worked at this institution and regular seminars 
organised at its base in Santiago were attended by leading economists from across the 
region (Love 1996: 251; Love 2005: 103). CEPAL, therefore, was the most concrete 
manifestation of the shared economic policy ideas that consolidated ISI. As well as 
providing important institutional space in which they could be articulated, CEPAL also 
developed important mechanisms and networks for their dissemination, permitting the 
formalisation of the model in theory and its implementation in practice. 
The influence of CEPAL over ISI, however, is not overstated. In fact, there is ample 
evidence provided by scholars emphasising ideas that initial policy experimentation 
often preceded the formalisation of theory. The institution simply provided “a scientific 
rationalization for an ongoing process and a justification for governments to adopt 
import-substituting industrialization more overtly and vigorously” (Kay 1989: 36). 
Many of the ideas formalised in theory and disseminated throughout the region were 
reflective of the policy measures that states were already pursuing. CEPAL, despite 
articulating and disseminating these ideas, was “simply push[ing] hard in the direction 
that history was already moving” (Love 2005: 103). The consolidation of ISI, therefore, 
was an engagement between the changing concrete conditions of domestic political 
economies and the ideas being developed to resolve the problems that this engendered. 
In many instances, it was domestic policymakers and economists that, driven by the 
local contexts in which they were operating, consolidated ISI. Consolidation was not the 
implementation of an abstract model, but rather a loosely connected series of ideas 
responding to the shifting domestic contexts of Latin American industrialisation. 
To begin with, important institutional spaces for ideas were established in diverse 
national contexts. In Chile, the Production Development Corporation (CORFO) was 
integral to the formation of an “ideology of industrialisation” and dissemination of 
economic research, whilst, in Argentina, the establishment of institutions like the 
Postwar National Council and Industrial Credit Bank were important in diagnosing 
crises and ensuring the influence of university-educated economists (Silva 2008: 86; 
Ffrench-Davis et al 2000: 128; Teubal 2001: 35; Girbal-Blacha 2003: 39 & 48). From 
within these institutions, important ideologically-driven programmes consolidated ISI in 
distinctive domestic forms. Developmentalism in Argentina during the 1950s and 1960s 
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was the outcome of a specific critique of previous economic policies, but quickly fell 
apart around its inadequate compromises and the failure of any institutional spaces to 
offer a proper “institutional home” (Sikkink 1991). In Chile, despite efforts to address 
redistribution and improve exports in response to the growing inequality and stagnation 
pervading industrialisation, reformist ideas mobilised during the 1960s were unable to 
convince their political opponents and only exacerbated existing tensions within the 
state (Hira 1998). As a result, ideas articulated and implemented in the consolidation of 
ISI failed because they were unable to address the tensions within these institutions. 
Such a perspective has been formalised around social constructivism, particularly as 
espoused by Mark Blyth (2002). In this perspective, ideas function at five levels: they 
resolve uncertainty in the face of crisis, they allow for the formation of coalitions and 
collective action, they provide weapons and blueprints in pursuit of this action, and they 
stabilise new institutional configurations. The ideas that consolidated ISI offer an 
important illustration of this framework. Ideas articulated and disseminated by CEPAL 
and domestic officials addressed uncertainty during the 1930s, they helped consolidate 
political alliances that allowed the implementation of these measures, they relied on 
critiques of previous frameworks, they provided directions for resolving persistent 
crises, and they attempted to stabilise new institutional configurations and address 
emerging political tensions. In each of the cases across the region, ideas were central to 
the consolidation of ISI as a “model” in a manner that was determined by domestic 
institutional opportunities and constraints and the capabilities of political elites.  
Yet in situating the conflicts that surrounded the consolidation of ISI in the domain of 
international and domestic institutions, identifying them with the competing ideas of 
actors within these institutions, and conceptualising their implementation as the 
transmission from these institutions to the wider political economy, this perspective 
delimits the breakdown of distinctive forms of ISI to the failure to find a proper 
“institutional home” or the inability to placate tensions within state. It restricts the 
causes of its breakdown to a few political actors who failed to embed their visions of 
industrialisation within prevailing institutions. Nevertheless, the constraints on these 
efforts are not necessarily limited to engagements within these political institutions 
themselves. For example, Sikkink (1991: 117-118) argues labour mobilisations were 
integral to ensuring the attempt to consolidate particular ideas about ISI in Argentina 
  10 
 
 
 
 
was a failure. Yet this conceptualisation of labour, as a disruptive force preventing the 
stable consolidation of a set of ideas about policy, acts, once again, to reproduce the 
notion that labour was external to the unfolding of ISI, attempting only to secure gains 
from outside the process. Workers are not ignored and, to an extent, are given a clearer 
role than in the cautionary tale or the NEH critique, but they are still marginalised. They 
are reduced to passively accepting changes imposed from within political institutions or 
to disrupting unfavourable decisions. Labour, therefore, is capable of being active only 
in placing constraints on the consolidation of policy models and ideas that inform them.  
 
Class and the Contested Social Formations of ISI 
The breakdown of ISI, as caused by intrinsic internal contradictions or the failure of 
political elites to generate consensus, is an aspect of ISI that a third perspective 
emphasising class also seeks to explain. Dependency theorists, alongside contemporary 
scholars emphasising the role of imperialism, have located the reasons for the collapse 
of ISI in the interests and actions of powerful actors in the “metropolis”, or imperial 
centre, of global capitalism (Galeano 1997; Weaver 2000). The seminal work of 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto (1979), moreover, has moved away from 
such an overarching emphasis on the global.1 Industrialisation was a phenomenon 
bounded by the constraints of the global economy, but determined by the “mode of 
domination” within the class structure of a domestic political economy. In the case of 
ISI this comprised the “ascendant middle classes, the urban bourgeoisie, and sectors of 
the old export-import system” acting alongside the state as an instrument of domination 
representing this dominant social formation (Cardoso & Faletto 1979: 129). 
Dependency and imperialism, therefore, were mediated by prevailing domestic class 
formations and, which produced and only partially suppressed the fundamental political 
tensions rooted within these relations of domination. 
                                                          
1
 Recent work on Uneven and Combined Development (UCD) has highlighted the complementarity of 
global and local changes in capitalist development. Much of this work has focused on addressing the 
emergence of diverse capitalist social relations globally during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, but recent work by Selwyn (2011) has placed these ideas firmly in the context of contemporary 
“catch-up” development. Whilst this perspective provides an innovative lens for understanding the 
interconnectedness of global and local political economies, it is a conceptual debate emphasising a 
theorisation of the “international” that falls beyond the bounds of this thesis. 
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These relations of domination, moreover, relied specifically on the state to express 
distinctive forms of political control. Yet the state cannot be translated as simply an 
expression of a dominant social formation. Instead, it is its “relative autonomy” that was 
most significant. The state was a site of deep-rooted conflict over competing visions of 
industrialisation, whilst specific institutions within the state, or “nodal agencies” often 
clashed directly with dominant social classes as they attempted to implement policy 
measures, experiencing changing capabilities in the pursuit of their aims (Chibber 2005; 
Kohli 2004: 20; Chibber 2003: 21). Thus the role of state in the tensions that were 
generated around ISI were as neither a stable site buffeted by the winds of social 
struggle, nor as an institutional space within which political elites attempted to create 
consensus around their ideas. Instead, they acted both as a mediator of wider social 
conflicts between classes and as actors pursuing strategies in support of, and 
occasionally in opposition to, dominant classes and the social formations around them. 
The tensions generated within and around these social formations, moreover, were 
integral to the breakdown of ISI, which was consolidated around fragile domestic social 
coalitions. The “urban political constituency” made up of labour, domestic 
industrialists, state bureaucracies, the ascendant middle classes, and, in some cases, 
foreign firms was in a state of constant conflict as dominant and subordinate classes 
attempted to impose their demands. In Chile, such tensions made ISI unviable. 
Attempted compromises between intrinsically conflictive interests were necessarily 
unstable and only able to sustain particular strategies for a short period of time. 
Moreover, the relative weakness of the domestic bourgeoisie in consolidating a 
trajectory around its own interests meant that these tensions, or the limits of the “born 
dependent” manufacturing sector, could not be overcome (Stallings 1978: 231-232; 
Vitale 2011: 592-593). The “socio-political support coalitions” that engendered ISI 
were forced, due to this weakness of the bourgeoisie and the inevitability of conflict, to 
be relatively inclusive and advance limited progressive measures that only exacerbated 
conflict (Silva 2007). It was these weaknesses of dominant social formations, therefore, 
that undermined the consolidation of ISI and created the conditions for its breakdown. 
These perspectives on class, the inherent instability of domestic social formations, and 
the active roles played by the state and the international political economy provide 
important insights into the breakdown of ISI. Powerful actors within the international 
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political economy, alongside powerful domestic political actors, played a crucial role 
through the pursuit of their own interests. The relative autonomy of the state and its 
capabilities in mediating the demands of dominant classes and acting to support or 
oppose these actors generated tensions over the implementation of economic policy. 
Social conflict then determined the potential for the articulation and implementation of 
such policy measures, with the institutions of the state creating rather than accumulating 
tensions. Thus fragile political compromises, the weakness of the industrial bourgeoisie, 
and its tense relations with institutions of the state constituted the breakdown of ISI.  
Nevertheless, the focus on the dominant actors within these social formations, on their 
role in mediating the impact of the international political economy, and their 
engagement with the policymaking apparatus of the state, again delimits the role of 
labour as being necessarily disruptive of their decisions. Labour is not ignored and, in 
fact, of these three perspectives, it is most comprehensively incorporated into the 
analyses. Silva (2007), for example, argues that their struggles for inclusion within the 
dominant social coalition inadvertently encouraged the implementation of progressive 
policy measures in Chilean ISI. Yet by framing these as the struggle for inclusion and 
the outcomes that are produced as inadvertent, workers are presented as necessarily 
external from the decisions taken by firms and the state. Rather than conscious 
strategies pursued by workers, firms, and the state, the conflicts pursued by labour are 
reduced, once again, to the pursuit of gains against an existing institutional system.  
 
The Politics of Production: Bringing Workers Back In? 
 
Whilst these perspectives provide important insights into ISI, challenging prominent 
narratives of caution and condemnation, they also reproduce the limitations on how it 
can be understood. The cautionary tale, and these responses to it, cannot explain why 
ISI persisted or the timing and violence of its breakdown because they are not able to 
incorporate the working class. The problem, therefore, is not simply that they “ignore” 
labour, but, instead, it is the manner in which workers’ (limited) political influence is 
conceptualised. Workers are externalised because, in these perspectives, ISI was 
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determined within and around institutions within which workers were not represented. It 
is inevitable, therefore, that workers are reduced to little more than an “interest group” 
seeking gains from a process over which they have little or no substantive influence to 
constitute to their own ends (Chang 2013). Interestingly, moreover, this reproduces the 
paradox in which workers’ struggles are necessarily disruptive, but workers themselves 
are seen to have little choice but to passively acquiesce to changes imposed by firms 
and the state. In this thesis, however, I will argue that by situating the determinants of 
ISI within and around the workplace, this can be overcome and workers can be instead 
be understood as directly constitutive of the changes that came with industrial policy, 
technological innovation, and the rapid expansion of domestic manufacturing. I will 
build on varying perspectives on the political influence of workers, from structural 
determination to “social subjects”, to establish an integrated methodological framework 
that connects work, resistance, and subjectivity to understand the formation and political 
influence of the working class as a political subject over the trajectories of ISI. 
 
The Limited Political Influence of Labour 
The political influence of “labour” can be conceptualised around its structural 
determination and its institutional manifestation. First, labour struggles are the result of 
workers’ structural location as direct producers within capitalist social relations. 
Second, these are pursued on their behalf by the political institutions of labour that 
represent them, the trade unions and political parties of the Left. These aspects are an 
invaluable starting point for the reconsideration of trajectories of development that 
incorporate workers as integral to processes that, typically, are represented as being 
imposed upon them and against which they seek only to acquire the most substantial 
gains. History is a process that should be understood through a “two-sided” model. 
Socioeconomic change, such as the emergence, consolidation, and breakdown of ISI in 
Latin America, has to consider the “conflicts, tensions and accommodations with and 
between dominant and subordinate classes” (Roxborough 1984: 23). Thus it is only 
through an analysis of the inherently conflictive relations between classes, and most 
importantly of the role played in these tensions by subordinate classes continually 
seeking political inclusion, that these processes can be understood (ibid: 23-4). In this 
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perspective, therefore, ISI cannot be understood as imposed from above, but rather, 
must be seen as having been directly constituted by the political influence of labour.  
Concretely, this influence determined the trajectories of economic development in the 
region, even prior to the widespread establishment of national trade unions and legal 
collective bargaining in the twentieth century. Labour history in Latin America has 
recognised this influence, particularly from a Marxist perspective. Workers were 
integral to the early emergence of industrialisation in the nineteenth century, as well as 
during the twentieth century. Early forms of organisation, mobilised in some of the 
continent’s leading export sectors, played a vital role in the political history of major 
economies, including Chile, Argentina, Venezuela, and Colombia. During the twentieth 
century, moreover, these actors exercised an often overlooked influence derived from 
the structural location of these earlier labour movements and the conditions that 
emerged in the establishment of export-led economies (Bergquist 1986: 13-14). 
Therefore, it was from these strategically significant structural locations that the extent 
of workers’ organisation and the degree of their political influence was determined. 
Guillermo O’Donnell (1979), moreover, in his seminal work shows that the unfolding 
of ISI was intimately linked to efforts targeting control over labour through the very 
institutions that represented it. He convincingly demonstrates that the actions of the 
state after the initial phase of industrial development in Argentina were characterised by 
concerted efforts aimed at controlling labour, or “the popular sector”, through 
restrictions on democracy, the “domestication” of the trade unions, and the channelling 
of political representation of all social sectors into organisations over which the state 
has ultimate control. These policies, he claimed, were explicitly tied to the 
developmental activities and goals of the state (O’Donnell 1979: 88-89). His argument 
contributes an important perspective on the centrality of labour policy to the industrial 
transformation pursued during the period of ISI. He highlights the importance of the 
timing of legislative measures to ensure control, of limited institutional representation 
and repression of worker mobilisation, and of tacit acceptance of these controls.  
Understanding the political influence of labour as a constitutive part of the “two-sided” 
model of economic history, as an actor determined through its structural location in 
strategic areas of the economy, or as continually constrained by the state provides a 
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useful starting point for understanding workers’ significance. Yet the structural 
determinations of political influence and its manifestation in political institutions 
obfuscate important aspects of political subjectivity. Focusing primarily on structural 
determination of labour in its struggles against capitalism delimits the contested forms 
through which these were manifested. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries workers adopted contested, and often contradictory, patterns of resistance and 
mobilisation that cannot simply be reduced to the structures of dependency established 
in the sixteenth century (Adelman 1991: 184). Focusing on the influence of workers as 
exercised through the political institutions of labour, moreover, repeats the mistakes Ian 
Roxborough claims were made by dependency theorists who assumed that dominant 
classes existed in coherent forms because of the existence of institutional political actors 
(Roxborough 1984: 19). Moreover, even O’Donnell’s (1979) argument demonstrates an 
over-reliance on institutional factors that allows it, for example, to be easily dismissed 
by Haggard (1990: 38-39) who simply points to the divergent timings of legislative 
measures. It is necessary, therefore, to move on beyond these structural and institutional 
determinants of “labour” and towards an understanding of the workers themselves. 
 
The Limited Political Influence of the Worker 
It is essential that any understanding of the political influence of the working class 
moves past notions of structural determination and institutional manifestation. The 
“essentialism” of structural determination, for example, continues to lead us away from 
workers themselves, obscuring important aspects of their struggles against firms and the 
state as well as “the variety of manifestations of this contest” (Adelman 1991: 178). The 
struggles workers engage in are determined by a multiplicity of factors rather than 
abstractions taken from their structural location. These structural locations within 
capitalism are only one factor determining the veracity and impact of mobilisation, 
whilst institutions are just one form of these mobilisations. Workers, therefore, are 
active as specific subjects, tied to diverse historical trajectories, even within the same 
structural locations, which means that these subjectivities require further explanation. 
Moving from abstract categories of labour and to the specific subjects of workers 
engaging in struggles within and against capitalism moves our starting point for 
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overcoming the problem of incorporating workers. The outcomes of influence are to be 
understood not in terms of the “macro-politics of labour”, but rather of the 
particularities of the “social subject” that we are trying to bring back in to our analysis 
(Wolfe 2002: 245-246). To do this, then, we must consider not just workers’ direct 
relation to capital, but the concrete situation of their lives inside and outside the 
workplace, their history, and their popular memory. Workers should not, moreover, be 
subsumed beneath the political institutions of labour which are often, directly or 
indirectly, seen to define the extent and limits of political interests and influence (ibid: 
254). Structural determination and institutional manifestation are two ends of the 
complex spectrum through which workers generate resistance and mobilisation in 
concrete, contested, and sometimes contradictory ways. Starting from the “macro-
politics” of labour reduces and obscures the struggles themselves, whilst starting from 
the subjects engaged in these struggles can move beyond “assuming that a certain set of 
extant political structures shape individual workers in ‘labour’” (ibid: 259). Doing away 
with “labour” and returning to the worker allows us to bring these subjects and the 
multiplicity of their determinations back in to our analysis without relying on abstract 
assumptions about subjectivity, political interest, or political influence.  
This perspective, starting from a critique of labour “essentialism” and providing a way 
to conceptualise workers as “social subjects”, provides another important set of 
determinations for conceptualising and incorporating the political influence of the 
working class. Yet, when taken to its logical conclusion, it restricts the extent of its 
influence and creates difficulties for understanding this beyond that of a simple “interest 
group”. Rather than focus upon workers experiencing the world around them and acting 
collectively as a class, this perspective centres attention upon workers as individuals. It 
leads away from the potentially fruitful similarities in the experiences of work and 
production that determine the collective, but contested, formation of political 
subjectivities. Thus in attempting to avoid a reproduction of “macro-politics of labour” 
devoid of social subjects, these social subjects become increasingly isolated from the 
processes with which they engage. As a result, their political influence is once again 
reduced to the margins as individual workers’ struggles against firms and the state.  
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Towards a Politics of Production 
These two attempts to conceptualise workers beyond a simple “interest group” are 
useful, if limited, starting points for understanding their political influence in 
constituting the trajectories of ISI in Chile and Argentina. On the one hand, by locating 
this influence in the structural condition of “labour” or the political institutions that 
represent it, the contested and contradictory manifestations of subjectivity are obscured. 
On the other hand, by locating this influence in the “social subject”, this subjectivity is 
constrained to that of an individual separated from the shared conditions of work and 
production that determine workers’ collective existence. Thus to recapture workers’ 
political influence, to incorporate it into wider trajectories of industrialisation, and to 
conceptualise it in a manner that neither externalises nor individualises these actors, I 
will build a methodological framework that takes the workplace as its starting point. It 
is here that the nexus between work, resistance, and subjectivity can be identified and it 
is here that, in the most concrete terms, the trajectories of ISI were constituted. From the 
collective experience of work, the resistance this engendered, and the political 
subjectivities it created, workers directly determined the strategies of firms and the state. 
In adopting this perspective, I offer insights into the competitive strategies adopted by 
firms that determined investment, technological development, production processes, and 
industrial structures. These decisions, from employment relations to transnational 
production networks, I demonstrate, derived from the engagement of firms in Chile and 
Argentina with workers within and around the workplace. Moreover, I offer insights 
into the role of the state in these leading examples of “state-led industrialisation” in the 
region. Policy decisions, typically understood as “protecting” firms from the 
vicissitudes of the global economy, will be shown to have focused on the imposition of 
workplace control. This was achieved by supporting the import of particular 
technologies, by facilitating foreign and domestic investment, and by strengthening the 
position of firms through political repression beyond the workplace. Economic 
governance, therefore, is linked to efforts to repress or resolve workplace conflicts. The 
persistence of ISI, in this perspective, was determined by firms and the state as they 
engaged with workers through attempts to impose political control in the workplace, 
whilst the timing and ferocity of its breakdown represented the failure of this control.  
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I start from these claims in order to demonstrate the constitutive influence of workers 
over ISI. I argue that it was in the workplace that discipline and control were concretely 
manifested, either in the strict authority of management or in the impersonal discipline 
of new technology and workplace reorganisation. This is not understood as structurally 
determining “labour”, however, but rather that the experiences of this discipline – the 
experiences of work and resistance – were a distinctive element of determination 
formed in the workplace. The formation of political subjectivities is then understood as 
the politicisation of these experiences in the course of engagements between workers 
and the ideas disseminated by political institutions and activists. These determinations, 
therefore, constituted workers as distinctive working classes. They were not an “interest 
group” making demands on the prevailing economic system, “labour” in intractable 
conflict with capital, or “social subjects” in individual struggles. Instead, the influence 
of the working class is understood as determined by its degree of political autonomy in 
the workplace from firms, the state, and, importantly, the political institutions of labour. 
 
The Structure of the Thesis 
 
The following chapters will demonstrate this novel methodological approach to 
understanding the political influence of workers over the persistence and breakdown of 
ISI in Latin America. Building on original primary source material including industry 
journals and workers’ newspapers, I will show how the working class played a unique 
constitutive role in determining these outcomes of ISI in Chile and Argentina.2 I will 
argue that the connection between struggles within and around the workplace and the 
policy decisions of the state and competitive strategies of firms are too often 
overlooked. Moreover, I will demonstrate how this is the result of a continuing failure 
to conceptualise this connection and its significance. Through a comparative analysis, I 
will demonstrate that it was the divergent capabilities of the working class, determined 
                                                          
2
 In this thesis I focus explicitly on the role of industrial workers, as the primary focus of economic policy 
and development strategies during this period. Across the region, workers in agriculture played an 
important role and continue to do so today. Although I do not explicitly consider their role in this thesis, 
the theoretical and methodological framework I develop can, potentially, also be applied in these still-
vital sectors across Latin America. For critical insights into the relations between peasant movements and 
historical and contemporary processes of economic development see Akhram-Lohdi and Kay (2009). 
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by their political autonomy from firms, the state, and the political institutions of labour, 
that determined the establishment of “progressive” forms of ISI, the consolidation of 
ostensibly “inefficient” industrial and institutional configurations, and the violent 
breakdown of these “models” around the distinctive threats posed by the working class. 
In Chapter 1, I will establish the conceptual and methodological framework of this 
thesis. Starting from the imposition of discipline and control within the workplace, I 
will offer an alternative perspective on the key aspects of working class formation: 
work, resistance, and subjectivity. I will establish five key determinations that must be 
incorporated as independent, but integrated, features that determine the extent of 
workers’ political influence: processes of production, experiences of work and 
resistance, politicisation and the construction of distinctive political subjectivities, the 
contested process of class formation, and workers’ political autonomy. It is this latter 
aspect, moreover, that is most significant in this thesis. The central claim is that it is this 
autonomy that enables workers to exert an influence over historical processes within 
which they constitute an integral and active political subject. 
In the next two chapters I examine the trajectories of ISI from the perspective of the 
relationship between the state, in terms of its implementation of policy to foment 
industrial growth and to impose discipline upon the working class, and the mobilisations 
of workers. In Chapter 2, I explore this process beyond established perspectives on the 
political and institutional stability of the “Compromise State” in Chile. I show that, by 
shifting our focus beyond this ostensible stability, the role of the state in attempting to 
resolve the threat posed by a militant working class provides a better starting point for 
understanding the establishment of ISI and the violent backlash and breakdown of ISI. 
In Chapter 3, I explore a similar process in Argentina, but instead look beyond the 
ostensible instability of the state apparatus. I show that, by looking past the internal 
political conflicts within these institutions, the role of the state in persistently imposing 
discipline on workers within the workplace provides a better starting point for 
understanding the persistence of ISI spiral of violent conflicts that led to its breakdown.  
In the next three chapters I tackle the question of the diverse mobilisation of the 
working class and its distinctive political influence by examining the nexus of work, 
resistance, and subjectivity in the formation of this autonomous political subject in three 
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leading sectors in these two country cases. In Chapter 4, I examine the mobilisation of 
workers in the textile sector in Chile and highlight the limitations of the inefficient 
industrial structures that were consolidated around large domestic firms in the decades 
of ISI. I look at how the combination of limited political representation, persistent 
radical political ideas, and the tensions between traditional forms of control and new 
forms of discipline brought workplace conflicts in this sector to the fore. In Chapter 5, I 
examine the mobilisation of workers in the metalworking and automobile sectors in 
Argentina and their differing incorporation into inefficient industrial structures, 
consolidated first around large domestic and state-run firms and later around foreign 
firms. I look at the different experiences of political representation, emphasising, in 
particular, the constraints imposed by the political institutions of labour. I also explore 
the role of changing forms of discipline in the workplace and its influence over the 
emergence of radicalised mobilisations from within the most advanced sectors of 
industrial manufacturing. In Chapter 6, I engage specifically with the breakdown of ISI, 
comparing the distinctive processes of class formation that occurred over the preceding 
decades in these three sectors and highlighting the outcomes that led to the violent 
repression of the 1970s that specifically targeted the working class. In Chile, it was the 
coherent political autonomy of workers that posed a distinctive threat to the institutional 
system that had overseen this trajectory of ISI, whilst, in Argentina, it was the 
fragmentation of this political subject that engendered a spiral of violence. 
To conclude this thesis, I will return explicitly to the five aspects that constitute its 
theoretical and methodological framework. I highlight their significance for 
incorporating the workplace and the working class into these trajectories of 
industrialisation, emphasising the historical processes that constituted the distinctive 
outcomes of ISI in each case. I use this framework, then, to re-examine the emergence, 
consolidation, and breakdown of ISI as constituted by the direct engagement between 
workers, firms, and the state within and around the workplace. I argue that the 
implementation of industrial planning and progressive measures aimed at redistribution 
were a clear attempt to pacify the emergent struggles of workers in the expanding 
sectors of industrial manufacturing. I argue that the consolidation of “inefficient” 
industrial and production structures represented a deepening of these efforts, 
particularly in terms of the technological innovations and workplace reorganisations 
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that accompanied them. And, finally, I argue that the breakdowns of ISI in the 1970s 
represented the failure of firms and the state, not to constitute internationally 
competitive industrial production, but to sufficiently pacify or repress the working class.   
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Chapter 1 
Towards a Political Economy of the Working Class 
 
This chapter will outline an integrated theoretical and methodological framework that 
reconnects work, resistance, and subjectivity in conceptualising the influence of the 
working class in determining the trajectories of ISI. This perspective will overcome the 
continuing limitations in linking the politics of production, which are situated in the 
workplace, to the politics of industrialisation, which are all too often delimited to 
engagements between firms and the state. This framework engages with the structural 
and subjective determinations of workers’ political influence and the limitations of its 
institutional manifestation. It highlights the interconnectedness of these factors in five 
key aspects that determine the extent of workers’ political influence. The problem is not 
that these aspects are ignored. Instead, it is that they are often conflated, making it 
difficult to incorporate the diverse manifestations of workers’ influence into our 
analyses. Locating workers’ influence at structural locations conflates the differences 
between production, work, and subjectivity, whilst workers’ institutional manifestation, 
or their necessarily disruptive impact, conflates resistance, subjectivity, and class 
formation. This framework, therefore, will overcome these conflations, separating each 
of these aspects and identifying their interaction in determining the political influence of 
the working class and its significance in constituting the trajectories of ISI. 
Production is the starting point for understanding this political influence of workers. In 
this perspective, it is understood not simply as a site in which firms and the state impose 
discipline and control, but also as a social space in which the effectiveness of this 
imposition is constituted by the workers themselves. Experiences of work and 
resistance, moreover, determine the outcomes of changes to production. Work is the 
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privileged point of mediation in the articulation of discontent, inasmuch as it represents 
the engagement with a shared set of experiences and wider ongoing social conflict. 
Resistance derives from these experiences and the necessarily incomplete imposition of 
control. It should not be externalised from the workplace in the institutional 
manifestations of its mobilisation or as an abstract disruption of the practice and policies 
of firms and the state. This framework, instead, concretely locates it in engagements 
within the workplace. In the course of this resistance, finally, political subjectivities are 
constituted that, in themselves, are complex and contradictory. This politicisation of 
grievances is a distinctive feature of workers’ mobilisations, an understanding of which 
can prevent them from being abstracted as simply disruptive. In this framework, 
political institutions and the ideas they promote, therefore, give meaning to workers’ 
experiences, whilst workers themselves imbue these ideas and institutions with purpose. 
The ongoing feedback between these determinations, in this perspective, constitutes the 
historical process of class formation whereby workers come together collectively within 
and beyond the workplace. This is not determined simply structurally as “labour”, or 
derived from a collection of individual “social subjects”, but instead arises in workers’ 
concrete engagement in the workplace with firms and the state. It is, therefore, against 
these distinctive working classes that firms and the state mobilise strategies to appease 
or repress the mobilisation of the working class around a “vertical” axis of conflict. 
Underlying these determinations, most importantly, is workers’ political autonomy. It is 
the persistence of this political autonomy beyond the constraints imposed in the 
workplace that gives workers the capacity to contest firm and state strategies. Moreover, 
it also allows for the constitution of workers as political subjects along a “horizontal” 
axis. Workers’ political influence is continually overlooked in determining the 
outcomes of trajectories of economic development. Yet by conceptualising this political 
influence in terms of the autonomous relations of solidarity experienced within and 
around the workplace, the influence of the working class can be brought back in to ISI.  
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Control and Discipline in the Social Spaces of Production 
 
Some of the most innovative recent work on the role of production in determining 
distinctive forms of capitalism has been generated in and around work on global 
production networks. Beginning as a concerted effort to reincorporate global economic 
actors, particularly transnational corporations (TNCs), into analyses of national political 
economies, the approach has provided fertile ground for scholars seeking to remind 
others of the importance of production and labour in shaping distinctive forms of 
development (Selwyn 2007; Selwyn 2009; Cumbers et al 2008). Jamie Gough (2003), 
for example, emphasises the significance of production on three levels: the organisation 
of the production process, the institutionalisation of employment relations, and the 
reproduction of labour power itself. His important point of departure is to highlight the 
significance of the spatial levels at which these aspects come to constitute the 
“geographies of labour power” (Gough 2003: 3-8). By emphasising the role of space, he 
situates the ostensibly detached and abstract social relations of capitalism in a specific 
local context. In a recent article, Jamie Gough (2014) advances this argument to 
incorporate the everyday lives of workers. Most significantly, he demonstrates how 
local struggles with the state and various “social relations of power – class, gender, and 
racism in particular” constitute local social spaces of production. 
It is returning to these specifically “local” spaces as a site in which the imposition of 
discipline and control is most concretely articulated that this framework begins. The 
workplace is a typical starting point for interpreting the significance of the working 
class, but conceptualising the importance of production to control remains problematic. 
This idea that the production process provided firms with new ways to exert control is 
central to Harry Braverman (1974). He argues that technological modernisation of 
production cannot be understood as simply a neutral means of increasing output: 
“within the historical and analytical limits of capitalism, according to Marx’s analysis, 
technology, instead of simply producing social relations, is produced by the social relations 
represented by capital… the first volume of Capital may be considered a massive essay on 
how the commodity form, in an adequate social and technological setting, matures into the 
form of capital, and how the social form of capital, driven to incessant accumulation as the 
condition for its own existence, completely transforms technology” (Braverman 1974: 20) 
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Processes of production are, therefore, reflective of the particular social formation of 
capitalism within which they are developed. Technological development, from this 
perspective, serves the purpose of extending the capacity for accumulation and, most 
importantly, determining the extent of control of firms in the workplace and beyond.  
Braverman goes on to show how the capacities of human labour power have continually 
been exploited through changing technologies and managerial practices. For example, 
the “technological-scientific revolution” that expanded and transformed capitalism 
throughout the twentieth century, he argues, served primarily to extend the exploitation 
of the “infinitely malleable character of human labour” (ibid: 55). First, he shows how 
technology expanded exploitation in general by moving masses of workers out of those 
sectors most strongly affected by these advancements, heightening surplus value 
extraction and keeping down wages in less technologically advanced sectors with a 
growing pool of available workers (ibid: 382-385). Second, he argues that rather than 
these advancements leading to improvements in workers’ skills, the training offered and 
the requirements for “skilled” labour reflected the categories by which capital 
transformed labour into its “hand”. Skills and training reflected the needs of firms to 
expand their accumulation and to retain control over production (ibid: 446-447). As 
such, technological modernisation represents an extension of control over the 
production process and the worker. Workers are moulded to the demands of 
accumulation, reproducing and transforming social relations of production to this end. 
Building on this argument, other labour process theorists have identified the particular 
characteristics of the workplace as integral to the exercise of control. For example, the 
success of the factory in the social organisation of work is argued to be due to its 
effectiveness as a site of control (Marglin 1980: 239-240). Perhaps the most important 
factor in this success has been its importance for controlling workers’ time. The factory 
served to prevent the increasing wages that came with expanded accumulation 
translating into expanded leisure time (ibid: 246). Marx also made this argument 
forcefully in his analysis of the working day. Controlling the amount of time that goes 
directly into the processes of production and accumulation is shown to be central to the 
specific form of capitalist production. For Marx, “the working day is… capable of being 
determined, but in and for itself indeterminate”. As such, the development of the 
factory, and the constant renewal and modernisation of the production process, was not 
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only necessary to the expansion of accumulation, but, most importantly, as a means to 
exercise control to this end. Workers’ need for time to “satisfy his intellectual and social 
requirements… conditioned by the general level of civilization” was mediated by the 
length of the working day (Marx 1990: 341). Control over production through the 
factory, therefore, became the control over how workers’ spent their time. 
This control over time, moreover, is one of the most important means by which early 
industrial capitalism was established. E P Thompson (1967: 60-61), for example, argues 
that it arose through the “discipline of time”, as task-oriented work was replaced by a 
clear demarcation of employers’ and workers’ “own” time. The imposition of working 
day came to be an essential feature for controlling workers’ lives for capital:  
“what we are examining here are not only the changes in manufacturing technique which 
demand greater synchronization of labour and a greater exactitude in time-routines in any 
society; but also these changes as they were lived through in the society of nascent 
industrial capitalism. We are concerned simultaneously with time-sense in its technological 
conditioning and with time measurement as a means of labour exploitation” (ibid: 80) 
Industrial capitalism necessitated the establishment of new forms of social organisation 
to exert control that, in turn, consolidated the social form of the factory as the most 
effective means to achieve this. Later phases of technological and managerial 
innovation, moreover, represented an extension of this means to exert control, 
reproducing and extending it through increasingly sophisticated means. 
However, whilst control over workers is an integral feature of capitalism, the 
workplace, and the specific forms of production that are undertaken within it, must also 
be understood as social spaces in which its imposition does not pass uncontested. One 
limitation of Braverman’s understanding of the workplace, for example, is the reduction 
of struggles over production to minor dissatisfaction rather than concerted opposition to 
the hegemony of capital (Elger & Schwarz 1980: 361-362). Thus a conceptualisation of 
the workplace requires an understanding of the means through which control is 
mediated. Most importantly, control also requires the establishment of discipline. The 
workplace, then, is constituted by the effects, rather than simply the technologies, of 
workplace organisation and the apparatuses of production regulating production 
relations (Burawoy 1985: 7-8). Most importantly, workers are active participants in the 
workplace, reproducing their own conditions of exploitation and constructing a form of 
implied consent to the discipline imposed through the production process around 
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relations, not just of, but also in production (ibid: 10-14). The distinction, between 
relations of and relations in production, is, therefore, particularly important for 
understanding the capabilities of firms to exert control within the workplace. 
The importance of this distinction for understanding the significance of the workplace 
and production will be demonstrated in the establishment of “disciplinary 
modernisation” in Chile and Argentina. The limits upon the consolidation of traditional 
forms of control exercised through a mix of workplace techniques (paternalism, harsh 
foremen, arbitrary punishment, and dismissal) and the state enforcing political 
repression emerged by the middle of the twentieth century. This necessitated the 
introduction of disciplinary methods that were imported by TNCs, but which became 
increasingly prominent in these “national” strategies of industrialisation. Fordist and 
Taylorist production and managerial techniques transformed the workplace from the 
1950s as firms sought to impose discipline through the use of relatively modern 
technologies. Modernisation was, therefore, not a neutral advance of industrialisation, 
but was instead marked by the implantation of locally specific forms of discipline 
within the workplace. This disciplinary modernisation marked the establishment of 
distinctive relations in production determined by the local necessities of ISI. 
 
The Experience of Work and Resistance 
 
Labour process theorists have made an important contribution to understanding the 
nexus at which production comes to serve as a means of exercising control in particular 
local social spaces. However, to understand the role of workers in contesting these 
relations in and of production and, most importantly, how this role comes to be 
constituted by those relations, it is necessary to engage with workers’ experiences. 
Work and production are interrelated, but distinct, features of the workplace. Whilst 
relations in production serve to consolidate control and discipline within the workplace, 
work is the experience of these measures and, as such, is given meaning by the context 
within which it is performed. Experience is shaped not only by the direct engagement 
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with the process of production, but also by the manner in which this is mediated.3 
Resistance comes about in response to efforts by firms to disrupt prevailing relations in 
production or when those that prevail come into increasing conflict with the ability of 
workers to reproduce themselves in these other spheres of social life. The conflation of 
resistance with other aspects of workers’ mobilisations leads it to be obscured and 
misunderstood as either spontaneous or orchestrated by actors beyond the workplace. 
However, by re-situating resistance in the workplace around the grievances engendered 
by the discipline of relations in production, these experiences can be linked to the 
confrontation with strategies of firms and the state as they manifested in the workplace.  
The importance of subjective experience is particularly prominent in sociological 
approaches to work that emphasise its central role in the formation of political identity. 
Workers exist as individuals at the intersection of multiple social interactions, with 
work representing a persistent locus around which these interactions are both mediated 
and expressed (Kirk & Wall 2011: 45). These identities, “can be seen as both ‘lost and 
found’ through the individual and collective experience of labour, as well as through 
forms – genres – and traditions long engaged with narratives of work” (ibid: 74). Work 
is central inasmuch as the workplace is a crucial arena of social interaction in which 
individuals articulate their grievances. Moreover, in a reversal of contemporary trends 
that have increasingly marginalised work, this activity continues to provide these 
scholars with a locus around which the various categories constituting identity are 
expressed as “gender and class, race and age, intersect in specific workplace contexts 
and… [are] articulated through feelings and in more structural forms” (ibid: 88-89).4 In 
this view, therefore, political identities are situated in the structural antagonism 
generated around strategies of discipline and control exercised in the workplace.  
However, whilst emphasising the mediation of various facets of identity through work is 
important, there is a danger that this detaches this subjective experience, and the 
                                                          
3
 The issue of work as a distinct and subjective experience that is separate from, but intrinsically related 
to, production has been tackled at length by various critical theorists. Phoebe Moore (2010: 25-36) 
provides the most incisive overview of these debates, explaining their implications for understanding the 
contested relationship between work and political subjectivities. In starting from this important separation 
of work and production, this section will take these ideas further to explore situated political resistance 
and, in the following section, the potential and limitations for its politicisation.  
4
 Issues of race and gender are important in understanding the constitution of specific relations of 
production and how these are contested in particular local contexts. Their influence as constitutive 
factors, however, is a question that is beyond the capabilities of this thesis.   
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resistance that it engenders, from the concrete conditions of production. In an important 
critique of the causes of “workplace conflict”, Maurizio Atzeni (2010) challenges the 
limitations of a subjective approach to mobilisation. He argues that the focus on a 
subjective sense of “injustice” as its main impetus focuses on the individual, displacing 
power and exploitation with an undefinable moralism. Whilst work can be an individual 
experience interacting with the plethora of social identities, it is its privileged role 
beyond any moral claim to injustice that distinguishes it in determining workers’ 
mobilisation (Atzeni 2010: 18-19). The importance of work in engendering forms of 
resistance derives from its relationship to concrete material elements of discipline and 
control exercised within the workplace. Once these elements are reconnected, moreover, 
resistance can be understood as the outcome of the distinctive objectification of the 
worker through the specific relations in production in which they are situated. 
Thus the notion of workers as active subjects in acquiescing to their own exploitation, 
as argued by Burawoy (1985), should be taken one step further to consider how workers 
are also active in resisting the imposition of these particular relations in production. One 
important notion is Chris Smith’s (2006) “double indeterminacy of labour power” that 
permits workers to confront firms and the state. Workers are able to confront their 
exploitation based on their own structural location in the production process. They can 
challenge the strategies of firms by reducing effort or by retaining mobility across 
workplaces. Whilst firms employ strategies to ameliorate and weaken these aspects of 
indeterminacy, they always persist. Resistance conceptualised through this 
indeterminacy is also central to Beverly Silver’s (2003: 13) use of Erik Olin Wright’s 
notion of “structural power”. For Silver, this notion is translated directly into what she 
refers to as “marketplace bargaining power” and “workplace bargaining power”. 
Workers in possession of scarce skills, operating in conditions of low unemployment, or 
retaining the ability to simply leave employment and survive on nonwage income have 
significant levels of marketplace bargaining power. Workers located in strategically 
important sectors of production networks possess similarly significant levels of 
workplace bargaining power. In the perspective of this framework, therefore, the control 
established by firms is contested in the workplace due to the location of workers in 
relations of production and their experience of relations in production. 
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Mobilisations against the strategies of firms and the state, as a result, are the outcome of 
these subjective experiences of work and resistance. As such, it is the struggles in which 
workers confront employers in specific contexts that determine the possibilities for and 
outcomes of this resistance (Iñigo Carrera 2012: 18). The grievances and demands that 
give purpose to political mobilisations are constituted at the nexus of the necessarily 
limited capacity of firms to exert control and discipline from within the workplace. 
Workplace conflicts, therefore, must be recognised as both persistent due to the logic of 
prevailing social relations of production, but also dependent upon the experiences of 
social relations in production. The persistence of resistance underlies and determines the 
extent and possibility of mobilisations that are most visible in strikes and protests that 
often extend beyond the workplace. It is, therefore, the subjective experience of work 
and resistance, mediated by production, which is central to workers’ mobilisations.  
As has been argued, resistance is not derived from an individualised spontaneity, nor is 
it determined by the organised dissemination of any moral critique of that experience. 
Instead it is determined at the nexus of production and experience. Changes to the 
practices of work emerge from certain relations in production established around the use 
of new technologies and managerial practices. Whilst the production process engenders 
distinctive forms of control and discipline within the workplace, the structural location 
and subjective experiences of workers produce distinctive strategies of resistance. The 
workplace is, therefore, a space in which workers’ resistance is continually reconstituted 
as they experience, at the most direct level, their own exploitation. This is demonstrated 
moreover, by the impact of disciplinary modernisation. The resulting intensification of 
political mobilisation is typically ascribed to the context of political repression in 
Argentina or radical socialist ideas in Chile. However, as will be shown, it was the 
efforts of firms to rationalise production and implement new forms of workplace control 
that generated resistance in the workplace. In both cases, this was neither spontaneous 
nor organised from above. Instead it was the direct outcome of the imposition of 
disciplinary relations in production. Workers experienced efforts to improve 
productivity as an intensification of exploitation and, as such, contested these strategies 
of firms and the state through increasingly militant forms of political mobilisation.   
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Ideas, Institutions, and the Politicisation of Experience 
 
The relationship between resistance and subjectivity is a particular problematic aspect 
of understanding workers’ political influence. On the one hand, as “labour”, this is 
conflated as an inevitable opposition to capital, with intrinsic limits on its possible 
forms. On the other hand, as “social subjects”, subjectivity is detached and externalised 
from the workplaces within which it is constituted. Reconnecting these aspects, 
therefore, without relying on any institutional manifestation, is integral to understanding 
workers’ political influence. This section will turn to conceptualising the formation of 
political subjectivities and the process by which seemingly isolated confrontations 
between workers and firms are transformed into mobilisations beyond the workplace. 
Understanding the causes of these mobilisations has always been problematic: 
“in the early 1970s, French historian Michelle Perrot warned that when scholars refer to 
‘the spontaneity’ of strikes and other forms of working class protests, they are only 
highlighting how little they know about the workers’ consciousness and level of organizing 
because large groups of people do not suddenly decide to gather in the same spot, seeking 
the same things without prior planning” (Wolfe 2002: 258) 
To understand this “prior planning”, therefore, the conceptualisation of politicisation 
will not simply identify the role of political institutions in organising and mobilising 
workers. Instead, it will demonstrate how workers’ engagement with these institutions 
and the ideas disseminated within gave new meanings to their struggles. It is this 
engagement, moreover, which constitutes workers’ distinctive political subjectivities. 
One important means by which workers’ mobilisations have been conceptualised is 
through the notion of “associational power”, which is again taken from Erik Olin 
Wright by Beverly Silver (2003: 13-15). This is defined, most simply, as “the various 
forms of power that result from the formation of collective organization of workers”, 
derived, most strongly, from the political parties and trade unions that represent workers 
and that, typically, are constituted within the legal-institutional frameworks of the state. 
In emphasising the capacity of these political institutions to represent workers, however, 
Silver and Wright externalise the capacity for mobilisation from the workplace. As 
such, this understanding of associational power is inadvertently detached from workers’ 
attempts to realise their structural power, both in its “marketplace” and, most 
significantly, its “workplace” forms. Associational power, in their perspective, is 
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primarily derived from the capabilities of the political institutions of labour to represent 
workers and to contest the strategies of firms and the state on their behalf. 
Conceptualising the organisation of workers in this manner obfuscates the strategies of 
resistance that emerge around the processes of production. As such, although 
spontaneous protests cannot be understood without acknowledging the means by which 
it is coordinated, emergent forms of organisation also cannot be understood without the 
resistance in the workplace that gives purpose to the political institutions of labour. 
It is, therefore, the relationship between workers’ mobilisations and these institutions 
that remains most difficult to explain. As a starting point, Maurizio Atzeni (2010: 6-8) 
argues that it is necessary to rethink the meaning of the political institutions that 
ostensibly represent the influence of workers. Building on the ideas of Luxemburg, 
Trotsky, and Antonio Gramsci, he demonstrates that the political institutions of labour 
serve primarily to reinforce the control imposed within the workplace. They exist, 
primarily, to negotiate the price of labour, rather than confront the specific relations 
upon which the purchase of labour-power is based. As a result, worker mobilisation, 
cannot, and often does not, rely simply upon these institutions. In the perspective of this 
thesis, this mediation of the relations between workers and firms by the political 
institutions of labour provides just a starting point in the politicisation of workplace 
conflict. On the one hand, these institutions play an important role in the process of 
politicisation in terms of the space they create for the dissemination of political ideas. 
On the other hand, however, they impose constraints on the mobilisation that is 
generated around these ideas. Mobilisation is given meaning by the politicisation of 
which these institutions play an important role, but this meaning can only be understood 
through its continual reconstitution around experience within the workplace. 
The notion of meaning is central to conceptualising politicisation. Mobilisation is a 
process that moves from the objective conditions of production, to the subjective 
experience of work, to the objective expression of resistance, and then back to a 
subjective meaning located in the engagement between workers and the institutions that 
come to represent them. As argued by Maurizio Atzeni (2010: 106-107), it is necessary 
to reconnect the “role of agency factors within the immanency of structural conditions”. 
Taking this further, moreover, prevailing political ideas, disseminated by activists 
within and beyond these institutions, should be understood as socially produced, rather 
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than acquired or imposed (Laffey & Weldes 1997: 213). But socially produced does not 
mean that ideas derive from an intrinsic logic of capitalism. Instead it provides a means 
of conceptualising how they are re-appropriated around workplace conflict. By 
emphasising the circulation of ideas from their production, to their diffusion, to their 
“use”, it is possible to recognise their significance in the formation of political 
subjectivity (Moulian 2009: 60). This use is carried out by the activists that disseminate 
the ideas and workers that mobilise around them. Politicisation is determined, therefore, 
at the nexus whereby ideas give meaning to workers’ experience and whereby workers’ 
experience transforms this meaning as it imbues it with political purpose. 
This dynamic between mobilisation and the politicisation of resistance through the 
reinterpretation and re-appropriation of ideas will be shown to have been highly 
significant in the “radicalisation” of workers’ protests in response to disciplinary 
modernisation in Chile and Argentina. In both cases, the political institutions of labour 
took on a dual role of creating the necessary conditions for the extension of resistance 
beyond the workplace and imposing constraints upon how far this could go.5 In Chile, 
these institutions were vital in the dissemination of radical socialist ideas amongst 
workers in the textile sector. These ideas, moreover, were given new meaning in the 
experiences of new disciplinary relations in production. For example, workers with 
relatively little experience of organisation constituted the most militant fractions of 
mobilisations that occurred throughout to the 1970s, giving renewed meaning to the 
ideas disseminated by political activists. In Argentina, the radical politicisation of 
resistance occurred with the weakening of the political institutions of labour in the 
metalworking and automobile sectors. However, the radical ideas that took hold were 
also re-interpreted in the prevailing political context of Argentina. For example, workers 
retained their loyalty to Peronism, infusing both the radical Left and this prevailing idea 
with new meaning in the context of intensifying workplace conflict. The politicisation 
of resistance, therefore, was not the result of the increasing prominence of political 
institutions of labour, of political activists, or of radical ideas. Instead, it will be shown 
                                                          
5
 This notion has been expressed in historical descriptions of the role of trade unions in Argentina during 
the 1950s and 1960s. The so-called “dual role”, in which the political institutions of labour came to both 
organise and mediate the actions of the workers, is most visible after 1955 (Munck et al 1987: 149-152). 
However, where this thesis goes further is in arguing that this is an intrinsic feature of the political 
institutions of labour in their structural location as bargaining agents for the price of labour. Whilst they 
are clearly significant in co-ordinating organised protest, they come to impose varying levels of 
constraints on this action, as will be discussed at length in later sections of this chapter.  
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that it was the engagement between these factors and resistance, linked to production 
and experiences of work, which determined the radical politicisation of resistance and 
the formation and mobilisation of radical political subjectivities of the working class. 
 
Class Formation: Work, Resistance, and Subjectivity 
 
Reconnecting work, resistance, and subjectivity has been shown to be the central 
problem for conceptualising the political influence of workers over ISI. By building a 
series of determinations from the imposition of discipline and control imposed through 
production, to the experience of work and resistance, to the formation of political 
subjectivity, this chapter provides a starting point for understanding the political 
influence of workers. Changes to production engendered distinctive experiences of 
work that in turn give rise to expressions of resistance. This resistance was politicised 
through an engagement with political institutions and ideas that gave it meaning within 
and beyond the workplace, a process that in turn reconstituted the very meaning of these 
ideas. Around this dialectical process, as a result, workers came together collectively to 
determine the outcome of changes in relations in production within their own workplace 
and the wider politics of industrialisation. This section, therefore, will seek to 
conceptualise how, and with what effect, workers came to constitute distinctive working 
classes against which the strategies of firms and the state came to be mobilised. 
Beginning with the seminal work of E P Thompson (1980), class formation will be 
understood as a deeply contested process, with necessarily distinct outcomes. From this 
perspective, the making of a working class emerges from both the objective conditions 
that locate workers within particular contexts and those experiences from which their 
subjectivities are constructed. For example, in his study of the English working class in 
the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, Thompson shows that the 
“catastrophic” effects of the Industrial Revolution were felt through political repression 
and “intensified exploitation, greater insecurity, and increasing human misery” 
(Thompson 1980: 217-231). Yet he argues that objective immiseration and exploitation 
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could not determine the formation of a class conscious of its interests and able to pursue 
them. Instead, these subjective aspects are constituted historically and socially: 
“the changing productive relations and working conditions of the Industrial 
Revolution were imposed, not upon raw material, but upon the free-born 
Englishman – and the free-born Englishman as Paine had left him or as the 
Methodists had moulded him” (ibid: 213)   
“rural memories were fed into the urban working-class culture through innumerable 
personal experiences… the urban worker made articulate the hatred for the ‘landed 
aristocrat’ which perhaps his grandfather had held in secret” (ibid: 253-254) 
For English workers, then, lived experience was a mediator between their social being 
in the workplace and their social consciousness as it was manifested in distinctive forms 
(Wood 1995: 96). As such, the English working class is not understood merely as 
influential in contesting the changes in the workplace, but rather as influential in 
generating political subjectivities that determined the conflicts in which it was engaged. 
One important contribution that takes this understanding of the working class further, in 
its formation and its confrontations with the strategies of firms and the state, is Michael 
Lebowitz (2003). For Lebowitz, there are two important aspects that lead to the 
formation of a working class: the process whereby capital mediates the “social product” 
and the social construction of “needs”. First, he argues capitalist production is 
constituted by two tendencies around the social productivity of labour. On the one hand, 
as production has expanded throughout history there has been a trend towards its 
increased combination. On the other hand, there is a counter-tendency, whereby firms 
mediate and control this through fragmentation. This fragmentation separates social 
productivity into discrete, competitive units, facilitating the exploitation of labour. 
Control, then, derives from the obfuscation of the former with the latter, mystifying the 
social product as a dependence upon ostensibly discrete social spaces that are controlled 
by firms (Lebowitz 1992: 70-80). As a result, firms’ control over the production process 
manifests the illusion of permanency in spite of, as has been demonstrated so far, their 
continual need to exert that control through the production process itself. Workers, in 
contrast, are objectified as productive inputs rather than active participants.  
It is this active participation in the process of production, however, concealed by its 
mystification and the continual fragmentation of production across networks and within 
the workplace itself, which provides a means to comprehend the formation of the 
working class. Lebowitz argues that it is essential to explore the potential power of 
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combination unmediated by this control (ibid: 82). Social productivity allows workers 
to mobilise not only their productive powers, but also to contest the strategies of firms 
and the state. This process is perhaps most adequately captured in Marx’s concept of 
Vergesellschaftung, which is more accurately translated as “societisation” rather than 
socialisation.6 This process has two effects: (1) it leads to the construction of a 
collective space for transformation and creation and (2) it allows for the 
instrumentalisation of work to meet the needs of those who control it (Castillo 2009: 
18). Societisation, as such, offers something different than socialisation. Whilst the 
latter implies the incorporation of workers into pre-existing social formations, the 
former implies the formation, through collective experiences of work, resistance, and 
subjectivity, of particular forms of “society” constituted by workers themselves.  
Second, to explain workers’ political influence over this societisation, Lebowitz turns to 
a dynamic conception of “needs”. He begins with the uncontroversial notion that 
workers’ needs are socially constructed. They are not simply the necessary means for 
survival, but are continually reconstituted around the expansive logic of capitalism 
(Lebowitz 2003: 41-44). Put simply, the more that is produced, the more that is deemed 
socially necessary. To take this one step further, the specific context of production, 
combined with the subjective factors that shape the extent to which these needs are seen 
to be met, leads to the formation of specific grievances. Lebowitz’s most important 
contribution to this debate is his reversal of the cause of conflicts derived from these 
grievances. It is not, he argues, the needs of firms that come up against the barriers of 
worker’s capacities to consume. Rather, it is workers’ needs to “reabsorb those alien 
and independent products of their own activity… [and] struggles to find time and 
energy for themselves” that come up against “the barriers created by capital” (ibid: 
204). As such, these needs constitute the demands of distinctive working classes 
seeking to overcome constraints imposed upon them by the strategies of firms and the 
state, in a process whereby they then determine outcomes of the strategies themselves. 
This formation of distinctive working classes was crucial to the establishment and 
breakdown of disciplinary modernisation in Chile and Argentina. As will be shown in 
this thesis, in seeking to overcome the barriers imposed through these new forms of 
workplace organisation and concomitant wage and social policies, workers determined 
                                                          
6
 Thanks to Kees van der Pijl for this definition/translation. 
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the strategies of firms and the state. Efforts to impose “rationalisation” and 
“stabilisation” were directly targeted at undermining the emergent combination of 
workers within increasingly advanced social spaces of production. As resistance and 
mobilisation spread beyond the workplace, workers transformed strategies aimed at 
expanding control through new production processes. In Chile, opposition to 
disciplinary modernisation and the growing cohesiveness of the working class led to 
increasingly reformist political strategies that offered concessions whilst attempting to 
deepen these disciplinary relations in production. In Argentina, the result was the 
intensification, under the auspices of authoritarian military government, of these 
strategies and a concerted assault on the political institutions of labour and the working 
class itself. In both cases, however, workers’ efforts to overcome the barriers imposed 
upon them led to the formation of distinctive working classes against which firms and 
the state had to construct their strategies of disciplinary modernisation under ISI. 
 
Autonomy and the Political Subject of the Working Class 
 
To understand the formation of these distinctive working classes, therefore, and to 
situate their political influence as central to the constitution of ISI, it is not enough to 
simply identify the existence of these conflicts on a “vertical axis”. The formation of 
this influence must, instead, also be understood around a “horizontal” axis that, most 
significantly, exists due to the persistence of workers’ political autonomy. By turning to 
the potential of the working class to act not just within, but also beyond capitalist social 
relations of and in production, this conceptualisation highlights the creative, rather than 
disruptive, elements of workers’ confrontations with changes imposed upon them. Marx 
made clear that the final contradiction – or Hegelian Limit – capitalism would face 
would come the workers who would become its “grave-diggers” (Lebowitz 2003: 12-
15). Yet to date, this has not occurred. The lack of correspondence between theory and 
reality necessitates, as such, under Marx’s own dialectical logic, the extension of efforts 
to understand the working class, its failures, and any remaining potential for it to fulfil 
this role (ibid: 26). Building on the prior conceptualisation of class formation, this 
section will locate this potential in the persistence of working class political autonomy.  
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To understand the trajectories of ISI, this thesis will situate workplace conflict at the 
core of its unfolding. It will make the central claim that the working class constitutes an 
integral and necessarily creative political subject. As is argued by Michael Lebowitz, it 
is precisely this “inimical mutual opposition… which drives capitalism along its 
specific trajectory” (Lebowitz 1992: 106). Yet this does not mean that it is only at the 
vertical axis that these struggles have significance. Instead, for Lebowitz and for the 
framework of this thesis, working class struggle has a deeper meaning. Workplace 
conflict is central to the distinctive political subjectivities of the working class and the 
extent their mobilisations. Struggle transforms the meaning of specific historical 
conflicts, engendering the transformation of active and autonomous political subjects 
both within and against capitalism (ibid: 143-149). As such, the politics of production 
and of industrialisation must begin by recognising the existence of workers beyond the 
strategies of firms and the state, the relations in and of production that are imposed upon 
them, and the political institutions of labour. Class struggle can then be understood as 
not only constituting distinctive forms of capitalism along a vertical axis, but as also 
transforming the working class along a horizontal axis into distinctive political subjects. 
The notion of working class autonomy has been most strongly associated with the ideas 
of operaismo, an academic and political approach that has seen sustained critique in the 
wake of its short-lived rise during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Steve Wright (2002), 
however, offers a fascinating and balanced account of this approach as it emerged out of 
factory-based workers’ movements in Italy in this period. He argues that, despite its 
flaws, the approach made an invaluable contribution to the study of working class 
politics that helped to “force attention towards an exploration of the inherently 
contradictory experiences of workers, whether waged or otherwise, and from this to the 
terms upon which their struggle to turn such contradictions against the capital relation 
become feasible” (Wright 2002: 226). As such, reclaiming the importance of working 
class autonomy has become increasingly central to scholars exploring the revolutionary 
potential of the working class and its limitations. Maurizio Atzeni (2010: 27-31), for 
example, makes an important contribution through his conceptualisation of “solidarity”. 
Solidarity, in his perspective, is not a function of political leadership, but a pre-existing 
condition of the workplace to which workers “simply have a living encounter”.  
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Perhaps the most significant implication of this focus on autonomy has already been 
touched upon in the outlining of earlier determinations of the working class and its 
political subjectivity. The constraining influence of the political institutions of labour 
has already been discussed, but the framing of this problem around political autonomy 
allows for a rethinking of the potential emergence of political institutions of the working 
class. Maurizio Atzeni (2010: 8-11) highlights Gramsci’s reference to factory-councils 
as offering the possibility of transcending limits on workplace representation and the 
potential to confront firms’ strategies of control. Institutions such as these, in the 
perspective of this thesis, are organically-linked to the determinations of production, 
work, resistance, subjectivity, and the historical process of class formation. They 
represent the interests of workers and have their purpose defined by the struggles 
generated in and around the workplace, but, unlike the political institutions of labour, 
they are continually reconstituted in response to the autonomous political subjects of the 
working class. Workers’ political autonomy, moreover, does not simply manifest itself 
in these political institutions of the working class, but gives them new meaning in 
confrontations against the constraints imposed on workers themselves. Political 
autonomy and the potential formation of these political institutions of the working class, 
therefore, are integral to rethinking the possibilities of working class political influence.  
This emphasis on autonomy and the formation of political institutions of the working 
class offers important insights into the breakdown of ISI in Chile and Argentina. 
Moreover, it can help explain why, despite the upsurge in radicalised forms of 
mobilisation and political organisation, there was, to differing degrees, a failure to 
develop a revolutionary trajectory of industrialisation. In Chile, the autonomy of the 
working class was the main reason for the nascent establishment of coherent forms of 
political organisation that could rightly be considered, in the perspective of this 
argument, political institutions of the working class. From the long history of struggles 
within the workplace and through the limited forms of representation that allowed firms 
to consolidate fragmented forms of representation, workers were mobilised, in the 
distinctive political context of the 1970s, to concerted efforts to overcome the limits 
imposed upon them. Direct confrontation intensified and, with ongoing politicisation 
through the engagement of radical ideas and experiences of work and resistance, the 
revolutionary potential of the working class began to pose a threat that could only be 
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overcome through violence. In Argentina, workers’ autonomy was increasingly 
constrained by the powerful political institutions of labour whose engagement with 
firms and the state had initially brought about some material gains. By the 1960s, the 
limits of these institutions, however, became increasingly apparent. Workers, engaging 
with the radical political ideas that had persisted within and around these institutions, 
began to experience their resurgent autonomy thereby reconstituting resistance in the 
workplace and mobilisations beyond it. However, beyond a few relatively isolated 
incidents, these did not lead to the establishment of political institutions of the working 
class. Their revolutionary potential was, instead, constrained beneath the fragmentation 
of the working class in the workplace and beyond it in a spiralling of violent conflict.  
 
Producing the Working Class: Implications for Research 
 
It is this combination of conceptual factors and historical processes that provide the 
foundations for understanding how, and in what ways, workers determined the 
trajectories of ISI in Chile and Argentina. Determination is used in this thesis in three 
senses. First, it is used to mean that the strategies of firms and the state, both in their 
formulation and their eventual outcome, responded to the real and potential threat posed 
by the political subject of the working class. Second, this is based on the notion that the 
workplace was the crucial nexus at which engagements between workers, firms, and the 
state occurred and, unlike in the institutional spheres of policymaking, that workers had 
here a significant influence over the decisions that were taken. Third, it implies a 
necessarily creative role for the working class. As argued by Lebowitz (2003), the 
working class must seek to overcome the limits that firms and the state impose upon the 
realisation of its aims and goals. Workers, in this sense, determine the trajectories of 
industrialisation not through disrupting the plans of other actors, but by pursuing their 
own strategies against the interests of those that seek to dominate and exploit them. This 
determination is a non-deterministic ontological claim as to workers’ political influence, 
reconceptualising this as being rooted in the creative potential of workplace conflict, but 
also recognising the pervasive constraints on the working class as a political subject. 
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This methodological framework that I have developed is a starting point for overcoming 
the immense and continuing difficulties for conceptualising this profound political 
influence of the working class. It explicitly seeks to move beyond the limits of 
understandings the working class as one “interest group” amongst many competing for 
material gains within shifting social formations, as “labour” structurally determined by 
its location in the social relations of capitalism or manifested solely by the political 
institutions that represent it, or simply as a collection of “social subjects”. It refocuses 
on the workers themselves, but in their collective mobilisations as a working class. 
Notions of material interest, structural determination, institutional manifestation, and 
individual subjectivity, therefore, are mediated by relations in production, experiences 
of work and resistance, political subjectivities, class formation, and, most significantly, 
the potential that is derived from the political autonomy of the working class.  
The workplace, as such, provides an integral starting point for understanding the 
conflicts that determined the decisions of firms and the state. Firms had to engage with 
workers as the direct producers of their products within the workplace. They had to 
impose discipline and control over the working class and this control entailed the 
implementation of diverse measures that transformed production and work. These 
changed the perception of wage increases and declines, influenced the degree of internal 
tension between foremen and workers, and created direct tensions between the demands 
of workers and the stated aims of firms. The state, moreover, had to mediate between 
these conflicting actors through policy. Workplace regulation, technological investment, 
forms of organisation, working hours, and wage agreements were all the responsibility 
of the state to reduce workplace conflict and, in the majority of instances, to reproduce 
discipline and control. As a result, the politics of industrialisation are, in the perspective 
of this thesis, indistinguishable from the politics of production in the workplace. 
The outcome of these conflicts for ISI in Chile and Argentina, therefore, were the locus 
for growing political tensions around the increasingly prominent role of the state and the 
competitive strategies of firms. From the imposition of discipline and control in the 
social spaces of textile, metalworking, and automobile production, concrete changes in 
the experience of work and the concomitant resistance it produced were politicised in 
the formation of collective subjectivities. At key moments, workers mobilised 
collectively as a class from within, but also beyond, the workplace, contesting the 
  42 
 
 
 
 
implementation of these changes in production processes, industrial structures, and 
economic policy. In engaging in these conflicts, moreover, workers themselves were 
transformed. Their political autonomy determined not just the outcome of these 
workplace conflicts, but also their own formation as political subjects. Workplace 
conflicts, as a result, constituted the emergence, consolidation, and breakdown of ISI 
around concrete manifestations of resistance and subjectivity that forced firms, the state, 
and the working class into direct confrontation in the workplace and beyond. It is from 
this effort to bring workers back in that these empirical cases will now be explored.  
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Chapter 2 
Beyond and Beneath the “Compromise State” in Chile 
 
At first glance, the experiences of ISI in Chile between 1930 and 1973 present a 
potential contradiction to the cautionary tale that sustains much of the condemnation of 
this period in Latin America. First, copper mining was a vital source of foreign 
exchange that allowed the state to subsidise imports of machinery and intermediate 
goods and, despite generating some tensions over sale price and foreign ownership, 
gave successive governments regular “windfall profits” for domestic spending (Collier 
& Sater 1996: 268-269). Second, the Chilean political system displayed high levels of 
institutional stability, with little or no military intervention, a functioning multiparty 
electoral system that produced incremental rather than radical change, and a strong 
commitment to constitutional democracy around the “Compromise State” (Sigmund 
1977: 3-14; Sheahan 1987: 205). Third, economic institutions, such as CORFO, were 
established as the archetype of technocratic, independent development organisations to 
be led by technical experts around a clearly stated “development mission” (Nelson 
2007: 158). Yet, by the 1970s, tensions were established around each of these 
institutional aspects and Chile had fallen into the familiar situation of deepening 
stagnation, rising inflation, and political conflict that typified the breakdown of ISI. 
The Chilean experience, therefore, should be understood as determined by a “double 
crisis” beyond and beneath the ostensible stability of the Compromise State, 
characterised by, on the one hand, the intensification of workplace conflict and, on the 
other hand, the persistence of low domestic demand. To understand the trajectory of this 
crisis, the role of the workplace and influence of the working class is central, inasmuch 
as limited concessions to wages and political organisation only exacerbated its 
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underlying causes. Earlier research on workers has focused on the political institutions 
of labour and their development as limited, fragmented, but politicised forms of 
workplace representation (Angell 1972; Barria 1971; Barrera 1972; Pizarro 1986; 
Zapata 1986). Recent research, moreover, has identified the significance of the workers 
themselves, highlighting the centrality of workplace conflict in important leading 
sectors of textiles, copper mining, and metalworking (Winn 1986; Klubock Miller 1998; 
Vergara 2008; Stillerman forthcoming). Moving from the ostensible stability of the 
institutions of the state to the conflictive relations between workers, firms, and the state 
during ISI is an important starting point. However, further efforts must be made to 
understand how workers determined the outcome of ISI beyond both the political 
institutions that represented them and their role as individuals within the workplace. 
The chapter will argue that, despite the institutional weaknesses of their representation, 
intensifying workplace grievances, radical socialist ideas, and high levels of political 
autonomy brought Chilean workers’ influence over the trajectory of ISI to the fore. In 
the initial period of rapid expansion during the 1930s, workers mobilised despite new 
legal constraints over organisation. These mobilisations engendered the progressive 
strategies of ISI backed by the state, domestic firms, and the political institutions of 
labour. As a result, however, workplace conflicts entered a period of pacification that 
allowed for a resurgent alliance between firms and the state to re-exert their control 
within and beyond the workplace. Many of the progressive measures were then 
reversed, which led, in turn, to new workplace conflicts. This engendered the beginning 
of a period of radicalisation. Starting in the 1950s and intensifying in the 1960s, 
workers challenged the constraints of the ostensibly stable Chilean political and 
institutional system, bringing the underlying confrontation that pervaded the trajectory 
of ISI to the fore around the consolidation of a radical and autonomous working class. 
The breakdown of the 1970s, therefore, was the outcome of these latent and unresolved 
tensions created in the workplace, not of the intrinsic contradictions of Chilean ISI. 
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From Export-Linked Industry to the Consolidation of ISI 
 
This section will explore the early emergence of industrial manufacturing, highlighting 
the unexpected outcomes linked to external crises, the changing role of the state, and 
efforts to pacify workers whose mobilisations had begun to pose a problem for domestic 
and international firms. Following the Depression, overall output saw a startling level of 
stability in contrast to the precipitous declines faced by leading commodity export 
sectors of copper and nitrates. As a result, relative employment levels rose dramatically, 
thus constituting a new locus of conflict. New political institutions of labour were 
established leading, eventually, to the electoral victory of a progressive coalition backed 
by workers and the political parties of the Left. This marked an important turning point 
for industrial manufacturing, institutionalising disjointed state support and giving 
workers a direct influence over policy. However, as this political influence was 
consolidated, workers’ earlier militancy declined, allowing a new political coalition 
supported by domestic firms to regain control of the growing state apparatus. 
 
External Crisis and the Institutionalisation of Industrial Manufacturing 
Industrialisation in Chile began prior to the emergence of ISI in the 1930s, with early 
manufacturing production establishing nascent linkages and a trajectory of growth 
independent of the leading export sectors. External crises were, alongside domestic 
political changes, central to the intensification of workplace conflict. As this conflict 
increased around rising levels of employment, political and institutional constraints that 
had been imposed over the working class became increasingly ineffective. The result 
was a radicalisation that was consolidated, rather than created, in the crises of the 1930s. 
Increasing output in industrial manufacturing, supported by the state, but oriented, in the 
main, around orthodox fiscal measures meant rapid industrial growth in the 1930s was 
accompanied by rising levels of discontent. Moreover, attempts to re-establish 
conservative policies that had previously fragmented the political institutions of labour 
inadvertently allowed for a surge in radical forms of mobilisation and the establishment 
of a new trade union federation. The result, as such, was the beginning of a double crisis 
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around measures that were characterised by a failure to address emerging workplace 
conflicts or the constraints imposed by the continuities of manufacturing growth. 
The effects of international conflict at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the 
twentieth centuries encouraged significant increases in manufacturing output in Chile. 
In particular, after 1914, limits on international trade and a high degree of import 
substitution meant the sector was gradually established as an independent “engine of 
growth” (Palma 2000a: 44 & 63). As it expanded, conservative governments imposed 
restrictions that sought to limit the concomitant growth of workplace conflicts. Original 
legislation for a new Labour Code in 1924 stated unions could be established only in 
firms with over twenty five workers, if 55 per cent agreed, and that federations could be 
created, but only with limited political objectives. Initially, these measures were an 
effective tool for control, creating a fragmented bargaining system and producing a 
decline in strikes until 1931 (Angell 1969: 39-40; Pizarro 1986: 93-96; Roddick 1989: 
201). Worker militancy, however, persisted. In 1925, for example, over 204 000 
workers were affiliated to illegal federations, in the Communist Party (PC)-backed 
Chilean Workers’ Federation (FOCH) or, to a lesser degree, the anarchist International 
Workers of the World (IWW). Also, there were five national general strikes and one 
hundred and fifteen general strikes in various sectors of the economy (Vitale 2011: 
238). The persistence of this militancy, therefore, meant further growth would have to 
resolve a deepening confrontation between the state, firms, and the working class.  
The most immediate impact of the Depression, however, was to consolidate and give 
new meaning to this confrontation. The crisis isolated the economy from international 
trade, which allowed the independent manufacturing sector to grow even more rapidly. 
Increasingly supported by policies placing restrictions on imports through high tariffs, 
exchange controls, and currency devaluations, by 1934, it had already returned to pre-
1929 output levels (Ortega et al 1989: 13-16). Moreover, whilst measures were not yet 
systematic, they were significant in consolidating the growing prominence of domestic 
industrial manufacturing and exacerbating the emergent “export pessimism” (Palma 
2000b: 223). Responding to the new space this created for alternative policy solutions, 
the Socialist Republic in 1932 implemented measures supporting workers and called for 
the “socialisation of all industry” (Vitale 2011: 254-256 & 260-261; Thomas 1964: 208-
209 & 216-219). Workers’ organisations, such as Revolutionary Committees, the 
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United Proletarian Front, and the Revolutionary Alliance, which included the FOCH, 
the PC and a variety of student organisations, strongly backed these measures (Vitale 
2011: 260-261). By offering practical policy solutions to the crisis, such an experience 
legitimised the political ideas of the Left and consolidated their links with the working 
class (Moulian 2009: 26; Angell 1969: 55; Palma 2000a: 45). Rapid growth and this 
growing prominence of radical ideas, therefore, gave new meaning to the deepening 
workplace conflicts and to the growing political influence of workers. 
In response, to resolve these tensions and undermine workers’ emergent influence, the 
brief interregnum of a military-backed government of the Left was brought to an end. 
Arturo Alessandri (1932-1938) utilised heterodox policy measures combining deficit 
spending, public works, and state-subsidised loans and tariffs with orthodox fiscal 
measures, little or no favourable discrimination towards industry, and no commitment to 
public enterprise (Palma 2000a: 58; Silva 2007: 72; Hirschman 1963: 180-181). Due to, 
and in spite of, these measures, Chile became one of the most industrialised countries in 
Latin America. It produced, by 1934, 90 per cent of its own consumer goods and, by 
1935, over 70 per cent of its durable and capital goods (see Table 1; Love 2005: 115). 
Industrial employment also increased, rising between 1927 and 1937 from 82 494 to 
151 157, with a growing number of firms employing over 100 workers (Garcés 1985: 
24-25). This led, however, to the consolidation of workplace conflict. Following earlier 
crises, workers with a “popular memory” of the “traditions of the unions of the militant 
nitrate miners” and a powerful sense of “class militancy” had moved from nitrate to 
copper mining sectors (Klubock Miller 1998: 85-87). It is not unlikely that a similar 
process occurred in migration to the industrial cities like Santiago. Significantly, it 
would be remarked upon by participants in the upheavals of the 1970s that workers had 
arrived with a “deep and entrenched sense of class” (Edmundo Jiles in Gaudichaud 
2004: 261). Rather than resolve tensions, the rapid growth in the 1930s brought the 
confrontation between workers, firms, and the state in manufacturing firmly to the fore. 
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Table 1: GDP and Manufacturing, Chile, 1929-1938 (data accessed from MOxLAD Database) 
Year 
Real GDP 
(Millions 1970 
Chilean 
Escudos) 
Constant 
Manufacturing Value-
Added (Millions 1970 
Chilean Escudos) 
Share of Constant 
Manufacturing Value-Added 
to Real GDP (%) 
1929 26 103 3 411 13.1 
1930 21 924 3 422 15.6 
1931 17 272 2 538 14.7 
1932 14 594 2 900 19.9 
1933 17 984 3 193 17.8 
1934 21 711 3 480 16.0 
1935 22 960 4 002 17.4 
1936 24 089 4 100 17.0 
1937 27 389 4 298 15.7 
1938 27 704 3 869 14.0 
 
Harsh repression under Alessandri in the early part of the 1930s, combined with the 
institutional limits placed on workers through the Labour Code, meant the number of 
strikes was relatively low. Yet they did continue, with illegal strikes exceeding those 
permitted by law (see Table 2). Moreover, there was a sharp rise in the formation of the 
political institutions permitted under the Labour Code, as well as an even sharper rise in 
participation between 1932 and 1938 (see Table 3; Barrera 1972: 12-22). The outcome 
of this growing participation in the political institutions of labour, moreover, was the 
establishment of the Chilean Workers’ Confederation (CTCH) in December 1936 
(Pizarro 1986: 101-102). Its organisational model was wide-ranging, incorporating 
workers from across the major economic sectors, with a strong emphasis on wider 
social, economic, and political problems (ibid: 112-116). The formation of the CTCH 
marked an important transition whereby, despite the importance of the railway workers’ 
strikes in January 1935 and February 1936, urban industrial workers were mobilising in 
increasing numbers (Garcés 1985). As such, these events were the consolidation of 
confrontations within and around ISI, as the attempted conservative restoration, rather 
than pacify workers’ struggles, only created the space to politicise them further. 
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Table 2: Legal and Illegal Strikes, Chile, 1932-1938 (adapted from Garcés 1985: 74-75) 
Year 
Legal Illegal 
No. of Strikes No. of Participants No. of Strikes No. of Participants 
1932 3 500 (approx.) 3 100 (approx.) 
1933 7 648 3 100 
1934 2 100 11 3 000 
1935 10 1 197 20 4 236 
1936 4 4 781 16 2 977 
1937 4 460 17 2 569 
1938 6 7 954 9 3 419 
Total 36 15 640 79 16 401 
 
Table 3: Industrial Unions, Chile, 1932-1938 (adapted from Barrera 1972: 12) 
Year No. of Unions Total Members Average Membership  
1932 168 29 442 175 
1933 243 39 802 164 
1934 266 42 617 160 
1935 255 47 442 186 
1936 275 51 185 186 
1937 316 69 113 219 
1938 333 78 989 237 
 
The early establishment of ISI, therefore, was not an inadvertent outcome of 
complementary forms of heterodoxy, but rather a deliberate attempt to confront the 
radical conflicts consolidated around the Depression. Efforts to re-establish conservative 
policies were a clear failure. Whilst domestic manufacturing output grew dramatically, 
leading to production of a significant proportion of domestic consumer and capital 
goods by the middle of the 1930s, little was done to address the grievances of the 
equally rapidly increasing number of industrial workers. As mobilisations increased, 
two important events highlighted the consolidation of this new locus of conflict. Radical 
mobilisations in 1936 and the establishment of the CTCH beyond the institutional limits 
imposed by the state highlighted the growing political influence of the working class. 
Attempts to marginalise workers, then, resulted in the consolidation of struggles that, in 
turn, created the conditions for the brief progressive turn in ISI led by the Popular Front. 
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The Limits of Institutional Stability and the Recapturing of the Apparatus of the State 
The establishment of a progressive trajectory of ISI was the direct result of the 
consolidation of worker militancy around the Depression, the rising levels of conflict 
this engendered between workers, firms, and the state, and the establishment of a new 
coalition between the state and the political institutions of labour. Under the Popular 
Front, direct state intervention and redistribution increased, meaning that manufacturing 
output and wages rose. However, the beginnings of the double crisis became 
increasingly apparent. The consolidation of ISI around small production establishments 
limited the potential for growth, the extent of workers’ political organisation, and wage 
increases that could bolster domestic demand. The pacification of the working class 
behind this ostensibly progressive trajectory, moreover, allowed for the consolidation of 
these limits through increasing levels of repression within and beyond the workplace. 
Wages, once again, were squeezed to make up for inefficiencies throughout the 
manufacturing sector and tensions within the political institutions of labour were 
exacerbated to undermine the emergent political influence of the working class.  
The electoral victory of Pedro Aguirre Cerda (1938-1941) and the Popular Front led to a 
dramatic increase in state involvement, represented by the establishment of the 
Production Development Corporation (CORFO) in 1939, increased subsidies, tariffs and 
quotas, multiple exchange rates, expanded social provision, and the direct stimulation of 
internal demand (Salazar & Pinto 2010a: 37). Moreover, the contribution of the CTCH 
and workers’ mobilisations to the establishment of these measures was crucial, with 
policy proposals between 1938 and 1941 closely linked to workers’ demands (Milos 
2008: 49, 265-266 & 285). The Popular Front thus sought to resolve growing conflict 
with redistribution, with a reorientation of economic priorities by taking leadership over 
specific projects rather than mediating the interests of firms, and by including 
representatives from the CTCH in economic institutions like CORFO (Moulian 2009: 
31; Ortega et al 1989: 56-63). In response, manufacturing grew significantly as a 
proportion of GDP and there was an important increase in real wages for industrial 
manufacturing workers (see Table 4; see Table 5). These outcomes, then, attempted to 
positively resolve tensions, reflecting the growing political influence of workers. 
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Table 4: GDP and Manufacturing, Chile, 1938-1948 (data accessed from MOxLAD Database) 
Year 
Real GDP 
(Millions 1970 
Chilean 
Escudos) 
Constant Manufacturing 
Value-Added (Millions 
1970 Chilean Escudos) 
Share of Constant 
Manufacturing Value-
Added to Real GDP (%) 
1938 27 704 3 869 14.0 
1939 28 286 4 397 15.5 
1940 29 419 4 882 16.6 
1941 29 086 5 794 20.0 
1942 30 436 6 361 20.1 
1943 31 305 6 434 20.6 
1944 31 896 6 650 20.8 
1945 34 652 7 619 22.0 
1946 37 619 7 416 19.7 
1947 33 559 7 342 21.9 
1948 39 142 8 445 21.6 
 
Table 5: Average Annual Real Wages per Worker, Chile, 1940-1952 (adapted from Mamalakis 
1980: 315) 
Year 
Average Annual Real Wages per Worker (1940 Chilean Pesos) 
Agriculture Mining Industry Construction Government All Sectors Average 
1940 3 422 9 024 4 451 4 115 4 235 4 353 
1941 3 344 9 020 4 668 4 151 4 159 4 348 
1942 2 730 8 434 4 440 4 598 3 780 3 904 
1943 2 986 8 324 4 659 3 762 3 773 3 958 
1944 3 279 8 233 4 847 4 000 4 268 4 093 
1945 3 058 9 505 5 358 4 281 4 429 4 347 
1946 3 496 7 856 5 211 4 222 4 466 4 354 
1947 2 884 7 530 4 873 3 976 3 796 5 872 
1948 2 847 9 073 5 090 4 074 4 218 4 107 
 
The outcome of these changes, however, was the consolidation of the double crisis. 
Despite the expansion of manufacturing, its decline in 1946 and 1947 offered signs of 
its fragility (see Table 4). Relatively high growth rates, averaging around 8 per cent 
throughout the 1940s, were premised on the proliferation of small establishments, 
adaptive engineering, and high levels of vertical integration. On the one hand, this 
lessened external dependence on technology, allowed for a new “industrial culture” to 
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develop, created forward and backward linkages, and permitted the accumulation of 
“human capital” (Ffrench-Davis et al 2000: 114-118). On the other hand, it consolidated 
structural constraints. Adaptive engineering and vertical integration consolidated earlier 
inefficiencies and the proliferation of networks of small, labour-intensive 
establishments around a few large, vertically-integrated firms exacerbated the limits on 
increasing domestic demand. Wages were linked to the size of establishments, as only 
workers in larger firms could obtain political representation, but here they continually 
came up against a dramatic imbalance in bargaining power (Angell 1969: 44). 
Progressive growth in manufacturing thus did not resolve the double crisis, instead 
restricting domestic demand and increasing the concomitant militancy of workers.  
In response, the Radical Party governments of the 1940s, led first by Juan Antonio Ríos 
(1942-1946) and then by Gabriel González Videla (1946-1952), began to reverse some 
of the progressive elements that had consolidated these emergent tensions, on terms that 
were far better-suited to firms (Vitale 2011: 553-554). In the early 1940s, workers had 
finally gained their seat at the political table, but in doing so had lost the power of their 
early militancy. In particular, the combative tendencies of the CTCH were eroded. 
Bernardo Ibáñez, then-head of the CTCH, praised the idea of general strikes in 1940, 
but also described the Popular Front as the “government of the people” to be defended. 
Moreover, as progressive measures were reversed after 1941, ties that had been 
established between the political institutions of labour and the state were an increasing 
constraint on the capacity to mobilise (Pizarro 1986: 119-120). As a result, these years 
saw renewed political repression and a decline of real wages for industrial workers, 
particularly between 1946 and 1947 (Sandoral 1945: 16-17; see Table 5). State 
strategies, as such, sought to repress rather than resolve the tensions emerging around 
the structural inefficiencies of industrial manufacturing. Yet as they came up against the 
militancy of the working class, which still demonstrably persisted beyond the 
constraints of the political institutions of labour, they only exacerbated these tensions.  
The most important effect of the three years of the Popular Front, therefore, was a 
consolidation of the political influence of workers and the political institutions of labour 
around “legal unionism in urban areas… with all its paradoxical preservation of the 
spirit of a political movement in the new anti-political form” (Roddick 1989: 214). It 
was such an actor that now had to be confronted. Statistics on the occurrence of strikes 
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vary significantly during this period. One estimate of legal strikes between 1938 and 
1945 records a total of 164 across the country, peaking in 1941 with 25 (Barrera 1972: 
101). A contemporary estimate from a leading Communist in the CTCH, however, 
claimed there were 2 843 “collective conflicts” between 1943 and 1945 alone (Araya 
1946: 9). Another estimate of legal and illegal strikes, moreover, puts the total at 834 
between 1938 and 1945, peaking at 512 in 1945 (Pizarro 1986: 105; see Table 6). Based 
on the ongoing tensions around the growth of manufacturing, it would be safe to assume 
that these latter estimates are most accurate. Chilean workers were distinguished by a 
long, and well-preserved, tradition of mobilising beyond the institutional constraints 
imposed upon them. Moreover, many of the workers in smaller factories, facing similar 
if not worse conditions, had been unable to formally organise due to the Labour Code. It 
was a deep-rooted radicalism and militancy, therefore, rather than the political 
institutions of labour, which bolstered the political influence of workers in this period. 
Table 6: Strikes and Participation, Chile, 1938-1945 (Pizarro 1986: 105) 
Year No. of Strikes No. of Participants 
1938 15 11 373 
1939 26 10 223 
1940 45 18 810 
1941 31 2 931 
1942 18 2 740 
1943 127 48 729 
1944 60 26 281 
1945 512 80 341 
Total 834 201 428 
 
These two tendencies of pacification and persistent radicalism were reflected in the 
general strike of 30th January 1946. All workers in sectors affiliated to the CTCH, 
including miners, port, construction, and industrial workers mobilised and shut down 
much of the economy. Beginning with calls for better wages and representation, they 
quickly took on an increasingly combative stance. Yet to pacify these mobilisations, the 
Ríos government took advantage of a split forming within the CTCH between those that 
sought to continue the strike and those more supportive of a rapprochement. Several 
ministers were incorporated from the Socialist Party (PS) into a new cabinet to which 
the PC leadership of the CTCH was strongly opposed. The PC’s calls for continuing the 
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strike were then blocked by the PS leadership within the CTCH, which remained 
aligned with its ministers in the cabinet (Pizarro 1986: 125-135). Thus whilst the initial 
attack on the working class had led a radical mobilisation within and beyond the 
political institutions of labour, these institutions had become a constraint upon efforts to 
contest new measures that posed a direct threat to workers’ earlier gains. 
The constraints imposed through the political institutions of labour were central to 
limiting workers’ attempts to consolidate and advance the progressive strategies of ISI 
that their earlier struggles had initiated. As a result, the rapid expansion of industrial 
manufacturing and the growth in the apparatus of the state enabled firms and the state to 
begin to reverse many of these measures. By capitalising on the breakdown of the 
Popular Front, the pacification of workers’ mobilisations, and tensions within the 
political institutions of labour, this new coalition was able to re-establish control and 
undermine workers’ emergent political influence. These changes, moreover, marked the 
beginning of another important turning point. The result, therefore, was the end of the 
short lived social coalition between workers, firms, and the state and a renewed 
consolidation of the confrontations that had earlier emerged with the emergence of ISI.  
 
Repression and the Radicalisation of the Politics of Industrialisation 
 
This section will examine the consolidation of ISI, highlighting the widening 
confrontation that was occurring between firms, the state, and workers and its 
implications for the double crisis that was pervading the manufacturing sector. The 
progressive reforms that had been instigated under the Popular Front were rapidly 
reversed as the balance of power shifted firmly in the favour of domestic firms. Wages 
were squeezed and worker’s political organisation was attacked as ISI was set upon a 
new trajectory of stabilisation and rationalisation. The result, however, was new 
mobilisations that led to the consolidation of a renewed space for the workers’ radical 
politicisation and of the double crisis. The state was forced to renew attempts to 
establish a “populist” compromise, but, with deepening social conflict, this resulted in a 
consolidation of its repressive tendencies in the workplace and beyond. As such, this 
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concerted attempt to take advantage of the weaknesses of the political institutions of 
labour and brief pacification of workplace conflict only reproduced political tensions.  
 
The Reorientation of “Progressive” Industrialisation  
The collapse of the Popular Front had begun to shift the balance of power within the 
trajectory of ISI firmly into the hands of domestic firms and their political allies. The 
continued growth of industrial manufacturing was premised on growing state 
intervention, but with a shifting of the burden of increasing stagnation onto workers 
through early forms of stabilisation and renewed attacks against the political institutions 
of labour. From explicit repression manifested in the “Permanent Defence of 
Democracy Law” to concrete efforts to establish a corporatist compromise led by the 
state, efforts to reinstate the pacification of the working class, however, only 
exacerbated tensions. This led workers to challenge the implementation of stabilisation 
measures that sought to restrict wages and undermine the more progressive elements of 
ISI. In response, a new coalition was consolidated between domestic and international 
firms, the state, and international institutions that reoriented this earlier trajectory. This 
had a contradictory impact that, whilst initially benefitting domestic firms, continued 
only to deepen the double crisis of ISI around the increasingly militant working class.  
The reorientation of ISI began in earnest in the 1950s. The breakup of the CTCH in 
1947 and the repression that accompanied it marked the beginning this reversal. 
González Videla responded to ongoing mobilisation with the establishment of the 
Permanent Defence of Democracy Law, or the “Damned Law”. This specifically 
targeted the PC and the political institutions of labour, with sanctions against any 
individual who “organised, maintained, or stimulated stoppages or strikes” (Vitale 
2011: 555). With the political institutions of labour weakened, firms and the state began 
to pursue strategies that undermined the more inclusive strategies of the Popular Front. 
Industrial manufacturing’s relative contribution to GDP was rising steadily (see Table 
7), but real term profits of firms had gone into decline. These had fallen dramatically 
from a high (in 1940s prices) of CH$1 226 million in 1944 to CH$659 million in 1950. 
By 1952, however, they had recovered again to around CH$909 million (Mamalakis 
1978: 235-238). Moreover, this was accompanied by a clear attack on real wages, which 
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stagnated between 1949 and 1952 (see Table 8). This combination, therefore, 
highlighted renewed efforts to address the double crisis by restricting the demands of 
the working class around the consolidated inefficiencies of industrial production.   
Table 7: GDP and Manufacturing Value-Added, Chile, 1948-1952 (data accessed from MOxLAD 
Database) 
Year 
Real GDP 
(Millions 1970 
Chilean 
Escudos) 
Constant Manufacturing 
Value-Added (Millions 
1970 Chilean Escudos) 
Share of Constant 
Manufacturing Value-
Added to Real GDP (%) 
1948 39 142 8 445 21.6 
1949 38 298 8 894 22.6 
1950 40 185 8 804 22.0 
1951 41 922 8 941 21.3 
1952 44 316 9 734 22.0 
 
Table 8: Real Industrial Wage Index, Chile, 1948-1952 (1955 = 100) (adapted from Pinchot 1991: 
538) 
Year Industrial Wage Index 
Consumer Price 
Index 
Real Industrial Wage 
Index 
1948 20 13 154 
1949 24 15 160 
1950 28 18 156 
1951 31 22 141 
1952 40 26 154 
 
The outcome, however, was not to resolve tensions. Under Carlos Ibáñez del Campo 
(1952-1958), stagnation, the rising cost of living, the belligerence of the state and firms, 
and the weakness of the political institutions of labour meant workers began to seek out 
new forms of representation (Zapata 1986: 102; Vitale 2011: 560). Ibáñez had 
authorised increased control over credit from the Central Bank and established the 
National Bank to replace multiple state credit agencies and to work alongside CORFO 
in a bid to boost production and growth (Hirschman 1963: 194). The effects, however, 
were less than impressive. Manufacturing growth rates fell to -0.4 per cent between 
1955 and 1960, with the manufacturing share of GDP stagnating across a sector now 
incorporating 5 854 establishments and 206 701 workers (Mamalakis 1976: 163; see 
Table 8; Vitale 2011: 564). He also sought to establish corporatist labour institutions, 
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even inviting advisors from Peronist Argentina (Moulian 2006: 159; Vitale 2011: 563). 
Overall, however, the result was inflation and a deepening of the double crisis, 
alongside pressure from firms, the military, and the political Right (Moulian 2006: 158-
162; Fernández Jilberto 2001: 70). As a result, industrial manufacturing stagnated, 
wages fell, and the rising political tensions remained beyond the control of the state. 
Table 9: GDP and Manufacturing Value-Added, Chile, 1953-1958 (data accessed from MOxLAD 
Database) 
Year 
Real GDP 
(Millions 1970 
Chilean 
Escudos) 
Constant Manufacturing 
Value-Added (Millions 
1970 Chilean Escudos) 
Share of Constant 
Manufacturing Value-
Added to Real GDP (%) 
1953 46 627 10 801 23.2 
1954 46 822 11 034 23.6 
1955 46 760 10 638 22.8 
1956 47 022 11 134 23.7 
1957 51 958 11 442 22.0 
1958 53 946 12 285 22.8 
 
The failure to address burgeoning tensions meant workers’ efforts to establish new 
forms of representation increased. Despite their pacification under the Popular Front, 
workers had retained a relatively cohesive autonomy (Roddick 1989: 215). For 
example, despite the continuing squeeze on wages and political repression, between 
1948 and 1956 there was a significant rise in the formation of factory-based unions. 
These increased from 607 to 788, with overall membership increasing from 151 633 to 
170 669 industrial workers (see Table 10). One reason for this was the formation of the 
Unified Workers’ Central (CUT) in 1953. This brought together diverse political 
currents around the “non-aligned” figure of Clotario Blest, a Catholic trade unionist 
who traced his own formative experience back to the Santiago Meat Riot of 1906 
(Gaudichaud 2005: 82; Zapata 1986: 101-102; Roddick 1989: 187). Due to the 
constraints of the Labour Code, the CUT was illegal and in constant financial crisis, 
relying on political parties and industry federations to mobilise workers. Yet it firmly 
opposed the state, stating in its opening declaration that “while capitalism exists in 
whatever form, the state will be an instrument of exploitation” (Angell 1969: 41 & 49; 
Gaudichaud 2005: 83-86; Moulian 2006: 180). It mobilised workers around these 
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radical ideas, with the levels of repression against the political parties of the Left also 
strengthening its independence (Angell 1969: 50; Gaudichaud 2005: 82-83). As a result, 
by retaining the institutional weaknesses that had characterised the FOCH and CTCH, it 
continued to provide space for the radical politicisation of workplace conflict. 
Table 10: Industrial Union Membership, Chile, 1948-1958 (adapted from Barrera 1972: 12) 
Year No. of Unions Total Members Average Membership  
1948 607 151 633 250 
1949 613 147 969 241 
1950 626 147 306 235 
1951 633 150 772 238 
1952 639 155 054 243 
1953 665 164 201 247 
1954 677 165 888 156 
1955 660 162 937 247 
1956 788 170 669 217 
1957 723 162 232 224 
1958 641 154 650 241 
 
Repression within and beyond the workplace, in response, was intensified. By mid-1954 
Ibáñez and his new Finance Minister, Jorge Prat, reversed many of the earlier measures 
with a “burden sharing” plan that included an increased minimum wage, low cost 
housing provision, taxes on luxuries, and the conversion of excess profits to CORFO 
bonds alongside salary and wage freezes and a ban on strikes (Hirschman 1963: 198). 
As a result, real wages dropped dramatically, with the effects of inflation and the wage 
freeze strongly felt amongst industrial workers (see Table 11). The continuing crisis, 
moreover, led Ibáñez to the US-based Klein-Saks consultancy firm at the end of 1955. 
The aim was to draft a stabilisation plan that would address inflation by squeezing real 
wages, opening up the economy to foreign trade and investment, and changing the role 
of CORFO from direct intervention to supporting large infrastructure projects and 
exports. These measures were aligned to the ideas of the political Right in Chile, as well 
as to the US government and the IMF, but opposed by the majority of local experts 
(Ffrench-Davis 1973: 25-26; Ortega et al 1989: 148-155). Thus, in combination, this 
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new Plan represented a concerted attempt to directly confront the resurgent political 
influence of the working class and to re-exert control through stabilisation measures.  
Table 11: Real Industrial Wage Index, Chile, 1952-1958 (1955 = 100) (adapted from Pinchot 1991: 
538) 
Year Industrial Wage Index 
Consumer Price 
Index 
Real Industrial Wage 
Index 
1952 40 26 154 
1953 44 33 133 
1954 58 57 102 
1955 100 100 100 
1956 160 153 105 
1957 213 207 103 
1958 253 249 102 
 
The outcome, however, was a growing number of mobilisations that led to significant 
organisational gains for workers and culminated in the general strike of 7th July 1955 
(Roddick 1989: 216-219). El Siglo estimated that there were 1.5 million workers 
involved and the Interior Minister was forced to explicitly deny it was a revolutionary 
movement (Pizarro 1986: 140-145). However, whilst the strike itself may not have been 
a revolution, it was an important turning point. It marked the emergence of a coherent, 
autonomous, and militant working class within and beyond the political institutions of 
labour. On the one hand, core demands referred to price rises, wage squeezes, and the 
repeal of the “Damned Law”. On the other hand, these had a demonstrably radical 
meaning. Clotario Blest, for example, described it as representing the restructuring of 
society and the economy, with the program offered by workers demanding agrarian 
reform, copper nationalisation, modifications to the credit regime, and the direct 
participation of workers in the economic organisation of the state (Moulian 2006: 181; 
Pizarro 1986: 149). It was then followed by mobilisations in 1956, as well as a dramatic 
urban insurrection on 2nd April 1957 where workers, students, slum-dwellers, and 
political activists directly confronted police (Moulian 2006: 181-182; Milos 2007). 
These mobilisations highlighted the culmination of tensions within the trajectory of ISI 
and, increasingly, the limits on resolving them through restriction and repression.  
This reorientation of ISI had led to the establishment of a new locus of conflict around 
stabilisation, declining real wages, and new, radical political institutions of labour. The 
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explicit attack on workers followed by the attempt to construct a corporatist coalition 
only demonstrated the persistent latent threat that the CUT now manifested most 
visibly. Workers’ mobilisations led to the establishment of this new federation that 
remained beyond the constraints of labour legislation, providing an openly radical and 
socialist space for the politicisation of workers’ opposition to continuing efforts to 
resolve the double crisis without addressing their demands or the continuing squeeze on 
wages. As a result, stagnation only deepened throughout industrial manufacturing as a 
variety of state-led strategies continued to come up against the limits of repression as a 
means to resolve rising political tensions. The general strike in 1955, then, led firms and 
the state to deepen these coercive attempts to impose control over the working class. 
 
The Explicit Assault on the Working Class and Radicalisation of Workplace Conflict 
Renewed attempts to exert control over the working class and to impose a restrictive 
trajectory of ISI premised on a combination of direct repression, economic stabilisation, 
and allusions to state-led corporatism had consolidated the confrontation that had been 
re-emerging between workers, firms, and the state. The response to this deepening 
confrontation, moreover, was the most overt assault on the working class since the 
1930s. Explicitly backed by the industrial employers’ association and international 
organisations, the state attacked wages, working conditions, and attempted to reverse 
many of the protective measures that had been implemented to support production and 
employment. In the short term, the result was relative stability and a return to high 
growth. But in the long term the impact on consumer goods sectors, on domestic 
demand, and on external debt only created new tensions. The outcome of the most 
dramatic reversal of ISI since the 1930s, therefore, was a deepening of the double crisis, 
epitomised by its attacks on political institutions of labour and on the working class.  
Unlike the ostensible populism of the “burden sharing” plan of Jorge Prat, the economic 
program of Jorge Alessandri (1958-1964) consisted of limiting wage increases to 
productivity, seeking foreign loans, lowering state expenditure to decrease deficits, and 
the elimination of trade controls whilst retaining import duties and tax exemptions. The 
result was a large increase in foreign investment, a relative deterioration of wages, and a 
sustained contraction in domestic production of consumer goods (Stallings 1978: 82-87; 
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Cademartori 1959: 18; Principios 1961: 38). Overall, manufacturing remained relatively 
stable as a proportion of GDP and rose to its highest level of 27.2 per cent in 1964, with 
an average growth rate between 1960 and 1965 of 7.3 per cent, and inflation fell from 
33.3 per cent in 1959 to 9.7 per cent in 1961. Light industry, however, went into steep 
decline, leaving thousands of workers unemployed and creating an unprecedented 
reliance on external investment and borrowing (see Table 12; Vitale 2011: 580 
Mamalakis 1976: 163-164). As a direct result of these measures the traditional 
consumer goods sector stagnated and sunk further into its now-persistent double crisis. 
Table 12: GDP and Manufacturing Value-Added, Chile, 1959-1964 (data accessed from MOxLAD 
Database) 
Year 
Real GDP 
(Millions 1970 
Chilean 
Escudos) 
Constant Manufacturing 
Value-Added (Millions 
1970 Chilean Escudos) 
Share of Constant 
Manufacturing Value-
Added to Real GDP (%) 
1959 53 657 13 992 26.1 
1960 57 195 13 867 24.2 
1961 59 931 15 066 25.1 
1962 62 771 16 799 26.8 
1963 66 741 17 509 26.2 
1964 68 227 18 563 27.2 
 
The relatively progressive strategies of state-led industrialisation after 1938, which 
emerged with the strong support of the working class, were eroded in less than two 
decades. Alessandri attempted to inaugurate a trajectory driven by the external market 
more so than at any time since the Depression (Salazar & Pinto 2010a: 41). The most 
significant feature of this strategy was the shifting of the costs of economic adjustment 
and stabilisation on to workers (Silva 2007: 76). Between 1959 and 1964 real wages fell 
to levels below those of 1955 (see Table 13). Moreover, in an attempt to limit 
resistance, the political institutions of labour faced further attacks, resulting in a 
membership decline after 1958 (see Table 14). These strategies were the most 
significant divergence from the earlier efforts to address the double crisis. Facing an 
increasingly militant working class, Alessandri chose not to follow the failed attempts 
of his predecessors to establish corporatist political institutions, nor did he opt for 
adopting limited progressive measures to pacify all but the most radical sectors. Instead, 
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he squeezed wages and restricted the political representation of workers, which only 
exacerbated the deepening confrontation between workers, firms, and the state. 
Table 13: Real Industrial Wage Index, Chile, 1959-1964 (1955 = 100) (adapted from Pinchot 1991: 
538) 
Year Industrial Wage Index 
Consumer Price 
Index 
Real Industrial Wage 
Index 
1959 311 345 90 
1960 337 376 97 
1961 390 402 100 
1962 461 460 95 
1963 621 652 97 
1964 932 958 105 
 
Table 14: Industrial Union Membership, Chile, 1959-1964 (adapted from Barrera 1972: 12) 
Year No. of Unions Total Members Average Membership  
1959 616 149 711 243 
1960 608 122 306 201 
1961 618 144 650 234 
1962 598 134 478 225 
1963 656 143 912 219 
1964 632 142 958 226 
 
It was the deepening of this confrontation that brought a decisive end to explicit 
coercive attempts to exert control over the working class. Despite achieving higher rates 
of growth and briefly halting inflation, the failures of this strategy of liberalisation, 
stabilisation, and political repression were increasingly apparent, even on their own 
terms. For example, the productivity of investment was low during the 1960s, as growth 
in GDP and fixed capital formation continued to be constrained by low domestic 
demand (Ffrench-Davis et al 2000: 116). These failings were widely understood as 
rooted in the policies proposed by Klein-Saks, discrediting its orthodox economic 
policies (Jobet 1961: 13; Sigmund 1977: 30). Moreover, what emerged in response was 
a working class increasingly confident and capable of radical mobilisation. Attacks on 
the political institutions of labour, as such, had only limited effects. For example, whilst 
legal strikes declined by around half after 1958, illegal strikes quintupled, mobilising 
tens of thousands of workers in recorded strikes by the beginning of the 1960s (Zapata 
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1986: 103; Pizarro 1986: 153; see Table 15). Workers, in these ongoing mobilisations, 
therefore, actively undermined firm and state strategies that sought to resolve tensions 
through repression and brought an end the explicitly repressive trajectory of ISI.  
Table 15: Strikes and Participation, Chile, 1961-1964 (adapted from Pizarro 1986: 154) 
Year 
Manufacturing Total 
No. of Strikes No. of Participants No. of Strikes No. of Participants 
1961 503 39 222 835 151 453 
1963 135 22 656 642 124 334 
1964 104 25 371 433 114 342 
 
This marked the end of explicit attacks on the political institutions of labour and 
workers. Strategies that had sought to re-impose control or to pacify struggles came up 
against a coherent and cohesive working class. Industrial stagnation continued, 
workplace conflicts intensified dramatically, and new, radical political institutions once 
again posed a direct threat to the interests of domestic and international firms. Not only 
did the CUT demonstrate an unprecedented degree of coordination, but political 
mobilisations beyond it became increasingly widespread. It was clear that only the 
resort to overt violence or meaningful reform would resolve political tensions in the 
double crisis pervading manufacturing. Firms and the state, in response, supported a 
return to explicit forms of state protection and limited concessions to workers’ demands. 
These, however, were implemented alongside the continuation of liberal economic 
policies, including stabilisation, rationalisation, and support for foreign investment.  
  
The Limits of Reform and Revolution in the Breakdown of ISI 
 
This section will identify the limitations that had been consolidated in the development 
of industrial manufacturing around limited “populist” compromises and explicit 
combinations of economic liberalism and political repression. In response to the 
intensification of tensions, the new government sought to combine elements of previous 
strategies in the so-called “Revolution in Liberty”. Borrowing elements of economic 
liberalism and combining these with even more limited progressive reforms, the result 
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was a slowdown in economic growth and a widening of conflict, with the double crisis 
left unresolved. Such a dynamic, however, resulted in a radical new trajectory of ISI 
premised on the transition to socialism. Led by the state, and explicitly supported by the 
political institutions of labour and the working class, this began to transform 
manufacturing production and output, but also created a new locus of conflict. As the 
new government explicitly sought to tackle the double crisis through real wage 
increases and the resolution of workers’ demands, these strategies produced a new 
confrontation that brought about the conditions for the violent breakdown of ISI.  
 
Towards a Reformist Solution to the Double Crisis of Manufacturing 
In response to the failings of successive governments to resolve or repress the political 
tensions that had been created within ISI, new efforts to deepen industrialisation 
through political and economic reform were established. On the one hand, these relied 
on a combination of policy measures that had been implemented with questionable 
success throughout previous decades. Direct state intervention was redirected towards 
large infrastructure projects and monopoly firms, foreign investment was encouraged 
alongside a liberalisation of capital and intermediate goods imports, and attempts were 
made to cement regional and international trade agreements to resolve limits on 
domestic demand. On the other hand, they also included new attempts to address the 
double crisis, including redistribution through the improvement of real wages and 
support for political organisation in small and medium-sized establishments. However, 
for industrial workers their effects were limited, premised as they were upon liberal 
economic policies that did little to resolve their ongoing demands. 
Initially, the Christian Democrat Party (PDC) government of Eduardo Frei (1964-1970) 
sought to deepen industrial development and stimulate growth through a program of 
direct state intervention, foreign investment, and the expansion of regional trade. 
CORFO was used to channel funds directly into large establishments and infrastructure, 
foreign ownership and imports of capital and intermediate goods were liberalised, and 
low demand, which had been exacerbated by the wage squeezes of the past decade, was 
targeted through regional trade agreements and the expansion of credit (Ortega et al 
1989: 178-180; Moulian 2006: 227; Stallings 1978: 67 Ffrench-Davis et al 2000: 134-
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135). As an immediate outcome, foreign investment more than tripled between 1960 
and 1968, with modern sectors rising to between 60 and 80 per cent foreign-controlled 
and industrial manufacturing overall to around 20.3 per cent (Stallings 1978: 43-44; De 
Vylder 1976: 14). The PDC also offered a limited degree of redistribution with an 
average wage increase of 8 per cent between 1964 and 1970, although this primarily 
benefitted agricultural and white-collar workers. Nevertheless, real industrial wages did 
rise, returning to levels in 1969 and 1970 that were only surpassed previously under the 
Popular Front (Salazar & Pinto 2010a: 42; Ffrench-Davis et al 2000: 146-147; see Table 
16). These reformist strategies, then, rejected the coercive liberalism that had resurfaced 
after 1955 and the populism that had preceded it, whilst retaining some aspects of both. 
Table 16: Real Industrial Wage Index, Chile, 1964-1970 (1955 = 100) (adapted from Pinchot 1991: 
538) 
Year Industrial Wage Index 
Consumer Price 
Index 
Real Industrial Wage 
Index 
1964 932 958 97 
1965 1 287 1 227 105 
1966 1 863 1 533 122 
1967 2 396 1 801 133 
1968 3 194 2 300 139 
1969 4 392 2 990 147 
1970 6 211 3 948 157 
 
The overall effect, however, was mixed. The value of manufacturing to overall GDP, 
after initially rising, was soon stymied by relatively low overall economic growth of 3.6 
per cent (see Table 17; Mamalakis 1976: 163). Moreover, whilst there had been a rapid 
rise in 1966 of 12 per cent in the output of traditional consumer goods and a steady 3 
per cent rise in more sophisticated consumer durables, there was a significant rise after 
1967 in the production of non-durable, durable, and intermediate goods. This reflected 
attempts to construct a more coherent and integrated manufacturing sector (Moulian 
2006: 226-227). Yet the open policy toward foreign investment, combined with the new 
targets of state investment, led to an increasing imbalance in the economy as modern 
sectors experienced an increase in growth whilst the economy as a whole continued to 
stagnate (Altamirano 1966: 6-8). This was further compounded by the consolidation of 
“protected inefficiencies” throughout the economy, with foreign investment and 
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technology imports targeting improvements in the use of existing resources rather than 
structural change (Ffrench-Davis et al 2000: 117). This imbalance, as a result, failed to 
address the problems related to stagnating production and exacerbated conflicts, 
reorienting them, in particular, against the growing support for foreign firms. 
Table 17: GDP and Manufacturing Value-Added, Chile, 1964-1970 (data accessed from MOxLAD 
Database) 
Year 
Real GDP 
(Millions 1970 
Chilean 
Escudos) 
Constant Manufacturing 
Value-Added (Millions 
1970 Chilean Escudos) 
Share of Constant 
Manufacturing Value-
Added to Real GDP (%) 
1964 68 227 18 563 27.2 
1965 68 778 19 747 28.7 
1966 76 448 21 444 28.1 
1967 78 930 22 052 27.9 
1968 81 755 22 593 27.6 
1969 84 797 23 264 27.4 
1970 86 541 23 570 27.2 
 
To compound these conflicts, few benefits were experienced by industrial workers. 
Despite a commitment to redistribution, in 1966 the purchasing power of the minimum 
wage was only 66 per cent and the minimum salary 70 per cent of their 1952 
equivalents, whilst workers’ share of national income declined from 36 per cent in 1960 
to 14.8 per cent in 1969 (Muñoz 1967: 10; Araya 1969: 26). Moreover, 77 per cent of 
industrial workers continued to work between nine and twelve hours, with 86 per cent 
earning less than the stagnating minimum wage (Paris & Porcell 1966: 50). As a result, 
participation in strikes increased, peaking in 1967, when 103 090 industrial workers 
were involved, and national general strikes were held in March 1966, November 1967 
and July 1970. Moreover, between 1961 and 1968 the levels of participation in illegal 
strikes outstripped that of legal strikes, with a rising involvement of workers not 
represented by the political institutions of labour. For example, in 1964 and 1965 illegal 
strikes involved over 20 000 unaffiliated workers, representing between 10 and 20 per 
cent of all participants (see Table 18; Roddick 1989: 208; Barrera 1980: 1292; Pizarro 
1986: 156-157). Thus the PDC, despite offering expanded representation and limited 
redistribution, continued to come up against their failure to resolve workers’ grievances. 
  68 
 
 
 
 
Table 18: Strikes and Participation, Chile, 1964-1970 (adapted from Pizarro 1986: 154) 
Year 
Manufacturing Total 
No. of Strikes No. of Participants No. of Strikes No. of Participants 
1964 104 25 371 433 114 342 
1965 158 47 291 792 234 189 
1966 162 31 011 737 140 667 
1967 912 103 090 2 177 314 987 
1968 215 51 010 913 203 360 
1969 237 37 082 977 275 406 
1970 305 62 765 1 303 396 761 
 
The growing number of strikes by non-unionised workers, moreover, also coincided 
with legal recognition of the CUT and a rapid surge in affiliation (Sigmund 1977: 43; 
see Table 19). Most importantly, this extended membership to workers outside the 
largest establishments. The importance of small firms was apparent in the disparity 
between the growth of unions, which doubled in just a few years, and of membership, 
which rose by under a third. This had particular significance for manufacturing as, in 
1968, 70 per cent of unionised workers worked in small firms with between 25 and 39 
workers (Angell 1969: 34-35; Pizarro 1986: 172-173). Moreover, attempts to establish 
“yellow unionism”, efforts to replace the right to strike with “Social Collaboration 
Councils”, and attempts to undermine the CUT with the “Frei-ist Workers’ Front”, were 
continually stymied (Figueroa 1966: 53-55). The expansion of union membership thus 
undermined the PDC’s attempts to pacify workers’ struggles. Instead, there was a 
consolidation of the political parties of the Left within the CUT, which received strong 
support from workers, despite party affiliates constituting only around 50 per cent of all 
CUT members (Barrera 1972: 59-60 & 66-67). Efforts by Frei to pacify the working 
class, therefore, only strengthened the radical politicisation of workplace conflict. 
Table 19: Industrial Union Membership, Chile, 1964-1970 (adapted from Barrera 1972: 12) 
Year No. of Unions Total Members Average Membership 
1964 632 142 958 226 
1965 687 154 561 225 
1966 990 179 506 181 
1967 1 174 190 367 162 
1968 1 261 189 815 150 
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1969 1 359 204 719 151 
1970 1 437 197 651 137 
 
This was particularly apparent in responses to new measures introduced by the PDC. 
Cooperatives and “workers’ enterprises”, which sought to promote alternative forms of 
self-management, had little impact outside agriculture, whilst the “Workers’ 
Capitalization Fund”, which was to be constituted by a matching 5 per cent salary 
contribution from employers and workers and a concomitant 20 per cent wage increase, 
was met with strong resistance (Salazar & Pinto 2010a: 43; Stallings 1978: 110). For 
example, in response to the latter, the CUT secretary general stated: “we say that the 
workers will be owners of the means of production when we are in power, and we do 
not want to share the direction of a company with our class enemies” (Hernán del Canto 
cited in Stallings 1978: 111). Workplace conflicts were mobilised continuously in a 
political manner, explicitly targeting the strategies of the state to pacify them and to re-
exert control (Pizarro 1986: 181). Moreover, by 1969 workers had undertaken the first 
factory occupations at the SABA electronics plant (Stallings 1978: 116-118; Espinosa & 
Zimbalist 1978: 41-42). Although an isolated incident, it was a manifestation of 
workers’ radical politicisation and demonstrated the failure of Frei and the PDC to 
resolve the double crisis by positively addressing the demands of the working class. 
The outcome of the “Revolution in Liberty” was the expansion of the tensions that it 
had set out to resolve. It demonstrably failed to overcome the restriction on domestic 
demand through limited wage gains for industrial workers. Whilst policies of 
redistribution and real wage increases did have a tangible effect, they focused primarily 
on white-collar and agricultural workers. In the manufacturing sector, which was now 
firmly at the centre of growing political tensions, workers saw little or no gains and, in 
response, firmly rejected attempts to pacify their struggles. The expansion of workplace 
representation, in particular, had the opposite effect from its intention. Not only did it 
permit the extension of the radical political ideas that had persisted within the CUT 
through its period of illegality, it also brought to the fore the far worse working 
conditions of workers in smaller establishments, transforming these ideas in the process.  
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Towards a Revolutionary Solution to the Double Crisis of Manufacturing 
The tensions that had been consolidated around the reformist measures of the 
Revolution in Liberty created the conditions for a more radical solution to the double 
crisis in the electoral victory of the socialist Popular Unity (UP). The combination of 
stagnation and rising tensions consolidated the militancy of the working class and 
engendered demands for an alternative trajectory. Through nationalisation of leading 
economic sectors, reactivation backed by state ownership, meaningful worker 
participation in the organisation of production, and redistribution towards a more equal 
share of gains from industrialisation, this period marked a radical transformation of ISI. 
Nevertheless, these strategies, rather than resolve conflict, only transformed it, as firms 
and their domestic and international political allies sought to prevent the consolidation 
of a new trajectory aimed explicitly at the establishment of socialism. Moreover, 
workers and the UP increasingly entered into conflict over constraints on this 
transformation. In particular, mobilisations of “popular power” came into growing 
antagonism with the peaceful transition envisaged by moderate leaders within the UP. 
By the end of the 1960s the combination of deepening stagnation and increasing levels 
of conflict produced a widespread desire for an alternative trajectory of ISI around a 
pervasive sense that the apogee of the double crisis had been reached (Moulian 2006: 
235). Under the government of Salvador Allende (1970-1973) and the UP, 
nationalisation of the “commanding heights” was envisaged as the first step of such an 
alternative. It aimed to bring 28.7 per cent of manufacturing production into the Social 
Property Area (APS) of direct state control and 15.2 percent into the Mixed Property 
Area (APM) of joint enterprise between the state and domestic firms (Espinosa & 
Zimbalist 1978: 47). CORFO would manage production as the peak of a new industrial 
structure. Sectoral Committees would coordinate nationalised firms, which, in turn, 
would determine the output of smaller firms in the APM and private sector. These 
Committees comprised state representatives, state-appointed technical managers, and 
workers’ representatives, and were envisioned as the basis for wider General 
Management bodies (Ortega et al 1989: 224-235; Garreton 1973: 66-67). These changes 
thus represented a progressive means of overcoming the double crisis, putting control 
over production first in the hands of the state and, eventually, into the hands of workers. 
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Alongside nationalisation, the UP prioritised a “reactivation” of manufacturing. Overall 
growth during 1971 was 8 to 9 per cent, with manufacturing growth even higher at 
between 12 and 14 per cent (Vuskovic 1973: 52). The share of manufacturing value-
added to GDP was close to 30 per cent of GDP by 1972, industrial income rose by 12.9 
per cent between 1970 and 1971, and manufacturing output rose to its highest levels, 
surpassing its 1968 peak (see Table 20; Mamalakis 1976: 164). By 1973, manufacturing 
employment had also risen by over 100 000 to roughly 664 000, one and a half times 
levels in 1960 (Stallings 1978: 256-257). Nevertheless, this rapid surge came with costs. 
It is claimed there was a “dramatic decline in productive capacity… [and] the worst 
inflation” caused by deficit spending, wage increases above productivity, and 
“limitless” subsidies to inefficient state-run firms (Mamalakis 1976: 164; Sigmund 
1977: 279). Government deficits in relation to GDP rose from 9.8 per cent in 1971 to 
14.2 per cent in 1972 and public sector debt rose from 15.1 per cent of GDP in 1971 to 
24.5 per cent in 1972 and finally to 30.5 per cent in 1973, leading the country to the 
“brink of hyperinflation” with prices rising by more than 600 per cent (Velasco 1994: 
396). Thus whilst the UP attempted to address the double crisis through expansive 
industrial growth and rising employment, its “success” remains contentious. 
Table 20: GDP and Manufacturing Value-Added, Chile, 1970-1973 (data accessed from MOxLAD 
Database) 
Year 
Real GDP 
(Millions 1970 
Chilean 
Escudos) 
Constant Manufacturing 
Value-Added (Millions 
1970 Chilean Escudos) 
Share of Constant 
Manufacturing Value-
Added to Real GDP (%) 
1970 86 541 23 570 27.2 
1971 94 291 26 796 28.4 
1972 93 147 27 549 29.6 
1973 87 964 25 754 29.3 
 
Yet these critiques obscure the most important aspect of these transformations. Rapid 
levels of employment growth, for example, demonstrate the centrality ascribed to 
worker participation. Under Allende, the CUT became the main social base for the 
government, shifting the weight of direct policy influence from business association 
representatives to labour leaders. Alongside party members, workers held positions in 
state agencies, state-run firms, and on the new National Development Council (Stallings 
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1978: 59 & 127; Angell 2010: 14). This was also extended to participation within 
factories through the establishment of “General Workers’ Assemblies” that chose 
representatives to an “Administrative Council” of the APS and to the “Production Unit 
Assemblies” that contributed to production committees and consultative bodies for 
state-appointed management. At their peak, these schemes incorporated around 50 000 
workers in the manufacturing sector (Silva 1999: 85-86). As such, despite their limited 
coverage, they were a vital demonstration of workers’ growing political influence.  
Moreover, even on their own terms, such critiques of the UP neglect crucial salient 
facts. For example, the UP did address some of the imbalances generated by rapid 
industrial expansion. After 1972 they sought to minimise early losses caused by price 
controls in the APS and encourage these firms to become self-financing and less reliant 
on bank credits (Castillo 2009: 93). Industry did not simply expand unchecked, as has 
been claimed, but was guided by measures to reorient its priorities. Alongside increased 
worker participation, for example, there was significant redistribution as workers’ 
relative share of total income rose from 51 per cent in 1970 to 62.9 per cent in 1972 
(Salazar & Pinto 2010a: 47). Real industrial wages rose rapidly, particularly between 
1972 and 1973, and, despite inflation preventing the gains being felt more significantly, 
they were a demonstration of the new priorities of the state (see Table 21). Rather than 
restrict wage increases to offset inefficiencies, the UP supported increasing wage 
increases to boost domestic demand and to consolidate the participation of workers both 
over production and in the gains from rising industrial output and domestic growth. 
Table 21: Real Industrial Wage Index, Chile, 1970-1973 (1955 = 100) (adapted from Pinchot 1991: 
538) 
Year Industrial Wage Index 
Consumer Price 
Index 
Real Industrial Wage 
Index 
1970 6 211 3 948 157 
1971 8 873 4 753 187 
1972 14 641 8 432 174 
1973 44 366 38 329 116 
 
These strategies, therefore, sought to reverse decades of the constraints imposed on 
workers. Despite representing only the beginnings of a revolutionary process, or a “pre-
revolution”, it was experienced by those who participated in it as an actual revolution 
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(Moulian 2005: 35-36). Strike participation peaked in 1970 and remained higher than at 
any time previously, with, for example over one million work days lost between 1971 
and 1972. There was also a concomitant expansion of the political institutions of labour, 
with membership rising by close to 100 000 (Angell 2010: 24; Cancino 1988: 219; see 
Tables 22 & 23). These were not mobilisations in opposition to the state, but alongside 
factory seizures, occupations, and alternative models of workplace organisation, they 
represented efforts by workers to lead the transition to socialism the UP had begun. The 
result was a new “popular political project” mobilised in the contemporary conjuncture 
but based on the “historical tradition of the Chilean popular movement… mutual 
solidarity, democratic control, democratic control of production, and participation” 
(Castillo 2009: 269). As a result, examples of worker self-management in production 
and even calls to self-government proliferated. Of these, moreover, the most significant 
development for industrial workers was the establishment of the cordones industriales. 
These nascent examples of self-management and self-government were an insight into 
the revolutionary potential of the autonomous political institutions of the working class.  
Table 22: No. of Strikes and Participation, Chile, 1970-1972 (adapted from Stalling 1978: 247, table 
A.5) 
Year No. of Strikes 
Blue-Collar 
Participants 
White-Collar 
Participants 
Total No. of 
Participants 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1 819 
2 709 
3 289 
- 
182 770 
232 373  
- 
119 628 
164 769 
656 170 
302 398 
397 142 
 
Table 23: Union Membership, Chile, 1970-1972 (adapted from Stallings 1978: 246, table A.4) 
Year Blue-Collar Unions White-Collar Unions Agricultural Unions Total 
1970 
1971 
1972 
197 651 
205 300 
213 183 
239 323 
252 924 
282 181 
114 112 
127 782 
136 529 
551 086 
586 006 
631 891 
 
In response, however, firms and their political allies became increasingly aggressive. 
The PDC and the National Party (PN) used their position in the National Congress to 
block all UP legislation and to table legislation aimed at reducing nationalisation, as 
well as seeking to impeach ministers to disrupt the government (De Vylder 1976: 82-
83). Credit was withdrawn from the US, the World Bank, and the International 
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Development Bank and, by 1972, any support from domestic firms, which had initially 
been marked by a “wait-and-see” attitude, ended with private investment collapsing 
(Stallings 1978: 133; De Vylder 1976: 62 & 84). This culminated in October 1972 with 
the truck-drivers’, or “Bosses’ Strike”, that paralysed the economy. This was an 
important turning point that “marked… the replacement of mobilisation led and 
manipulated by the political parties, by a mobilisation directly generated by the owners 
of firms” (Valenzuela 1989 cited in Salazar & Pinto 2010b: 45). In a bid to placate these 
tensions, in 1972 a ministerial meeting headed by Allende proposed an alliance with the 
PDC and a reversal of many earlier UP policies. By 1973, Allende and the PC were 
pressing forward with such agreements, primarily aimed at shrinking the APS and 
protect private property (Castillo 2009: 92; Gaudichaud 2005: 99-100). This brought 
increasing tensions within the leadership of the UP and with workers that continued to 
press forward with their own changes and confront firms and their political allies. 
The breakdown of ISI that was confirmed by the political violence instigated by the 
Right and the Chilean military in 1973 was the culmination of political tensions that had 
emerged throughout the preceding decades of ISI. Most significantly, it was the 
outcome of attempts to resolve a double crisis centred upon the militancy of the 
working class. Repression and limited progressive reforms failed, resulting in the 
establishment of a radical government explicitly backed by workers. Yet as this 
increasingly came up against the institutional constraints of the Chilean “Compromise 
State” and, as the working class continually sought to extend transformations beyond its 
bounds, the threat to firms and their political allies became too great. New forms of 
workers’ mobilisation, in particular, challenged the dominance of these political actors. 
Military intervention and the brutal repression of the political institutions of the working 
class were then the only means to prevent this from leading to the establishment of a 
radical, and potentially revolutionary, new trajectory for industrialisation.  
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The Failed Consolidation of Repression, Reform, and Revolution 
 
This chapter has demonstrated the significance of the persistent and changing conflicts 
between firms, the state, and workers that constituted the emergence, consolidation and 
breakdown of ISI in Chile. The Depression and crises of the 1930s did not engender a 
new economic model riven by contradiction and crisis, but rather consolidated the 
intensification of conflicts that were already present in the country and shifted them into 
the new urban centres of industrial manufacturing. From here, resolutions manifested in 
the attempted conservative restoration, the limited progressive strategies of the Popular 
Front, and the return to political repression attempted to pacify of the working class. 
The result, however, was the consolidation of the double crisis of Chilean industrial 
manufacturing. The two aspects of this crisis, low domestic demand and persistent 
worker militancy, were continually reproduced by renewed attempts to impose a 
resolution to political tensions within ISI. Industrial manufacturing continued to grow at 
a relatively rapid pace throughout these decades, but attempts to reorient it through 
direct state intervention, opening up to foreign investment, and limited concessions to 
workers left tensions unresolved. Despite the institutional constraints imposed upon the 
working class, workers continued to exercise a degree of political influence through 
legal and illegal forms of mobilisation that stymied efforts to consolidate unfavourable 
outcomes and, instead, began to establish a potentially revolutionary alternative. 
For the state, therefore, it was attempts to resolve the conflicts that had been generated 
and consolidated within and around industrial manufacturing that determined policy 
decisions. Whether these involved repression and restriction on workers’ capabilities or 
whether they sought to offer limited degrees of incorporation into the decision-making 
process or the gains generated by ISI, it was in their engagement with workers that these 
strategies and their outcomes were determined. Typically, the role of the state during 
this period is understood as characterised by the tensions that had accumulated around 
the failure to build on favourable conditions created by copper exports, institutional 
stability, and relatively independent economic institutions of the state. However, once 
the focus is moved away from the political institutions of the state as mediating 
relationships with the international political economy or acting as a stable institutional 
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space within which elite political actors negotiate conflict, it is possible to identify its 
direct role in reproducing and consolidating the political tensions that constituted the 
trajectory of ISI. Actors within the state were actively limiting the institutional space 
through which workers could mobilise, attempting to pacify workers through limited 
concessions, and repressing mobilisations and organisations that posed a growing threat. 
Workers, moreover, had an influence over these decisions that belied their limited 
institutional representation. The fragmentation of the political institutions of labour 
inadvertently began to open space for the consolidation of a working class capable of 
challenging attempts by firms and the state to construct a trajectory of ISI that directly 
sought to restrict their share in the distribution of gains and, most significantly, their 
political influence within and beyond the workplace. The role of these political 
institutions of labour, therefore, is particularly interesting. On the one hand, they were 
important in the brief pacification of workers’ militancy under the Popular Front, 
allowing for the reversal of some of the more progressive measures. On the other hand, 
they were vital in the formation and consolidation of the working class as an active and 
radical political subject. Due to the initial fragmentation of these institutions, they were 
more responsive to workers’ demands, supporting mobilisations and allowing the 
dissemination of radical political ideas. This limited the formation of social coalitions 
and consolidated conflict within and around the trajectory of ISI. To understand this 
conflict, its manifestation, and its extent and limitations, however, it is necessary to look 
deeper at the engagement between work, resistance, and subjectivity in the workplaces 
of one of the leading sectors of Chilean industrial manufacturing: the textile sector. 
  
  77 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
The Continuities of State-Led Discipline in Argentina 
 
The experiences of Argentina between 1930 and 1976 offer a much clearer 
demonstration of the cautionary tale of ISI. First, military intervention and political 
upheaval pervaded a political system characterised by deep-rooted tension and an 
inability to ensure peaceful democratic transitions (Sikkink 1991: 5). Second, this 
upheaval produced limited continuity in the policies adopted by these institutions, with 
little consistency either in their capacities and capabilities or in their priorities (Dezalay 
& Garth 2002: 23-24; Sikkink 1991: 178-179). Third, after the 1930s the state grew 
exponentially under governments of various political tendencies, focusing on the 
extension of an incoherent intervention and on exerting the will of the prevailing 
political coalition (O’Connell 2000: 177; Skidmore & Smith 1997: 88; Sikkink 1991: 
183-186). Therefore, it is the relative incoherence of the political functions of the state 
and the tensions within its institutions and between the political elites that occupied 
them that typically provide the explanation for the instability of the trajectory of ISI.  
Understanding the experience of growing tensions around ISI in Argentina, however, 
must instead begin in the rapid changes that were occurring beneath the political 
institutions of the state. In particular, rather than understand these conflicts as occurring 
between political elites – liberal, conservative, Peronist, or reformist – struggling for 
control within the state, the starting point should be the conflicts that were occurring 
within the workplace and the political influence of workers from within these spaces. 
Much of the early analysis of the working class in Argentina focused on the role of 
Peronism and how this constituted the limits of and possibilities for workers’ influence 
(Germani 1971; Murmis & Portantiero 2004). More recent research, however, has 
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moved to consider the impact of industrialisation on the workers’ themselves, on their 
changing abilities to confront firms and the state, and on the diverse character of 
mobilisation (Doyon 2006; Schneider 2005; Schiavi 2008; Basualdo 2010; Iñigo 
Carrera 2012). Moving beyond Peronism to the political influence of workers within 
and beyond the political institutions of labour is highly significant. However, further 
efforts will be made in this chapter to reconnect workplace conflict to the strategies of 
firms and the state to show how the working class determined the trajectory of ISI. 
This chapter will argue that the intensification and pacification of workplace grievances, 
the re-appropriation of nationalist ideas, and the constraints on workers’ autonomy 
determined their influence over the trajectory of ISI in Argentina. Following the steady 
recovery of manufacturing in the 1930s, workers established new forms of 
representation. Their struggles to confront the state engendered increasing imperatives 
for further support for industrial manufacturing. As a result, Perón came to power and, 
with the support of the political institutions of labour, expanded the role of the state in 
consolidating ISI. The pacification of workers’ struggles this produced, moreover, was 
bolstered by continued growth in manufacturing and wages, but, as these stagnated, the 
state attempted to embed new forms of control through stabilisation and rationalisation. 
This led to a resurgence of conflict, with new forms of control established under an 
alliance between foreign firms and the authoritarian state, which served to exacerbate 
the intensification and radicalisation of workplace conflict. However, as this reached its 
apogee at the end of the 1960s, the strengthening of the political institutions of labour 
fragmented these struggles. The breakdown of the 1970s, therefore, rather than 
represent the inability of elites to embed a stable ISI within the state, was the direct 
outcome of ongoing political conflicts that emerged from within the workplace. 
 
Crisis, Conflict, and the Political Foundations of ISI 
 
This section will examine the consolidation of workplace conflicts within industrial 
manufacturing in response to the relatively limited impact of the Depression in 
Argentina. Manufacturing was well-established by the early decades of the twentieth 
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century, with significant political institutions of labour engaging directly with the state. 
After the crisis, however, the state attempted to reverse some of the progressive gains 
that these institutions had achieved. This involved expanding state involvement in 
supporting traditional activities alongside some concomitant gains for connected 
manufacturing sectors. The result was to exacerbate conflict between workers, firms, 
and the state, with radical political institutions of labour leading small, well-organised 
fractions of the working class. The mobilisations that emerged, moreover, consolidated 
these institutions and their emergent relationship with the state, encouraging further 
intervention in support of manufacturing alongside limited wage gains for workers. 
 
The Limits of External Crisis and the Consolidation of Industrial Growth 
Industrialisation in Argentina in the early decades of the twentieth century was led by 
traditional sectors, including foodstuffs and textiles, linked to the still-buoyant export 
sector. After the Depression, manufacturing quickly recovered, but without the direct 
state support that typified ISI. The new military-backed coalition offered indirect 
support to keep down domestic costs and to support their increasingly diversified 
economic interests. Significantly, the dynamic of social conflict that came to 
characterise the 1930s was already present. In response, political repression combined 
with deliberate efforts to keep down wages, engendering strikes against the strategies of 
the state. In these strikes, workers were organised by national trade union federations 
linked to anarchism, syndicalism, and the Communist Party, as the consolidation of 
conflict produced the consolidation of these political institutions of labour. 
Traditional manufacturing sectors grew significantly during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Foodstuffs, for example, constituted over 50 per cent of 
manufacturing output. These sectors were driven, primarily, by rising domestic demand 
caused by booming export incomes and high levels of immigration (Díaz Alejandro 
1970: 211-212; Ferrer 2008: 203; Belini & Korol 2012: 54). The breakdown of 
international trade in 1914, however, led to a relative decline, with recovery again in the 
1920s led by large domestic and foreign firms operating in a context of indifferent, or 
outright hostile, government policy (Katz & Kosacoff 1989: 48; Belini & Korol 2012: 
57-58; Katz & Kosacoff 2000: 283; Díaz Alejandro 1970: 215- 218). Political tensions, 
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moreover, also began to emerge. In particular, prominent political institutions of labour 
forced governments to meet workers’ demands. These institutions were led by socialist 
and anarchist groups, with federations increasing their memberships dramatically 
throughout the 1920s. The anarchist Argentine Regional Workers’ Federation (FORA), 
for example, expanded from 3 000 to 70 000 members between 1915 and 1920, whilst 
wages that had fallen by around 38 per cent in Buenos Aires between 1914 and 1918, 
had, by 1921, recovered to 1914 levels and, by 1929, risen by a further 32 per cent 
(Belini & Korol 2012: 29-34). Wage concessions and growing political institutions of 
labour, as such, characterised the trajectory of industrialisation during these decades. 
Changes brought about by the Depression, moreover, were limited. The manufacturing 
sector did see some important continuing growth. It grew dramatically as a proportion 
of GDP and relative to agriculture (Girbal-Blacha 2004a: 41; see Table 24). Yet this 
was not the result of deliberate state intervention. The Concordancia (1931-1943) did 
introduce exchange controls in 1931, an exchange control commission in 1933, and the 
Central Bank in 1935 (Cortés Conde 2009: 86-109). However, these policies primarily 
sought to bolster public incomes or agricultural growth (Díaz Alejandro 2000: 31; 
Whitaker 1975 cited in Teubal 2001: 30-1). Economic recovery during the 1930s was 
driven, not by manufacturing, but by a recovery in traditional agricultural exports. 
Whilst declining export prices caused a contraction in GDP of around 14 per cent, 
bilateral agreements with the UK and US limited the severity of declines in export 
volume. As a result, export price recovery was the most important “engine of growth” 
after 1932 (Belini & Korol 2012: 68; O’Connell 2000: 176). Moreover, probate records 
show that, during this period, landowners also increasingly began to diversify their 
assets into manufacturing (Hora 2002: 614). Links to buoyant export sectors and the 
concomitant investment made by traditional landowners were the main impetus behind 
manufacturing growth after 1930, rather than the clear indifference of the state.  
Table 24: GDP and Manufacturing Value-Added, Argentina, 1929-1936 (data accessed from 
MOxLAD Database) 
Year 
Real GDP  
(Millions of 
1970 Argentine 
Pesos) 
Constant Manufacturing 
Value-Added (Millions of 
1970 Argentine Pesos)  
Share of Constant 
Manufacturing Value-
Added to Real GDP (%) 
1929 24 471 5 064 20.7 
1930 23 460 5 008 21.3 
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1931 21 830 4 446 20.4 
1932 21 114 4 177 19.8 
1933 22 097 4 734 21.4 
1934 23 853 5 374 22.5 
1935 24 907 5 523 22.2 
1936 25 075 5 864 23.4 
 
Where the role of the state was significant, however, was in reversing earlier gains made 
by workers across industrial manufacturing. This was most clearly demonstrated in the 
disparity between economic recovery and wage stagnation. Overall real wages in 
Buenos Aires remained stagnant after 1932, collapsing by 1936 (see Table 25). Average 
industrial wages in Buenos Aires, moreover, fell from an index of 100 in 1929 to 81 in 
1932. This was caused directly by the measures implemented by the state. Minimum 
wage rates were denied, worker organisation disrupted, and labour legislation ignored 
(Munck et al 1987: 108). Earlier tensions were, therefore, consolidated in the 
manufacturing sector. Strikes surpassed their previous peak in 1932, and each year 
between 1934 and 1936 (see Table 26). Industrial workers led this surge, moreover, 
contributing 26.7 per cent of reported unrest between 1930 and 1943, with, between 
1934 and 1942, 72 per cent of strikes and 48.7 per cent of work days lost coming from 
manufacturing, despite the sector contributing only 16 per cent of unionised workers 
(Korzeniewicz 1993: 9; Munck et al 1987: 113). Attacks on workers and the political 
institutions of labour, therefore, consolidated the conflicts the state sought to repress. 
Table 25: Real Wages in Buenos Aires (1925/1929 = 100), 1930-1936 (adapted from Munck et al 
1987: 124, table 10.8) 
Year Real Wages  
1930 95.80 
1931 103.16 
1932 109.47 
1933 101.05 
1934 104.21 
1935 106.32 
1936 100 
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Table 26: Strike Statistics, Argentina, 1925-1936 (adapted from Doyon 2006: 252 & Iñigo Carrera 
1936: 52) 
Year Strikes Striking Workers Work Days Lost 
1925 89 39 142 125 367 
1926 67 15 880 287 279 
1927 58 38 236 325 963 
1928 135 28 108 224 800 
1929 113 28 271 457 022 
1930 125 29 331 669 790 
1931 43 4 622 54 531 
1932 105 34 562 1 299 061 
1933 52 3 481 44 779 
1934 42 25 940 742 256 
1935 69 52 143 2 642 576 
1936 109 85 438 1 344 461 
 
These conflicts, moreover, were mobilised around various political ideas. In the General 
Confederation of Labour (CGT), for example, syndicalists emphasised deepening links 
with the state, an apolitical approach to strikes and protest, and support for state 
intervention and mediation in workplace disputes (Korzeniewicz 1993: 30-31). 
Communists and anarchists, however, offered an alternative, with the former organised 
around the Committee of Class Struggle Unity (CUSC) taking the lead in the increase in 
strikes throughout the 1930s (ibid: 22-23; Camarero 2007: 201-211). Nevertheless, 
close relations were already being established with the state by both the CGT and 
CUSC. Whilst the former was the most conducive to this tendency, even the latter 
frequently turned to the state to meet its demands (Horowitz 1983: 107-110). Thus 
whilst this increased the capacity of these institutions to resolve grievances, it did so in 
a manner that strengthened the institutions themselves, particularly whilst membership 
remained low (see Table 27; Munck et al 1987: 108). As a result, the upsurge in strikes 
of the 1930s saw these institutions grow in influence, but also pacify workplace conflict. 
Table 27: Union Membership in Selected Sectors, Argentina, 1936 (adapted from Iñigo Carrera 
2012: 68 & Doyon 2006: 37-38) 
Sector No. of Workers Union Membership Affiliated Workers (%) 
Industry (Total) 472 152 73 282 15.5 
Foodstuffs 108 378 10 688 9.9 
Metalworking 85 754 1 975 2.3 
Textiles - 5 550 - 
  83 
 
 
 
 
Woodworking 30 910 8 827 28.6 
Chemicals 16 676 166 1.0 
 
This combination of mobilisation and pacification was most clearly apparent in the most 
important working class mobilisation of the 1930s that occurred in 1936. Despite 
continuing efforts to placate growing tensions, the combination of worker militancy and 
the increasingly prominent political institutions of labour produced a general strike on 
7th and 8th January 1936. Although demands were mainly limited to incorporation into 
the prevailing institutional system, there was an important current that contained 
“elements of confrontation with that system… to transcend and transform it radically” 
(Iñigo Carrera 2012: 322-323). This challenge, however, did not bring about its 
transformation, but only consolidated an alliance between the political institutions of 
labour and the political parties marginalised by the Concordancia (ibid: 326-333). 
Industrial workers, therefore, were directly confronting the repression of the 
Concordancia, but, in the process, were allowing the conditions to be set for their own 
pacification beneath the increasingly influential political institutions of labour.  
The general strike of 1936 thus marked the culmination of tensions that had emerged 
during the early twentieth century. In attempting a recovery characterised by growth in 
traditional sectors, the Concordancia only consolidated emergent workplace conflict 
across manufacturing. Whilst workers mobilised in unprecedented levels, the result, 
however, was primarily the strengthening of the political institutions of labour. Low 
levels of representation and established relationships with the state meant these 
institutions became increasingly prominent. Despite the continued presence of radical 
political ideas and activists, the main impetus was already towards the pacification of 
the working class. Yet these institutions, and the workers they represented, continued to 
pose a growing threat to firms and the state. As such, increasingly direct support was 
provided for manufacturing, particularly with concessions granted to wage demands. 
  
The Failure of Repression, Conflict, and the Reorientation of the State 
It was increasingly clear that repression was only exacerbating tensions and conflicts 
throughout the manufacturing sector. Meeting the wage demands of workers through 
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partial compromises marked the beginning of a shift in attempts to exert control over 
the working class. Even more significant, however, were the strategies directly targeting 
the independent growth of the sector. Demands from employers’ organisations and the 
political institutions of labour called for increased protection and, to placate these 
demands and minimise provoking the working class that had mobilised with such force 
in 1936, direct state support for manufacturing emerged. As a result, there was a 
restructuring in which non-traditional sectors growing far more rapidly, helping to 
establish manufacturing as an independent leading sector. Within the state, moreover, 
efforts to consolidate this growth emerged, particularly with the 1940 Pinedo Plan.  
By the mid-1930s, the transformation of industrial manufacturing was occurring at an 
increasingly rapid pace. Overall, it had grown in absolute and relative terms and, 
between 1935 and 1946, the number of factories and installed capacity rose by over 55 
per cent and employment by 130 per cent to over 1 100 000 workers. This period saw 
the previously dominant foodstuffs, beverages, and tobacco decline from representing 
31 per cent of establishments to 22 per cent, from 27 per cent of employment to 23 per 
cent, from 42 per cent of production to 34 per cent, and from 32 per cent of value-added 
to 27 per cent (see Table 28; Belini & Korol 2012: 95-101). In response, there was 
mounting pressure for increased support from both firms and workers, particularly in 
traditional sectors. For example, the Argentine Industrial Union (UIA) and the Textile 
Workers’ Union (UOT) came together to argue foreign “dumping” represented unfair 
competition, to demand protection for domestic producers, and to call for the inclusion 
of the political institutions of labour in resolving issues facing the “national economy” 
(Korzeniewicz 1993: 33-34). This period saw the consolidation of a restructuring 
towards non-traditional sectors and increasing pressures for direct state intervention. 
Table 28: GDP and Manufacturing Value-Added, Argentina, 1936-1943 (data accessed from 
MOxLAD Database) 
Year 
Real GDP  
(Millions of 
1970 Argentine 
Pesos) 
Constant Manufacturing 
Value-Added (Millions of 
1970 Argentine Pesos)  
Share of Constant 
Manufacturing Value-
Added to Real GDP (%) 
1936 25 075 5 864 23.4 
1937 26 901 6 225 23.1 
1938 27 014 6 596 24.4 
1939 28 039 6 849 24.4 
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1940 28 503 6 715 23.6 
1941 29 964 6 983 23.3 
1942 30 315 7 741 25.6 
1943 30 076 8 081 26.9 
 
Alongside these changes, there was a continued expansion of union membership. In the 
CGT, it rose from 262 630 in 1936 to 330 681 in 1941 and in the autonomous 
federations (including those affiliated to the CUSC) it rose from 72 834 to 118 838, 
with membership increasingly significant in the traditional sectors of manufacturing 
(Munck et al 1987: 115; see Table 29). However, whilst membership rose, activity 
declined. For example, from an index of 100 in 1935 for the number of meetings and 
attendance, there was a drastic decline by 1942 to 64 and 27 respectively (Munck et al 
1987: 116, tables 10.7). Strikes, moreover, were less frequent and with lower levels of 
participation (see Table 30). This decline was primarily due to the growing level of state 
mediation. Between 1930 and 1935 the percentage of strikes with no mediation was 
consistently around 75 per cent, peaking at 85.8 per cent in 1932, but by 1936 this 
figure had fallen to 64.6 per cent, with 28.6 per cent of strikes receiving mediation from 
the state. This increased between 1937 and 1942, with around half receiving direct 
mediation from the state by this period (Korzeniewicz 1993: 25). Workers’ mobilisation 
had strengthened the political institutions of labour, but the continuing growth in 
mediation this had engendered imposed new constraints. Rising levels of state 
mediation narrowed the potential for imposing new imperatives on firms and the state. 
Table 29: Union Membership in Selected Sectors, Argentina, 1941 (adapted from Doyon 2006: 37-
38) 
Sector No. of Workers Union Membership Affiliated Workers (%) 
Industry (Total) - 145 572 - 
Foodstuffs 150 941 29 171 19.3 
Metalworking 136 841 4 459 3.3 
Textiles 75 000 (approx.) 15 504 16.6 (approx.) 
Woodworking 53 454 6 304 11.8 
Chemicals 30 064 250 0.8 
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Table 30: Strikes and Participation, Argentina, 1925-1936 (adapted from Doyon 2006: 252) 
Year Strikes Striking Workers Work Days Lost 
1936 109 85 438 1 344 461 
1937 82 49 993 517 645 
1938 44 8 871 228 703 
1939 49 19 718 241 099 
1940 53 12 721 224 599 
1941 54 6 606 247 598 
1942 113 39 865 634 339 
1943 85 6 754 86 290 
 
These increasing levels of pacification are illustrated by the outcomes of workplace 
conflict during latter half of the 1930s. Whilst prior to 1935 most strikes had resulted in 
negative outcomes for workers, after this year the balance shifted significantly to 
positive, but partial, compromises. Between 1935 and 1942, strikes with wholly 
negative outcomes fluctuated between low levels of 3.6 and 13.8 per cent, compared to 
figures between 56 and 91 per cent in the first half of the decade (Doyon 2006: 40). 
Real wages, moreover, remained relatively stable in Buenos Aires after 1936 (see Table 
31). These outcomes can be attributed to two main causes. First, the increasing levels of 
mobilisation and the militancy of the working class forced firms and the state to adopt a 
more conciliatory stance than previously. Resolution was favoured over direct 
repression. Second, these victories were the outcome of the increasing incorporation of 
the political institutions of labour. The partial nature of victories, however, meant 
workers’ earlier militancy was being pacified by these institutions, as the combination 
of repression and limited concessions undermined workers’ political influence. 
Table 31: Real Wages in Buenos Aires (1925/1929 = 100), 1936-1944 (adapted from Munck et al 
1987: 124, table 10.8) 
Year Real Wages 
1936 100 
1937 101.05 
1938 101.05 
1939 102.11 
1940 103.16 
1941 103.16 
1942 106.32 
1943 112.63 
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The limit on workers’ political influence was epitomised by the failure of the Pinedo 
Plan in 1940. The Plan was authored by Federico Pinedo, then Minister of the 
Economy, but strongly influenced by the head of the Central Bank, Raul Prebisch, and 
represented the first coherent effort in Argentina at economic planning and state 
intervention favouring domestic manufacturing (Rock 1993: 212). Although never 
implemented due to Congress opposition to the Concordancia rather than the actual 
policy content, it included the following proposals: agricultural price supports, cheap 
housing in the cities, credit provision to promote industry, and extended tariff and trade 
protections (Cramer 1998: 536-537). Most importantly, its failure demonstrated the 
limits on workers’ ability to impose sufficient imperatives on the state to implement a 
more decisive transformation in the trajectory of industrialisation. 
Whilst the Pinedo Plan was never implemented, its articulation hinted at the recognised 
need for a reorientation in the role of the state. However, by mediating tensions through 
partial concessions, the imperatives to fundamentally transform this role were 
drastically weakened. Yet this pacification, and the wage concessions that came with it, 
was only temporary. As the sector continued to expand so did the potential for a repeat 
of the 1936 general strike. The political institutions of labour still only represented a 
limited fraction of the industrial working class, particularly in the now fastest-growing 
sectors that were no longer linked to traditional exports. As a result, a more 
comprehensive transformation was soon required. The military takeover that came in 
1943 represented such a shift. Most importantly, it consolidated the continuing efforts 
of the state to exert control over the working class by strengthening the political 
institutions of labour and the state’s capacities for direct economic intervention. 
 
The Pacification of the Working Class and the Consolidation of ISI 
 
This section will explore the implications of renewed efforts to establish state control 
over the working class, emphasising the continuities with the earlier consolidation of 
conflict, the establishment of a new political alliance between the state and the political 
institutions of labour, and the limitations this imposed for workers and manufacturing. 
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The emergence of the CGT during the 1930s and its nascent relationship with the state 
was firmly established after 1946. However, the ostensible transformation in the 
significance of the state after this date represented a degree of continuity. The Peronist 
state represented the consolidation of emergent state-led discipline around new 
apparatus for economic intervention. In the first instance, this was achieved with 
concessions to the political institutions of labour. Yet as the limited effectiveness of this 
strategy became apparent in the stagnation pervading leading sectors of manufacturing, 
more aggressive forms of discipline were imposed through stabilisation, rationalisation 
and the return to state support for traditional economic actors and activities.  
 
Consolidating the Myth of Populist Industrialisation 
Rather than mark a significant break with the preceding decade, the strategies adopted 
after 1943 were characterised by an ongoing expansion of state intervention and the 
consolidation of the relationship between the political institutions of labour and the 
state. Initially, this produced a rapid growth in manufacturing, with the state apparatus 
now directly supporting it through credit, tariffs, and, in some important cases, direct 
ownership. Structural transformation also proceeded at a more rapid pace, as non-
traditional sectors grew most rapidly. The most important effect, however, was the 
pacification of workplace conflict. The state offered concessions to workers in wages 
and political organisation, facilitating an increase in participation and membership, but 
also securing a definite decline in political militancy. Yet these strategies continued to 
rely on workers’ mobilisations and it was this threat, pushing against the new 
constraints, which permitted the consolidation of an ostensibly populist trajectory of ISI. 
The military government of 1943 to 1946 and Juan Perón (1946-1955) quickly set about 
expanding state intervention. By mid-1946, the Central Bank and private deposits were 
nationalised and the Argentine Institute for the Promotion of Trade (IAPI) was 
established. These institutions, combined with new monetary and credit policy, led to 
increases in public spending of over 60 per cent between 1946 and 1955 (Belini & 
Korol 2012: 115). Under Perón, much of this initially targeted the 80 per cent of the 
roughly 85 000 industrial establishments in 1945 that employed less than one hundred 
workers (Girbal-Blacha 2003: 39). Yet the state also gave support to the largest firms, 
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whilst nationalisation led to an increase in state participation in production and 
employment, which tripled to 10 per cent and 12 per cent respectively (Belini & Korol 
2012: 126-129). Although justifying these interventions as targeting national “strategic” 
industries, it was fear of bankruptcy that encouraged much of this activity (Brennan 
1994: 4; Brennan & Rougier 2009: 13). Nationalised firms were placed under the 
control of the National Directorate of State Industries (DINIE), which focused on 
expansion of the internal market, redistribution towards workers and manufacturing, 
and full employment. Most significantly, it took control, between 1947 and 1950, of 
twenty-nine former German firms in metalworking, chemicals, and electrical goods 
(Belini 2001: 98-101). The state, therefore, was integral to consolidating the 
restructuring of industrial manufacturing around these leading non-traditional sectors.  
Overall, these measures had a mixed effect. Industry had already peaked in terms of the 
share of manufacturing value-added to GDP as early as 1947. The figures for both 
relative and absolute growth, moreover, demonstrate the ongoing instability of the 
trajectory of ISI (see Table 32). Initially, manufacturing grew at an 8 per cent average 
annual rate, but it entered in crisis between 1948 and 1952, falling by 1.4 per cent 
(Cortés Conde 2009: 185-188). Yet whilst growth was not as impressive as typically 
believed, structural changes continued. Between 1946 and 1955 in traditional sectors, 
overall capital stocks rose by 25.3 per cent, employment by 9.3 per cent, output by 10.5 
per cent, capital per worker by 5.3 per cent, and output per worker by 1.1 per cent. 
However, in non-traditional sectors, capital stocks rose by 118.2 per cent, employment 
by 19.9 per cent, output by 51.5 per cent, capital per worker by 86.7 per cent, and output 
per worker by 29.6 per cent (Sidicaro 2002: 75, table 3). It was this restructuring toward 
non-traditional sectors, therefore, that marked the most important changes under Perón. 
Table 32: GDP and Manufacturing Value-Added, Argentina, 1943-1952 (data accessed from 
MOxLAD Database) 
Year 
Real GDP  
(Millions of 
1970 Argentine 
Pesos) 
Constant Manufacturing 
Value-Added (Millions of 
1970 Argentine Pesos)  
Share of Constant 
Manufacturing Value-
Added to Real GDP (%) 
1943 30 076 8 081 26.9 
1944 33 490 8 876 26.5 
1945 32 408 8 458 26.1 
1946 35 302 9 216 26.1 
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1947 39 221 10 722 27.3 
1948 41 399 10 418 25.2 
1949 40 837 9 690 23.4 
1950 41 342 9 886 23.2 
1951 42 949 10 145 23.7 
1952 40 788 9 954 24.4 
 
Most significantly, moreover, it was the pacification of workplace conflict that 
permitted these changes. After 1943, the CGT No. 2, formed by Socialist and 
Communist Party leaders, was repressed in favour of the “moderate” CGT No. 1 
(Munck et al 1987: 117-118; Doyon 2006: 100). Accompanying this repression, real 
wages rose and official prices of consumer goods were kept well below world market 
prices, providing workers with an indirect subsidy (Belini & Korol 2012: 116-117). 
Workers initially responded positively to this ostensibly conciliatory attitude adopted by 
the state, accepting real term wage gains up until 1949 and favourable state mediation 
(see Table 33; Adelman 1992: 248-250). Moreover, the CGT also gained unprecedented 
prominence, with, for example, the proportion of affiliated industrial workers rising 
from 39.5 per cent in 1945 to 55 per cent in 1954 (ibid: 121; see Table 34; Doyon 2006: 
244). This conciliatory stance was permitted by labour leaders that pursued a political 
alliance with Perón mirroring previous strategies that favoured mediation (Horowitz 
1983: 103-107 & 115; Luis Monzalvo 1974 cited in Munck et al 1987: 120). By 
offering limited concessions, Perón facilitated the strengthening of the political 
institutions of labour to sustain control and consolidate the ostensibly populist ISI. 
Table 33: Real Wages in Buenos Aires (1943 = 100), 1945-1952 (adapted from Munck et al 1987: 
144, table 11.6) 
Year Real Wages 
1945 105.8 
1946 111.7 
1947 140.0 
1948 172.9 
1949 181.4 
1950 173.6 
1951 161.3 
1952 143.1 
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Table 34: Union Membership for Selected Industrial Sectors, Argentina, 1946-1954 (adapted from 
Doyon 2006: 247) 
Sector 1946 1948 1950 1954 
Foodstuffs, Beverages and Tobacco 167 650 337 142 444 781 377 800 
Textiles 60 995 100 899 107 500 121 000 
Woodworking 21 855 39 045 40 000 23 000 
Chemicals 5 000 - 20 000 31 000 
Metalworking 21 855 108 326 112 500 118 000 
Total 837 336 1 532 925 1 992 404 2 256 580 
 
Yet the continued significance of worker militancy in constituting this trajectory of 
conciliation and populist state intervention should not be overlooked. The prominence 
of political activists of the Left was not simply extinguished after 1943, as members of 
the disbanded CGT No. 2 simply transferred their membership to CGT No. 1 (Munck et 
al 1987: 118). Moreover, protests on 1st May 1943 led by workers linked to the 
Communist Party and strikes in March 1944 demonstrated the continuing support for 
radical mobilisation (Doyon 2006: 102 & 106-109). Most significantly, the general 
strike of 17th October 1945 illustrated the continuing influence of the working class 
beyond the political institutions of labour. Workers and local activists led this protest, 
with support in general assemblies and widespread discontent pressing the political 
institutions of labour into action. Demands were wide-ranging: opposition to members 
of the conservative opposition entering cabinet roles, the formation of a democratic 
government in consultation with the CGT, immediate elections, the release of all 
prisoners incarcerated for supporting workers, and the maintenance of social reforms 
(ibid: 157-173). Its success, therefore, was premised not on the coordination of a narrow 
political leadership, but instead on pressure still generated by the workers themselves. 
This continuing political influence of workers was also apparent in the upsurge in 
strikes that occurred after 1946. Striking workers numbered over 330 000 in 1946, over 
500 000 in 1947 and around 300 000 in 1948, although this did decline significantly in 
1949 (see Table 35). The autonomy of workers, however, was being sustained by the 
structures established within the political institutions of labour also facilitated their 
pacification. Article 49 of the 1945 Law of Professional Associations allowed workers 
to establish internal commissions that expanded political representation, monitored the 
implementation of labour legislation, provided a direct channel between workers and 
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their leadership, and transformed the balance of power in the workplace (Basualdo 
2010: 87-89). On the one hand, these allowed workers to continue to pose a continuing 
threat to the prevailing trajectory of ISI. On the other hand, at this time, they also 
allowed for a consolidation of constraints over continuing workers’ mobilisations. 
Table 35: Strikes and Participation, Argentina, 1943-1952 (adapted from Doyon 2006: 252) 
Year Strikes Striking Workers Work Days Lost 
1943 85 6 754 86 290 
1944 27 9 121 41 384 
1945 47 44 186 509 024 
1946 142 333 929 2 047 601 
1947 64 541 377 3 467 193 
1948 103 278 779 3 158 947 
1949 36 29 164 510 352 
1950 30 97 048 2 031 827 
1951 23 16 356 152 243 
1952 14 15 815 313 343 
 
It was these constraints, most importantly, that enabled the “liberal turn” in Peronism 
after 1949. Consolidating the influence of the political institutions of labour was integral 
to the establishment of control over the working class, to limiting its potential to resist 
the imposition of new disciplinary strategies aimed at resolving the instability within ISI 
in favour of firms, and to constrain the threat that workers had earlier demonstrated. The 
decline in workers’ mobilisations, however, was only a temporary solution that quickly 
demonstrated its limits. In supporting growth in both the largest firms, with the greatest 
ability to sustain control, and the smallest firms, which represented a significant 
proportion of employment and a fragmentation of the working class, Perón had 
consolidated inefficiencies that could only be addressed by a resort to stabilisation, 
rationalisation, and increasing demands for productivity. In consolidating the political 
institutions of labour as a source of control, moreover, these strategies had inadvertently 
created new spaces for the manifestation of the radical autonomy of the working class. 
It was such changes that came to characterise the new locus of conflict around ISI. 
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The “Change of Direction” and the Renewed Disciplining of the Working Class 
The so-called “change of direction” or “return to the countryside” in 1952 saw attempts 
to address manufacturing stagnation through stabilisation, support for rural exports, and 
the encouragement of foreign investment. The most significant change, however, was 
its impact on the workplace. Stabilisation, the reorientation of state support, and appeals 
to foreign firms resulted in a significant squeeze on wages and an undermining of the 
earlier compromise that had allowed for the consolidation of relatively extensive 
industrial growth. This breakdown in the conditions necessary to pacifying the working 
class, therefore, resulted in a resurgence of workplace conflict. The growing number of 
strikes, which led to some concessions for workers, remained unresolved in some of the 
most important manufacturing sectors. In response, domestic firms increasingly adopted 
aggressive stances to deepen discipline within and beyond the workplace.  
As Noemí Girbal-Blacha (2003) has demonstrated, this “shift” was actually a 
continuation of earlier strategies that began as early as 1949. The removal of domestic 
industrialist Miguel Miranda as Economics Minister and his replacement with Alfredo 
Goméz Morales, however, made this explicit. Stabilisation and rationalisation measures 
intensified after 1952, focusing on reversing some of the extensive expansion of 
manufacturing and giving greater priority to agricultural sectors (Brennan 2007: 53). In 
manufacturing, there was increasing support for large-scale, non-traditional sectors such 
as steel, chemicals, aluminium, and mechanical goods and an opening up of these to 
foreign investors (Belini & Korol 2012: 145). Monetary restriction also sought to rein in 
inflation that had developed as a result of earlier expansionary policies, wage rises and 
redistribution, and the broader failure to address the technological constraints on small 
firms (Brennan & Rougier 2009: 52-54). Overall, however, the effect on manufacturing 
was not particularly profound. Foreign investment was limited between 1953 and 1955 
and, by 1955, growth had only just returned to pre-1949 levels (Katz & Kosacoff 1989: 
30; Brennan 2007: 53). As a result, there was very limited change. The relative 
significance of manufacturing experienced a slight decline in 1953 and 1954, whilst in 
absolute terms, despite a slight drop in 1953, growth continued during 1954 and 1955 
(see Table 36). There was, then, little change in the ostensible “change of direction”.  
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Table 36: GDP and Manufacturing Value-Added, Argentina, 1952-1955 (data accessed from 
MOxLAD Database) 
Year 
Real GDP  
(Millions of 
1970 Argentine 
Pesos) 
Constant Manufacturing 
Value-Added (Millions of 
1970 Argentine Pesos)  
Share of Constant 
Manufacturing Value-
Added to Real GDP (%) 
1952 40 788 9 954 24.4 
1953 42 949 9 898 23.0 
1954 44 722 10 682 23.9 
1955 47 881 11 989 25.0 
 
One area where change was significant, however, was the workplace. Concessions and 
benefits that had been received by workers in the latter half of the 1940s were 
increasingly eroded. For example, with the exception of 1953, real wages in Buenos 
Aires declined to levels lower than at any time since 1947 (see Table 37). This marked 
an important shift as the courting of foreign investment, the open support for large 
domestic firms, and the attack on the wages of industrial workers put a growing strain 
on the political compromise that had been established. The period between 1951 and 
1954, for example, saw a growing need for interventions in local sections of the 
political institutions of labour to bring them back under control, with 48 such cases 
carried out by the largest national federations (Doyon 2006: 369). Alongside this was an 
upsurge in strikes, with the number of workers mobilised and the number of working 
days lost increasing as protests were no longer halted by favourable mediation (see 
Table 38). For example, whilst strikes in 1954 resulted in agreements for wage rises of 
between 15 per cent and 18 per cent, in key sectors of tobacco and metalworking they 
remained unresolved (Doyon 2006: 382-385). Overall, the squeeze on wages brought 
about by efforts to impose a particular resolution to the crises of 1949 had reopened a 
confrontation between workers, firms, and the state that had only briefly been resolved. 
Table 37: Real Wages in Buenos Aires (1943 = 100), 1952-1955 (adapted from Munck et al 1987: 
144, table 11.6) 
Year Real Wages 
1952 143.1 
1953 249.3 
1954 164.7 
1955 163.0 
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Table 38: Strikes and Participation, Argentina, 1952-1955 (adapted from Doyon 2006: 252) 
Year Strikes Striking Workers Work Days Lost 
1952 14 15 815 313 343 
1953 40 5 506 59 294 
1954 18 119 701 1 401 797 
 
In response to these deepening tensions, two “productivity conferences” were organised 
by Perón, the CGT, and the leading employers’ association for domestic firms, the 
General Economic Council (CGE). The first (23rd to 28th August 1954) was “largely 
intended to redress the balance of power in the workplace… [with] the purpose of the 
conference to be the achievement of ‘humanized rationalization’ of the factory”, 
demonstrating the centrality of the workplace in these tensions. The second (21st to 31st 
March 1955) continued to focus on the balance of power in the workplace and 
rationalisation. Firms and the political institutions of labour disagreed on the sources of 
low productivity, with the former blaming worker’s political power and the latter 
blaming management and subcontracting (Brennan & Rougier 2009: 104-105). Yet 
firms and the state were unable, or unwilling, to impose their demands and confront the 
CGT that represented the bulwark against the re-emergence of a radical working class.  
The stalemate of these productivity conferences in 1954 and 1955 marked the failure of 
Perón to consolidate control over industrial workers. Attempts first to pacify these 
struggles through wage concessions and then to resolve crises through stabilisation had 
resulted in a resurgence of workplace conflict. Firms, however, could not force through 
changes in the workplace whilst the state relied on political institutions of labour 
responsive to the demands of industrial workers. Moreover, the state could not impose 
further restrictions on workers without undermining the compromise that had allowed 
for the imposition of these constraints in the first place. This, then, was a manifestation 
of unresolved tensions in the trajectory of ISI. As new strategies became favourable to 
the interests of firms, the resurgence of workplace conflict was met by a sharp increase 
in political repression and the deepening of discipline within and around the workplace.  
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Resistance and the Radicalisation of the Trajectory of ISI 
 
This section will explain the radicalisation of workplace conflict. Despite the combative 
rhetoric and growing instability within the institutions of the state, limited changes were 
made in strategies aimed at fomenting industrial growth. The most prominent moves, 
targeting the weakening of the political institutions of labour, the encouragement of 
foreign investment, and the rationalisation of industrial structures and production 
processes, had their origins in the final years of Peronism. The most significant change 
in this period, however, was the transformation in the relationship between the political 
institutions of labour, the state, and the working class. Attempts by the state to reassert 
managerial authority after 1955 engendered growing discontent, which increasingly 
began to exceed the constraints of the political institutions of labour. As a result, 
deepening political conflicts undermined successive attempts to re-establish control 
over the working class, which continually confronted the strengthening alliance between 
the state and foreign firms that was leading the reoriented trajectory of ISI. 
 
Counter-Revolution to the Radicalisation of the Working Class 
ISI after 1955 proceeded with a remarkable degree of similarity to the first half of the 
decade. The relative pace and fluctuating character of growth, as well as the policy 
measures designed to support it, changed little under the military and civilian 
governments that succeeded Perón. Stabilisation, rationalisation, and foreign investment 
remained the main pillars of economic policy. The most significant changes, however, 
were in the increasingly aggressive attempts to control the working class. Efforts to 
dismantle the Peronist leadership and replace it with more pliant figures marked an 
effort to sustain controls that had been developed over previous decades. Attacks on the 
workplace, however, were a direct attempt to quell the resurgence of the working class 
that had continued to demonstrate its threat to the strategies of firms and the state.  
The “Liberating Revolution” of 1955 made few changes in economic policy. Its most 
important contribution, the “Prebisch Plan” was a “cosmopolitan developmentalist 
approach with some classical overtones” that targeted increased agricultural production 
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and exports to address the stagnation of manufacturing and the indebtedness of state-run 
enterprises (Sikkink 1991: 78; Belini & Korol 2012: 158). Thus despite the change in 
political leadership, ISI remained on a relatively similar trajectory. Between 1955 and 
1957 manufacturing value-added continued to grow both in absolute terms and as a 
proportion of GDP (see Table 39). Between 1956 and 1961 this growth averaged 
annually at around 4.2 per cent, composed of rates of 9.7 per cent in non-traditional 
sectors and negative rates of -0.2 in traditional sectors (Schiavi 2008: 63). These 
measures and their effects were a continuation of the earlier liberal turn characterised by 
an ongoing restructuring of manufacturing in favour of the non-traditional sectors. 
Table 39: GDP and Manufacturing Value-Added, Argentina, 1955-1958 (data accessed from 
MOxLAD Database) 
Year 
Real GDP  
(Millions of 
1970 Argentine 
Pesos) 
Constant Manufacturing 
Value-Added (Millions of 
1970 Argentine Pesos)  
Share of Constant 
Manufacturing Value-
Added to Real GDP (%) 
1955 47 881 11 989 25.0 
1956 49 212 12 820 26.1 
1957 51 761 13 833 26.7 
1958 54 920 13 447 24.5 
 
Such continuities were also apparent under Arturo Frondizi (1958-1962). Liberal 
policies were represented by new foreign investment guidelines, a liberalisation of profit 
remittances, and reforms to the Industrial Bank that meant it would only provide credit 
to firms employing over 300 workers (Sikkink 1991: 91-92; Brennan 1994: 37-38; 
Brennan & Rougier 2009: 110). Stabilisation measures also increased in veracity. 
Monetary devaluation, liberalisation of foreign exchange rates, restrictions on domestic 
credit, suppression of price controls, and a reduction in the government deficit were 
implemented in exchange for significant credit from the IMF. Yet these measures had a 
relatively limited effect on manufacturing. Although GDP declined by around 6.5 per 
cent and inflation rose dramatically to 125 per cent in 1959, manufacturing grew 
consistently in relative and absolute terms between 1958 and 1961 (Belini & Korol 
2012: 165-166; see Table 40). This was primarily led by large, mainly foreign, firms 
that increased from 1 413 establishments in 1954 to 1 645 establishment in 1964, with 
around 40 per cent of these new entrants being foreign subsidiaries or affiliates 
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(Schvarzer 1996: 230). These measures, therefore, continued the restructuring of 
manufacturing around large foreign and domestic firms in non-traditional sectors. 
Table 40: GDP and Manufacturing Value-Added, Argentina, 1958-1962 (data accessed from 
MOxLAD Database) 
Year 
Real GDP  
(Millions of 
1970 Argentine 
Pesos) 
Constant Manufacturing 
Value-Added (Millions of 
1970 Argentine Pesos)  
Share of Constant 
Manufacturing Value-
Added to Real GDP (%) 
1958 54 920 13 467 24.5 
1959 51 373 13 439 26.2 
1960 55 418 14 791 26.7 
1961 59 353 16 272 27.4 
1962 58 411 15 375 26.3 
 
Growing political tensions in the sector were also consolidated after 1955. In response 
to earlier mobilisations, the new regime sought to undermine workers’ influence 
through the removal of Peronist leaders, the repression of political organisation within 
the workplace, and the restructuring of collective bargaining to increase productivity 
and squeeze wages (James 1988: 54). In 1956, firms were instructed to remove all 
clauses in contracts preventing productivity increases and internal commissions were 
either dissolved or appointed by the state in a bid to reassert “the right of managers to 
manage” (Zarrilli 2004: 116; Belini 2006: 96; Munck et al 1987: 150). As a result, 
whilst there were relative wage increases during this period, these were increasingly the 
result of bitter negotiations with firms that seized their opportunity to transform the 
workplace (see Table 41; James 1988: 69). Rather than repress tensions, therefore, the 
result was growing intransigence on all sides and increasing workplace conflict. 
Table 41: Real Industrial Wage Index, Argentina, 1955-1958 (1955 = 100) (adapted from Pinchot 
1991: 526) 
Year Industrial Wage Index 
Consumer Price 
Index 
Real Industrial Wage 
Index 
1955 100 100 100 
1956 114 114 100 
1957 152 142 108 
1958 209 186 112 
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Moreover, whilst Peronism was an important idea that gave meaning to these 
mobilisations, it was not a Peronism envisaged by Perón or the leadership of the 
political institutions of labour. Instead it was a reinterpretation of its core ideas in the 
context of the deepening conflicts of the Peronist Resistance.7 For example, the scale of 
the general strike between 14th and 17th November 1955 was unprecedented. 
Absenteeism was 75 per cent across Buenos Aires and 95 per cent in manufacturing 
(Schneider 2005: 78-79; Gaspari & Panella 2008: 12-13). Strike action soared, with an 
increasing participation and dramatically rising numbers of work days lost (see Table 
42). Most significantly, the impetus for these mobilisations came from the workers 
themselves, with the internal commissions and workplace delegates giving meaning to 
their demands and permitting the dissemination of radical ideas. Following the 
proscription of the CGT, many workers had joined the Communist “Inter-Union 
Commission” as its membership soared to 2.5 million (Gaspari & Panella 2008: 14; 
Schneider 2005: 91). The combination of renewed mobilisation and radical political 
ideas, then, marked an important turning point in the resurgence of workplace conflict.  
Table 42: Strikes and Participation, Argentina, 1956-1958 (adapted from Munck et al 1987: 163 & 
Schneider 2005: 132) 
Year Strikes Striking Workers Work Days Lost 
1955 21 - 144 120 
1956 52 853 994 5 167 294 
1957 56 304 209 3 390 509 
1958 84 277 381 6 245 286 
 
This resurgence also continued under Frondizi. After 1959, stabilisation measures were 
most keenly felt in the decline of real wages. Despite a slight recovery between 1960 
and 1962, in Buenos Aires they remained well below previous levels (see Table 43). 
Moreover, efforts were made to purge radical activists and dissolve many of the internal 
commissions through repression or their co-opting with the promise of “a good 
redundancy payment” (Munck et al 1987: 158). Yet, despite these explicit attacks on 
                                                          
7
 Research by Daniel James (1988) and Alejandro Schneider (2005) offer the two most influential 
accounts of this period of the “Peronist Resistance”, with the former providing important insights into its 
composition, its links to the exiled leadership of Perón, and the militant clandestine commando groups 
that used increasingly violent tactics against the state. Where the two accounts differ is that James sees 
the resurgence of the working class as relatively short-lived and quickly contained beneath the 
reconstitution of the political institutions of labour. Schneider, however, argues that this process marked 
the reopening of political space for workers. It is the latter argument that is supported in this thesis.   
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workers and their representatives, internal commissions and workplace delegates 
remained influential in the workplace, the leadership of the political institutions of 
labour was still far from reconstituting its control, and there was a clear accumulation of 
experience and organisation amongst the workers themselves (Schneider 2005: 195). As 
a result, mobilisation reached an impressive peak in 1959. Despite only 45 recorded 
strikes, these involved nearly 1.5 million workers and resulted in over 10 million lost 
work days (see Table 44). Such mobilisations, therefore, demonstrated the depth of 
opposition from workers and the continuing failure of the state to re-exert control. 
Table 43: Real Industrial Wage Index, Argentina, 1958-1962 (1955 = 100) (adapted from Pinchot 
1991: 526) 
Year Industrial Wage Index 
Consumer Price 
Index 
Real Industrial Wage 
Index 
1958 209 186 112 
1959 355 399 89 
1960 471 507 93 
1961 587 576 102 
1962 737 738 100 
 
Table 44: Strikes and Participation, Argentina, 1958-1962 (adapted from Munck et al 1987: 163) 
Year Strikes Striking Workers Work Days Lost 
1958 84 277 381 6 245 286 
1959 45 1 411 062 10 078 138 
1960 26 130 044 1 661 519 
1961 43 236 462 1 755 170 
1962 15 42 386 268 748 
 
Workers after 1959 possessed a renewed degree of political influence, overcoming the 
previous constraints that had been imposed upon them. The formation of the “62 
Organisations” was, initially, enabled by the resurgence of workplace conflicts and, 
whilst these political institutions represented new limits on the extent of mobilisation, 
their political influence relied more so than ever upon the continued threat that was 
posed by the working class (Gaspari & Panella 2008: 26). This became even more 
pronounced after 1960, despite the decline in strikes. For example, the return to 
negotiated settlement was only made possible by shared recognition of the level of force 
demonstrated in earlier mobilisations and a continuing level of protest amongst 
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industrial workers that was framed around a deep-rooted opposition to firms and the 
state (Schneider 2005: 151-158). Thus, whilst the political institutions of labour 
attempted to reconstitute their influence on the back of this threat of force, they could 
not pacify the working class and, as such, permitted the resurgence of its influence. 
Attempts to re-establish discipline and control, therefore, only intensified workplace 
conflict. Moreover, the explicit assault on the political institutions of labour had 
inadvertently consolidated the resurgence of workers’ political influence. Although this 
resurgence had led to a reconstitution of the constraints that were imposed by the “62 
Organisations”, this was on completely different terms to the 1940s. As such, the 
attempt to construct a trajectory of ISI reliant on stabilisation, rationalisation, and a 
reorganisation of the workplace was continually undermined by the workplace conflicts 
these measures engendered. The state, in response, was forced to intensify political 
repression within and beyond the workplace, as rising tensions were consolidated 
around renewed efforts to reassert control, the failure to address resurgent working class 
militancy, and the tensions generated by the restructuring of industrial manufacturing. 
 
The Continuities of Conflict and the Limits of Institutional Constraints   
The immediate response to the resurgence of the working class and the political tensions 
that were created around the trajectory of ISI was an attempt to re-establish economic 
liberalism and a deepening of political repression. The short-term, but severe impact of 
these changes led to a rapid reinstatement of familiar policy strategies of direct 
intervention premised on the expansion of foreign investment. This consolidated the 
restructuring of the sector, with leading foreign firms in non-traditional sectors 
increasingly responsible for economic recovery. The impact of this combination of the 
brief imposition of economic liberalism and the return of expansive strategies 
encouraging foreign investment produced the longest sustained period of industrial 
manufacturing growth in this period of ISI. As a result of the character of this recovery, 
however, workplace conflict across manufacturing became increasingly widespread. 
The inability to reassert control over the working class led, under the military-backed 
government of José María Guido (1962-1963), to an explicit assault on workers. 
Currency devaluation and orthodox monetary and fiscal policy produced a severe 
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contraction in domestic demand, a steep decline in economic activity and public works, 
widespread bankruptcy, and a rise in unemployment to a record 8.8 per cent (Belini & 
Korol 2012: 169). The electoral victory of Arturo Illia (1963-1966), however, led to a 
re-establishment of an expansive industrial policy that promoted growth in primary and 
industrial exports to address the deepening balance of payments crisis (Sikkink 1991: 
103; Katz & Kosacoff 1989: 57). After 1964, as a result, ISI entered its most successful 
phase, including an average 6 per cent annual productivity increase over the next decade 
(Katz & Kosacoff 1989: 52 & 57; see Table 45). Increasing foreign investment, 
moreover, produced important changes. Large firms led the resurgence and, although 
net foreign investment fell, its prominence in leading non-traditional sectors meant that 
foreign firms stimulated overall recovery in both output and employment (Schvarzer 
1996: 255; Belini & Korol 2012: 180-185). The implication of this return to expansion, 
after several years of stagnation and decline, as such, was a consolidation of these new 
leading sectors of non-traditional, foreign-controlled industrial manufacturing. 
Table 45: GDP and Manufacturing Value-Added, Argentina, 1962-1966 (data accessed from 
MOxLAD Database) 
Year 
Real GDP  
(Millions of 
1970 Argentine 
Pesos) 
Constant Manufacturing 
Value-Added (Millions of 
1970 Argentine Pesos)  
Share of Constant 
Manufacturing Value-
Added to Real GDP (%) 
1962 58 411 15 375 26.3 
1963 57 026 14 750 25.9 
1964 62 900 17 531 27.8 
1965 68 663 19 951 29.1 
1966 69 107 20 083 29.1 
 
The tensions this engendered, however, were also consolidated. Whilst real wages 
remained relatively stable between 1962 and 1966, workers’ share of GDP declined. It 
fell from 47 per cent between 1953 and 1955 to 38.5 per cent between 1959 and 1963 
(see Table 46; Belini & Korol 2012: 174). Firms, the state, and, increasingly, the 
political institutions of labour also continued their attack on the most radical activists 
within the factories. One illustrative example was in the metalworking firm TAMET 
where, in November 1963, the firm dismissed 20 leading activists with the implicit 
support of the national federation (James 1988: 161). Moreover, there were only 15 
strikes in 1962 and a maximum in this period of 32 in 1965, with a peak of 235 913 
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participants in 1966 and a little over 1 million days lost (see Table 47). To explain this 
decline, it is often claimed that “carefully orchestrated mobilisations replaced the 
spontaneous energy of the working class” and that the political institutions of labour had 
reached “the height of [their] power” (Munck et al 1987: 162; James 1988: 161-166). 
Yet, as has been demonstrated, even under the most well-established constraints, 
workplace conflict remained significant. After 1962, for example, many workers 
occupied their factories beyond “official” strikes (Schneider 2005: 188-192). By the 
mid-1960s, therefore, workers continued to confront the strategies of firms and the state. 
Table 46: Real Industrial Wage Index, Argentina, 1962-1966 (1955 = 100) (adapted from Pinchot 
1991: 526) 
Year Industrial Wage Index 
Consumer Price 
Index 
Real Industrial Wage 
Index 
1962 737 738 100 
1963 918 915 100 
1964 1 252 1 118 112 
1965 1 662 1 439 116 
1966 2 265 1 899 119 
 
Table 47: Strikes and Participation, Argentina, 1962-1966 (adapted from Munck et al 1987: 163) 
Year Strikes Striking Workers Work Days Lost 
1962 15 42 386 268 748 
1963 20 207 216 812 395 
1964 27 144 230 636 302 
1965 32 203 596 590 511 
1966 27 235 913 1 003 710 
 
One of the most important examples of this continuity was the “Struggle Plan”. 
Coordinated by the Peronist leadership between 1963 and 1965, it comprised hundreds 
of factory occupations, and involved hundreds of thousands of workers, including 
important radical political currents (Grau et al 2006: 131-148; see Table 48; Basualdo 
2010: 116-117). Significantly, it represented a shift in the mobilisation of workplace 
conflicts. Rather than strengthening the position of the political institutions of labour, it 
consolidated the resurgence of the working class. New forms of mobilisation, including 
factory occupations, combined with a growing space for the dissemination of radical 
political ideas. Thus as the political institutions of labour gradually re-established their 
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political influence, they facilitated the emergence of a radicalised working class that 
challenged the constraints these institutions imposed. Firms and the state were, 
therefore, unable to re-establish control, thereby undermining the developmentalist, 
“modernising” strategies of stabilisation and rationalisation that were being pursued.  
Table 48: Details of the 1964 Struggle Plan, Argentina (Schneider 2005: 106) 
Date Operation Establishments Occupied Workers Involved 
21/5/64 No. 1 800 500 000 
27/5/64 No. 2 1 200 600 000 
29/5/64 No. 3 1 100 650 000 
2/6/64 No. 4 750 150 000 
3/6/64 No. 5 “A” 60 8 000 
4/6/64 No. 5 “B” 40 5 000 
18/6/64 No. 6 2 950 850 000 
24/6/64 No. 7 4 100 1 150 000 
Total - 11 000 3 913 000 
 
The “Struggle Plan”, therefore, was not the apogee of control exercised through the 
political institutions of labour. Without pressures emanating from the workplaces of 
manufacturing, and without persistent tensions created by attempts to reassert discipline 
and control by firms and the state, there was no imperative to adopt such a radical form 
of protest. The response of firms and the state, moreover, demonstrates how far these 
mobilisations were from representing an attempt to pacify workers. The strategies for 
ISI characterised by limited concessions in wages, expansive growth, and increasing 
foreign investment failed to impose control over the working class. Moreover, reliance 
on constraints exercised through the political institutions of labour, which now 
depended more than ever on the persistent threat of working class mobilisation, also 
failed. The state, then, resorted to a deepening of repression from beyond the workplace. 
 
The Limits of Repression and Revolution in the Breakdown of ISI 
 
This section will identify the limitations that had been created through the conflicts 
within ISI, highlighting the important continuities in state strategies aimed at fomenting 
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industrial growth by exerting control over the working class through institutional 
constraints, through measures aimed at stabilisation, rationalisation, and foreign 
investment, and, on regular occasions, through direct political repression. The 
consolidation of the authoritarian apparatus of the state in 1966 marked the beginning of 
the apogee of these conflicts between the new coalition of foreign firms and the state 
and the working class. It was, ostensibly, these most “successful” efforts to engender 
industrial growth that produced the most violent and widespread conflicts. As the new 
regime failed to consolidate control over an increasingly militant working class, 
concessions were made to the political institutions of labour with the aim of 
reconstituting earlier constraints. The result, then, was the fragmentation of this political 
subject and the spiral of increasingly violent conflicts that led to the breakdown of ISI. 
 
The Consolidation of Authoritarian Control within ISI 
After 1966, in close alliance with foreign firms in the leading industrial sectors, the state 
squeezed wages, attempted to dismantle the political institutions of labour, repressed 
autonomous forms of mobilisation, and implemented a harsh plan of stabilisation. The 
immediate effect was a consolidation of the upsurge in growth, with leading foreign 
firms benefitting significantly at the expense of smaller firms and workers. However, in 
the long term, the deepening of discipline within and beyond the workplace led to 
growing tensions. Wages stagnated, and, most significantly, demands for rising 
productivity increased. Attacks on the political institutions of labour and the weakening 
of their ability to address these grievances then created space for the emergence of 
alternative political institutions. The radical Left and “dissident” Peronism, therefore, 
took on increasing significance in the continuing resurgence of workplace conflicts. 
The “Argentinian Revolution” of 1966 redoubled efforts to supress workplace conflict. 
Policies targeting inflation were a pretext for squeezing wages, collective agreements 
were frozen, collective bargaining was suspended, and even the holiday resorts of CGT 
were confiscated (Munck et al 1987: 161; James 1988: 216-217). Repression in the 
workplace was even more intense, moreover, with workers forced to resist this assault 
without traditional forms of representation (Schneider 2005: 282-283). Policymakers 
then used this repression to implement a plan in March 1967 aimed at “eliminating the 
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drag on capital accumulation, reducing the public spending that led to inflationary 
pressure, and increasing worker productivity”. This imposed a currency devaluation of 
40 per cent, liberalised exchange markets, set high taxes for non-industrial exports, 
decreased tariffs by 50 per cent, froze salaries until December 1968, and imposed strict 
controls on workplace organisation. It also included a steady increase in public spending 
relative to state revenues, which had a stabilising effect on the economy and facilitated 
an overall increase in production (Brennan 1994: 104; Gordillo 1999: 389; Cortés 
Conde 2009: 236; Katz & Kosacoff 1989: 58). Increased state intervention through 
public investment, stabilisation measures aimed at inflation, and a suppression of the 
political institutions of labour characterised the new phase in the trajectory of ISI. 
The short to medium-term effect was the continuation of this successful period of ISI. 
Between 1966 and 1971 manufacturing value-added, both in absolute and relative 
terms, continued to grow impressively (see Table 49). Overall industrial growth 
remained at around 7 per cent annually between 1963 and 1974, employment growth 
was relatively high across industry at around 2 per cent, and worker productivity rose at 
around 5 per cent. This was led, moreover, by non-traditional sectors that continued to 
increase their share of industrial GDP (Belini & Korol 2012: 222). As part of the 
“deepening of the efficiency”, tariff reforms had dramatically reduced protection for 
traditional sectors. Also, rather than provide short-term credit to cover current account 
deficits, the state focused on long and medium-term loans for importing machinery and 
equipment, as well as for the installation of new production facilities in non-traditional 
sectors. Changes in the sector, moreover, were compounded by the growing presence of 
foreign firms, with their capacity to raise finance internationally and access to 
technology resulting in “denationalisation” (ibid: 223; Katz & Kosacoff 1989: 42). 
Their presence was supported, however, by large domestic firms in non-traditional 
sectors, which sought a shift in the “local leadership of manufacturing” (Schvarzer 
1996: 272). This was not a transformation enforced by the state, but rather an ongoing 
restructuring of industrial manufacturing backed by large foreign and domestic firms. 
 
 
  107 
 
 
 
 
Table 49: GDP and Manufacturing Value-Added, Argentina, 1966-1971 (data accessed from 
MOxLAD Database) 
Year 
Real GDP  
(Millions of 
1970 Argentine 
Pesos) 
Constant Manufacturing 
Value-Added (Millions of 
1970 Argentine Pesos)  
Share of Constant 
Manufacturing Value-
Added to Real GDP (%) 
1966 69 107 20 083 29.1 
1967 70 936 20 387 28.7 
1968 73 983 21 712 29.3 
1969 80 301 24 064 30.0 
1970 84 624 25 583 30.2 
1971 87 807 28 052 31.9 
 
The downturn in strikes continued, moreover, particularly between 1967 and 1968 (see 
Table 50). However, whilst the political institutions of labour faltered in the face of the 
concerted attack, workplace conflict persisted. For example, resistance continued 
against increasing working hours in the meatpacking plants and rising productivity 
demands in the automobile sector, demonstrating “the latent existence of a respectable 
level of organisation and consciousness” (Schneider 2005: 283-285). This was 
manifested, moreover, in the sudden resurgence of strikes after 1968 as real wages 
declined and, particularly in the non-traditional sectors, productivity demands increased 
(see Table 51). For example, whilst the average annual rate of wage increases between 
1950 and 1970 in these sectors were at an index of 128 compared to 100 for 
manufacturing as a whole, productivity increases were at an index of 164 (Munck et al 
1987: 167). In response, then, workers increasingly confronted firms and the state, 
particularly as the political institutions of labour could no longer support their demands. 
Table 50: Strikes and Participation, Argentina, 1962-1966 (adapted from Munck et al 1987: 163 & 
184) 
Year Strikes Striking Workers Work Days Lost 
1966 27 235 913 1 003 710 
1967 6 547 2 702 
1968 50 - - 
1969 93 - - 
1970 237 - - 
1971 187 - - 
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Table 51: Real Industrial Wage Index, Argentina, 1966-1971 (1955 = 100) (adapted from Pinchot 
1991: 526) 
Year Industrial Wage Index 
Consumer Price 
Index 
Real Industrial Wage 
Index 
1966 2 265 1 899 119 
1967 2 933 2 454 120 
1968 3 048 2 851 107 
1969 3 352 3 058 109 
1970 3 959 3 458 114 
1971 5 589 4 694 119 
 
Whilst these grievances had, for a short time at least, been contained within the 
workplace, they increasingly found expression beyond it. The persistence of internal 
commissions and workplace delegate committees played a significant role in 
politicising workers’ demands. They were in a position not just to impose the 
constraints of the political institutions of labour, but, most importantly, they were 
receptive to the workplace grievances and provided space for radical political activists. 
So-called “anti-bureaucratic” tendencies grew in prominence, as “combative” currents 
of the Left played a role that was becoming equally as important as the traditional 
Peronists. From here, the working class posed a growing threat to the conciliatory 
leadership of the political institutions of labour and to the ability of firms and the state 
to exert discipline and control within the workplace (Basualdo 2010: 118-124). 
Resistance, as a result, gained increasing coherence through engagement with new 
activists, who gave workplace conflict a significance that transcended the factory walls. 
The most important manifestation of these tendencies was the formation of the General 
Workers’ Confederation of Argentinians (CGTA). Founded in 1968, it comprised 
workers that had been most badly affected by the measures implemented after 1966. 
Despite being led by Peronists, it acted, in the main, as “a pole of attraction for dissident 
workers, the increasingly confident student movement, and the left generally” (Munck 
et al 1987: 170). Yet whilst it failed to attract the affiliation of workers in traditionally 
powerful sectors, it was symbolic of the new forms of workplace conflict (Dawyd 2011: 
84-85). It was, however, just one of the increasingly prominent alternatives emerging 
from under traditional Peronism. Workers began to engage in news forms of 
organisation within the workplace, with the formation of “resistance committees” or 
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“strike committees” pushing forward their demands. There was also a growing rejection 
of the traditional political institutions of labour, with the formation of new institutions 
as “instruments of alternative and radicalised struggle” (Schneider 2005: 295-296 & 
303). Attempts to impose discipline within and beyond the workplace intensified 
alongside the political tensions they produced. Although the CGTA did not directly 
represent the most radical branches of the working class, it was a significant, if short-
lived, space within which radical opposition to firms and the state came to the fore. 
This resurgence culminated between 1969 and 1971 with mass working class 
mobilisations that challenged the state, firms, and the trajectory of ISI. Significantly, 
these mobilisations began in those areas least influenced by the constraints of the 
political institutions of labour. For example, the cordobazo and viborazo, the two most 
prominent instances of mobilisation, occurred in and around the city of Córdoba, 
spreading to other provincial cities and to the suburbs of Buenos Aires. Whilst the 
immediate impact was local, the implications went far beyond this. Not only did these 
protests present workers with new strategies of resistance, including legitimising the use 
of violence, they also increased the significance of the ideas of the Left (Brennan & 
Gordillo 1994: 490; Schneider 2005: 306-307). As stated by an observer for the AFL-
CIO in the aftermath of the cordobazo: “many of the young Peronists of the left are not 
Peronists, but communists taking advantage of the political moment to try and gain 
supporters” (Boggs 1971 cited in Schneider 2005: 308). Beyond the Cold War rhetoric, 
the recognition that self-identified “Peronists” were mobilising around radical political 
ideas illustrated an important shift that was occurring within the working class. 
The protests of the cordobazo and the viborazo were an important turning point in 
political tensions around ISI. They reflected the persistence of a working class 
independent of Peronist-dominated political institutions of labour. As such, these 
mobilisations, which emerged in response to the deepening of discipline, were no longer 
being led by a leadership committed to collaboration and complicity. Most importantly, 
they were being consolidated in leading sectors dominated by foreign firms, pointing to 
the limitations of strategies that for several decades had pursued a strengthening of the 
relationship between foreign firms and the state. Resolving the inefficiencies that had 
been created within industrial manufacturing by imposing new forms of discipline in 
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these new leading sectors had, once again, resulted in failure. As a result, it was in this 
most successful period of ISI that the conditions for its breakdown were established. 
 
The Failures of State Control and the Violent Breakdown of ISI 
The dramatic upsurge in workplace conflict marked the beginning of the end of ISI, 
opening up a spiral of increasingly violent confrontations throughout the country. This 
began with the return of Perón and ostensible efforts made to return to “social peace”. 
Attempts, however, to re-establish constraints came up against a working class whose 
radical autonomy had been reconstituted in direct conflicts with firms and the state. It 
quickly became clear that the return of Perón was not the victory for workers that had 
been hoped for. Domestic firms took the initiative in implementing plans that would 
support their recovery. Yet these measures only increased political tensions and failed 
on their own terms, leading manufacturing growth to its first decline in almost a decade. 
The Grand National Agreement (GAN) of 1971 was an important shift in the strategies 
of the state. This emphasised efforts to depoliticise and pacify working class struggles 
using a compromise similar to that established in the mid-1940s and, eventually, with 
the return of Perón (Munck et al 1987: 181). For the political institutions of labour, this 
was one of their major demands. However, after 1973, Perón sought to sustain the 
trajectory of ISI he had begun after 1949 and which had been intensified in later 
decades. Firms pursued offensive strategies against workers, particularly in efforts to 
increase productivity and limit workplace conflicts (Brennan & Rougier 2009: 151). 
Moreover, even prior to his return, Perón proposed “absorbing” and “liquidating” some 
of the militant tendencies within the working class (Schneider 2005: 354). It was the 
complicity, after 1973, between the state, firms, and the political institutions of labour to 
pacify and destroy the radicalised working class that determined the breakdown of ISI.  
The “Social Pact” was particularly illustrative of this complicity. It combined a 
commitment to income redistribution, control of inflation through restrictions on capital 
flight, an increase in state support for housing, employment and education, and an 
increasingly strident rhetoric against landowners and foreign firms (Sidicaro 2002: 116-
117). Industrial policy was formulated, primarily, by the CGE and, in particular, its 
head José Ber Gelbard, who authored the first “Three Year Plan” or the “Gelbard Plan”. 
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He supported traditional consumer goods production and sought to “deepen” ISI 
through restrictions on foreign capital, regional development, and the expansion of 
trade. Credit, moreover, was distributed to firms outside Buenos Aires and to traditional 
manufacturing sectors (Brennan & Rougier 2009: 160-169; Brennan 2007: 60-61). The 
effect was mixed. Growth proceeded at a rapid pace, with manufacturing value-added 
and GDP rising between 1971 and 1974 (see Table 52). However, earlier problems re-
emerged. Government deficits, for example, grew from 4.6 per cent of GDP in 1972 to 
6.9 per cent in 1973 (Cortés Conde 2009: 250). The prior phase of restructuring had 
patently failed, generating significant tensions as workers were increasingly squeezed 
out of any benefits from the relative prosperity generated in non-traditional sectors. This 
new support for traditional sectors, however, was also a failure as, by 1974, the 
manufacturing sector went into overall decline for the first time in a decade. 
Table 52: GDP and Manufacturing Value-Added, Argentina, 1971-1976 (data accessed from 
MOxLAD Database) 
Year 
Real GDP  
(Millions of 
1970 Argentine 
Pesos) 
Constant Manufacturing 
Value-Added (Millions of 
1970 Argentine Pesos)  
Share of Constant 
Manufacturing Value-
Added to Real GDP (%) 
1971 87 807 28 052 31.9 
1972 89 631 29 725 33.2 
1973 92 988 31 614 34.0 
1974 98 015 33 539 34.2 
1975 97 433 32 598 33.4 
1976 97 422 31 051 31.9 
 
Alongside these failings, efforts to re-impose constraints on workers also continued. 
Wages saw a one-off increase, funded by the increases in state spending, followed by a 
two-year freeze (see Table 53; Brennan & Rougier 2009: 184). This, combined with the 
increasing influence of the CGT, however, did not produce the desired decline in 
strikes. Only repression after 1974 was able to, but even this was short-lived (Sidicaro 
2002: 153-154; see Table 54). Attempts to pacify workers, then, were continually 
unsuccessful. The decline in factory occupations following the repressive measures 
imposed after 1974 was belied by the continuation of radical workplace conflict. Not 
only was dissident Peronism increasingly imbued with radical meaning, but an 
alternative political strand known as clasismo was consolidated during the 1970s 
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amongst a growing section of the working class. Significantly, this represented far more 
than simply a “democratic opening” within the political institutions of labour or a 
narrow ideological contribution to the contemporary struggles of the workers (Munck et 
al 1987: 191-199; Schneider 2005: 333 & 338). Instead, it marked the culmination of 
political tensions, the continuing failure of firms and the state to pacify or repress 
workplace conflict, and the resurgent political influence of the working class. 
Table 53: Real Industrial Wage Index, Argentina, 1971-1976 (1955 = 100) (adapted from Pinchot 
1991: 526) 
Year Industrial Wage Index 
Consumer Price 
Index 
Real Industrial Wage 
Index 
1971 5 589 4 694 119 
1972 7 943 7 441 107 
1973 13 964 11 927 117 
1974 16 291 14 671 111 
1975 46 545 41 627 112 
1976 144 290 226 382 64 
 
Table 54: Strikes and Factory Occupations, Argentina, 1973-1976 (adapted from Munck et al 1987: 
204) 
Date Monthly Average of Strikes 
Percentage with Factory 
Seizures 
June 1973 – September 
1973 30.5 43 
October 1973 – February 
1974 30.8 31 
March 1974 – June 1974 39.0 19 
July 1974 – October 1974 22.5 11 
November 1974 – March 
1975 11.6 10 
April 1975 – June 1975 24.7 4 
July 1975 – August 1975 33.0 9 
September 1975 – January 
1976 31.2 7 
February 1976 – March 
1976 17.0 - 
 
This influence, however, was continually fragmented. For example, rather than a 
coherent clasismo, workers were mobilising around distinctive clasismos shaped by 
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local contexts (Brennan 1996: 296). On the one hand, this made it particularly 
responsive to workers’ demands as dissident Peronist and clasista activists began to 
overcome certain constraints on mobilisation. Organically linked to struggles in the 
workplace and shaped by the political ideas of the Left, resistance took on a distinctive 
and radical character. Clasismo and dissident Peronism moved closer together, 
politicising these struggles and constituting a significant challenge to efforts to pacify 
the working class. On the other hand, this localism engendered its weakness, with the 
political institutions of labour becoming the most significant impediment to the 
formation of coherent political institutions of the working class. Finally, as a result of 
this fragmentation, these conflicts reached a stalemate only brought to an end by the 
violent and brutal repression of the 1976 “National Reorganisation Process”.  
The breakdown of ISI in Argentina was, therefore, the outcome of a spiral into 
increasingly violent conflicts in the context of a fragmentation of the working class 
through direct political repression, intensifying discipline within the workplace, and, 
most significantly, its continual pacification within the political institutions of labour. 
Workers’ mobilisations targeted domestic and foreign firms, the state, and political 
institutions of labour, whilst the state, firms, and these political institutions of labour 
supported and directly engaged in efforts to reassert control over the working class. The 
conflicts this produced were not the inevitable manifestation of any inherent instability 
in ISI, but rather the outcome of the failure of these strategies aimed at fragmenting and 
controlling the working class. The threat that workers then posed and the spiral of 
conflicts these tensions produced led to brutal repression and the breakdown of ISI. 
 
The Failed Fragmentation of Industrial Development 
 
This chapter has demonstrated the significance of persistent and changing efforts led by 
the state to impose control over the working class and the implications of the conflicts 
this produced for the trajectory of ISI in Argentina. The Depression consolidated the 
emerging conflicts within and around an already-established manufacturing sector. 
Growing tensions engendered by the sector’s increasingly rapid expansion culminated 
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in direct confrontation between workers and the repressive apparatus of the state. These 
conflicts, however, were increasingly contained within political institutions of labour. 
Using these institutions, expanding their coverage, and mobilising them to pacify 
workplace conflicts were a central aspect of strategies throughout the expansion and 
consolidation of ISI. However, rather than establish a populist coalition riven by tension 
and against which future political coalitions within the state would come into conflict, 
the result was a consolidation of deepening political tensions between workers, firms, 
and the state around an “inefficient” industrial structure. The result was a continuing 
fluctuation in economic growth, alongside an enhanced capability for restricting the 
resurgence of workplace conflict. Thus the forms of discipline and control exercised by 
firms and the state, in alliance with the political institutions of labour, continually 
fragmented and undermined the potential political influence of the working class. 
The significance of the state, therefore, was not its efforts to resolve conflicts, but rather 
its central role in constituting tensions by adopting strategies to constrain the working 
class. Typically, the role of the state during this period is understood as characterised by 
its rapid incoherent expansion, with the politicisation of its policy apparatus leading to a 
distorted and contradictory trajectory of ISI. However, once the focus is moved beyond 
the political institutions of the state and conflicts between elites over control of this 
apparatus, it becomes possible to identify the state’s direct role in reproducing and 
consolidating the deepening political tensions that constituted ISI. The conservative 
restoration and its attempts to undermine the emergent political institutions of labour, 
the populist strategies of Perón that sought to incorporate these very same institutions to 
ameliorate emerging political tensions, the combination of these strategies of direct 
repression and limited concession that typified the 1950s and 1960s, and the 
authoritarianism of the post-1966 military government, all emphasised, primarily, 
control over the working class that it faced. Moreover, the failure of these strategies to 
adequately undermine the resurgent working class led to its emergence, by the 1970s, as 
a direct threat, not to stability, but to political control within the workplace and beyond. 
The working class in Argentina, despite its ostensible institutional strength, had a far 
more limited influence than it Chilean counterpart. Most importantly, it was the relative 
coherence of the political institutions of labour that restricted the possibility for the 
consolidation of a political subject capable of challenging the discipline and control 
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exercised by firms and the state. On the one hand, these institutions were vital in 
restricting the capability of workers to contest the strategies of firms and the state. On 
the other hand, the capability to impose such restrictions was the result of the potential 
threat posed by workers themselves. These institutions did not simply act to constrain 
the working class, but also offered important institutional space for the politicisation of 
their struggles. This was most clearly manifested in the changes to Peronism, 
particularly and the role it played in mobilisations against state repression after 1955. 
This was combined with the role played by radical political ideas, which, by the 1960s 
and 1970s, had an important influence over the period’s most significant mobilisations. 
The political autonomy of the working class beyond the political institutions of labour, 
therefore, played an important role in determining the possibilities of workers’ political 
influence. As such, it is necessary to look deeper at the engagement between work, 
resistance, and subjectivity in the workplaces of two of the leading sectors of industrial 
manufacturing in Argentina: the metalworking and automobile sectors. 
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Chapter 4 
Consolidating the Double Crisis in Chilean Textile Production 
 
From each of the perspectives outlined previously – institutions, ideas, and class – the 
textile sector in Chile exemplified experiences of the emergence and consolidation of 
ISI. First, it emerged as an autonomous “engine of growth” protected by non-systematic 
tariffs and subsidies and consolidated around a series of “protected inefficiencies” 
(Palma 2000a; Ffrench-Davis et al 2000). Second, it was one of the main beneficiaries 
of the “ideology of industrialisation” from the end of the 1930s and one of the most 
dramatic sites of conflict over measures targeting redistribution (Silva 2008; Hira 1998). 
Third, it was subject to the whims of imperialism and external dependency and to the 
establishment of domestic monopolies that shaped the political agenda and real-term 
distribution of gains from industrial growth (Cardoso & Faletto 1979; Stallings 1978). 
This chapter argues, however, that these key features of Chilean textile production were 
constituted by workplace conflict, with important implications for inefficiencies in 
production, expanded state protection, limits on redistribution, and the growing 
ideological significance of domestic monopoly, imperialism, and dependency. 
There have been relatively few systematic studies of this sector during these decades, 
and even fewer that have explicitly considered the significance of workplace conflict. 
This chapter, therefore, makes extensive use of industry journals and workers’ 
newspapers. Industry journals, such as Chile Textil, provide detailed accounts of firms’ 
concerns over managerial control, over the introduction of new technologies and work 
processes, and the importance of securing favourable policy measures from the state. 
Workers’ newspapers, such as Obrero Textil, Tribuna Textil, and Unidad Textil, offer 
workers’ perspectives on the changes being imposed upon them. Moreover, they 
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provide insights into the constitution of workers’ subjectivities, detailing not only the 
cause and consequence of particular strikes and protests, but also the meanings that 
were ascribed to them. Important secondary source material includes the empirical 
research on the sector produced by Frias et al (1987a, 1987b), the thesis by Toledo 
Obando (1948), the study conducted by CEPAL (1962), and the historical anthropology 
of Winn (1986). Each of these sources provides important empirical material used in 
this chapter to explain the significance of changes within and around the workplace. 
Using this material, I will show how the working class confronted old forms of strict 
paternalistic control, persistent political limits on workers’ political organisation, and 
the attempted reorganisation of the workplace to resolve crises through locally-specific 
forms of disciplinary modernisation. These three strategies pursued by firms and the 
state were attempts to exert control over militant workers who continually mobilised 
around radical political ideas and whose political subjectivities continued to be 
constituted around distinctive forms of Chilean socialism. The ideas disseminated by 
activists from the PC, which held a central role in the fragmented political institutions of 
labour representing textile workers, were, moreover, continually reconstituted in these 
struggles. The combination of conflict and radical subjectivity, therefore, consolidated a 
working class political subject with an influence that belied its limited institutional 
representation and against which textile firms and the state were continually forced to 
reorient their strategies. Workplace conflict, I will demonstrate in this chapter, 
determined the rise and decline of traditional forms of production, the consolidation of a 
double crisis in the sector, attempts to establish disciplinary modernisation aimed at 
resolving this crisis, and the consolidation of a militant and autonomous working class.  
 
Textile Production and the Emergence of Workplace Conflict  
 
This section will identify the important facets of the sector’s early establishment and its 
growth and expansion after the Depression. As the sector grew from its relatively 
modest foundations, and as increasing numbers of workers were incorporated into the 
strict workplace control that was established, a series of strikes and protests occurred 
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that represented the first sustained challenge to textile firms. Incidents of workplace 
resistance intersected with the increasingly radicalised political ideas of the time, which 
were disseminated, in particular, by the PC activists who played an early and highly 
significant role in organising workers in the sector. The politicisation of resistance to 
the harsh managerial authority exercised within the workplace led to wider 
mobilisation, preventing any attempt to return to the earlier conservative trajectory. As a 
result, steadily rising wages, an increasing role for the state, and limited forms of 
political organisation were established by the end of this initial phase of rapid growth. 
 
The Emergence and Consolidation of Textile Manufacturing 
The textile sector in Chile was not created in the aftermath of the Depression. Instead, it 
can be traced back to the middle of the nineteenth century and a few large factories, 
linked primarily to the needs of the burgeoning export sectors. Two important external 
events then stimulated its renewed growth in the early decades of the twentieth century. 
First, the First World War closed off international trade and led to a rapid, but short-
lived, surge. Second, the Depression provided an even more decisive closing off of 
international trade that allowed domestic firms to consolidate their position in a way 
that had been blocked by the earlier recovery of international trade in the 1920s. 
However, this “natural” process of growth was only possible with the support provided 
by the state. As a result, firms reproduced many of their “inefficient” traits of low-scale 
and outdated technology that had stymied their earlier growth. The nexus between these 
traditional production and industrial structures and state protection is the archetype 
around which ISI has been understood. Yet whilst the implications of these strategies 
for international competitiveness are continually condemned, their effects upon the 
workplace and the prevailing relations in production are rarely considered.   
The earliest records of the textile industry date back to the mid-nineteenth century, with 
plants both inside and outside Santiago. Early examples include El Salto in Santiago, 
founded in 1850, and Paños de Bellavista in Tomé to the south of the capital (Toledo 
Obando 1948: 41). These factories were part of a small but growing sector that focused 
primarily on the production of simple consumer goods. By 1878 there were eight 
factories employing 448 people: two cotton weaving establishments, one wool weaving, 
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one producing rope and twine, and four manufacturing sacks (Frias et al 1987a: 21-22). 
The relatively small scale of the sector and its production priorities – sacks, rope and 
twine, and weaving – show that it was primarily geared towards supporting other 
sectors producing for export. This is also shown by the fact that most of these 
establishments tended to be based in port cities, like Tomé, outside the consumer 
heartland of Santiago. Moreover, whilst the First World War provided an important 
boost to the textile industry, its effects were short-lived. Factories with their outdated 
technology simply could not compete and were quickly undermined at the end of the 
war by foreign trade and the “dumping” that drove local producers out of the market 
(Toledo Obando 1948: 41-42). This relative uncompetitiveness, as a result, meant that 
growth in the sector prior to 1930 remained limited to just a few remaining factories. 
After 1930, but prior to the direct state support that typified ISI, the textile sector 
experienced rapidly expanding production that exceeded the growth of manufacturing as 
a whole. Bucking the general trend of non-durable consumer goods, which were not 
growing at the same rate as durable, intermediate or capital goods, textiles rose from 6 
per cent to 13.7 per cent of manufacturing production between 1929 and 1935, with the 
locally produced share of total supply rising from 30 per cent to 77 per cent in the same 
period (Palma 2000a: 60-62). This remarkable growth was directly linked to the import 
of new technologies, the expansion of the internal market, and, later, the immigration of 
technicians and businessmen (Frias et al 1987a: 23-25). In terms of the workplace, 
moreover, these changes had a dramatic effect. The sector was divided between two 
main types of production establishments: the large modern factory and the small 
workshop usually located in family homes or in the back of commercial premises 
(Toledo Obando 1948: 47). Large factories already possessed relatively advanced 
industrial technology and workplace organisation, whilst smaller firms, which in the 
1920s worked with very antiquated machinery, were, in this context of rapidly rising 
growth, able to accrue substantial profits and also acquire relatively new equipment 
(ibid: 43). Despite this, however, work remained characterised by labour-intensive 
processes, with the introduction of more capital-intensive production appearing only 
after the 1940s (Frias et al 1987b: 24; Toledo Obando 1948: 9). The growth of this 
leading sector, therefore, relied upon modern, but inefficient, relations in production. 
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Most importantly, it meant that control in the workplace was organised through the 
imposition of strict managerial authority. The behaviour and attitudes of the new 
owners, the “turcos” as they were referred to in the workers’ press, is specifically noted 
in complaints against employers (Obrero Textil 04/10/36, 1:2: 1). This new patrón 
became increasingly common during this period, installing and controlling some of the 
most important textile factories. The most famous was Juan Yarur, who first came to 
Chile from Peru in 1933 at the invitation of the government of Arturo Alessandri and 
opened his first factory in 1937 (Winn 1986: 16). Other major firms, moreover, such as 
Hirmas, Said, and Sumar, also reflected the growing prominence of these recent 
migrants. They had come to Chile during the 1930s and, by the end of the decade 
controlled a significant proportion of the textile sector. Primarily focusing their interests 
in cotton weaving, they brought advanced technology along with strict paternalist 
management techniques and a disdain for unionisation (ibid: 31-37). Workers, therefore, 
were incorporated into new workplaces characterised by strict managerial authority, 
harsh labour-intensive production processes, and limits on political representation.   
The changes wrought to the textile sector during the 1930s, therefore, were most 
significant within the workplace. New, large-scale establishments, linked not simply to 
the vicissitudes of domestic exports or world market contractions, predominated in 
leading sectors such as cotton and silk. However, it was in the newly established 
factories of cotton weaving where the most significant innovations emerged. With the 
direct support of the conservative government of Arturo Alessandri, these factories 
exemplified the strict paternalistic control that was combined with new imported 
technology. At the largest firms like Yarur this was particularly apparent. As will be 
shown, moreover, in silk weaving and in some older establishments, attempts were also 
made to impose these paternalistic managerial practices, but with far less tangible 
success. Managers and foremen became the source of grievances in the workplace as 
firms demanded increasing output for little tangible gains in wages, working conditions, 
or political organisation. The rapid expansion of production that the sector experienced 
was, therefore, achieved primarily through the continual enforcement of managerial 
authority within the workplace, making the textile sector a locus of workplace conflict.   
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The First Textile Workers’ Revolt and the End of Conservative Restoration 
Workplace grievances, centred upon the symbolic figure of the patrón, increased 
exponentially around the rapidly expanding textile sector. Conflicts in these factories 
initially incorporated only a small proportion of workers, but they were typified by a 
high degree of radicalised militancy. This radical conflict continued throughout the 
1930s, despite the concerted efforts to control these workplaces. Workers in the silk 
weaving sector, organised by the PC, but demonstrating a significant degree of 
autonomy, initially came to the forefront in resisting the strategies of firms and the state. 
Their resistance to the increasingly strict forms of managerial authority were politicised 
around prominent radical ideas, linking their workplace experiences to the role of the 
state and to the limits on their political representation. As a result, workers in these 
relatively marginal sectors, rather than those in the new leading sectors of cotton 
weaving, came to the fore in confronting workplace control, the increasing demands of 
rising production output, and the skewed distribution of its gains. 
Despite rapid growth and recovery in the early and mid-1930s, textile workers 
continued to receive persistently low wages. For example, the rising cost of foodstuffs 
relative to wages became a particular concern (Obrero Textil 27/10/36, 1:3: 3). 
However, it was the attempts to exert control in workplace that were at the forefront of 
ongoing grievances. For example, one former worker at the La Continental silk factory 
writes at length of her experiences as “an ex-victim” as she observed “owners passing 
by, watch in hand, monitoring the labour of the female workers, summoning them as he 
pleased and applying arbitrary fines with each step” (Obrero Textil 04/10/36, 1:2: 2). 
Such practices provide an insight into work in the sector. Although the author stresses 
the unique nature of employer abuses at the plant, the relatively lax enforcement of 
labour laws, repressive political climate under Alessandri, and weak unionisation all 
allowed employers to exercise strict discipline over the workers and maintain these 
abusive practices (Garcés 1985: 43-47; Roddick 1989: 205-206). Workers’ grievances, 
therefore, were explicitly targeted at the patrón as it was he who most clearly 
manifested the discipline and control that was being imposed in the workplace.  
As a result of these tensions within and around the growing sector of textile production, 
mobilisation and protest became increasingly widespread. The 1930s were a 
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transformative period for workers’ struggles in the textile sector (Frias et al 1987b: 23). 
For example, workers in the silk weaving sector not only managed to obtain significant 
victories against employers through strikes and other forms of political action, but they 
also came to form a “vanguard” around which workers from across the textile industry 
could mobilise and organise (ibid: 25). Successes such as the establishment of unions at 
larger factories including El Salto, Lourdes and Sedería Chile were highly significant in 
securing increasing levels of representation that were continually denied by labour 
legislation and textile firms (Obrero Textil 04/12/36, 1:4: 1). Moreover, this also 
represented the latent solidarity of workers across the sector and extended the scope for 
further struggles (Obrero Textil 15/09/36, 1:1: 1). Workers were generating radical 
changes in the textile sector, pressing their demands with increasing vigour and 
demonstrating the limits of the rapid growth that relied on strict paternalistic control. 
In particular, textile workers demanded expanded political representation and the 
implementation of the new legal provisions that would offer a vital institutional tool for 
resolving conflicts in their favour. For example, following the failure of negotiations, 
calls were made for the Inspector General of Labour to ensure the honouring of 
agreements to redress the demands of silk weavers (Obrero Textil 03/04/37, 1:7: 1). 
Abuses at the Sedería Chile, moreover, were described as being in direct contravention 
of rules set out by the Labour Inspectorate, enabling calls for legitimate legal redress 
(Obrero Textil 04/12/36, 1:4: 3). Also, in justifying large scale strike action at two large 
factories, El Salto and Lourdes, there is a strong sense that it was the workers who were 
acting in defence of the law as “all of us that work in the textile industry know that day 
by day [employers] demand more and pay less. We know how they laugh at social 
legislation and make a mockery of the Labour Code” (Obrero Textil 04/04/37, 1:8: 1). 
Demands for the extension of political representation, therefore, represented a clear 
attempt to mobilise available measures to redress the imbalance within the workplace. 
Moreover, this focus on the institutional means to confront employers was imbued with 
radical meanings derived from the ideas and activists, particularly those of the PC, who 
played a central role in the nascent forms of political organisation in the sector. Radical 
ideas and interpretations of their plight prevailed throughout the contemporary workers’ 
press. For example, the everyday conditions faced by workers were described in 
withering terms: “we are worse than malnourished slaves and forced to go on with such 
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a miserable life” (Obrero Textil 04/12/36, 1:4: 2). Also, the disciplinary practices within 
the workplaces of Yarur, La Continental, and other large textile factories were described 
in terms: “as if obeying a ‘Franco’ of the textile industry, employers have begun a 
vigorous offensive against their workers with the objective of killing off all just 
initiatives for economic improvement” (Obrero Textil 04/08/37, 1:10: 1). Such 
references comparing the imposition of workplace control to the Spanish fascist leader 
offer important insights, then, into the radical politicisation of these workplace conflicts. 
This radical politicisation culminated in the outburst of working class mobilisation 
between 1936 and 1938. Workers continued to confront the practices of firms and the 
terms under which the rapid growth in the sector was occurring. At the Sedatex and 
Kaitan factories, for example, they mobilised to challenge employers’ attempts to 
impose 25 per cent wage reductions, a strategy that was typical of factory owners at the 
time (Obrero Textil 03/04/37, 1:7: 2). At El Salto and Lourdes, moreover, a series of 
long strikes contested endemic low wages and worsening working conditions. A strike 
in 1934 lasting 43 days was only halted by police repression, whilst another lasting 21 
days in 1935 resulted in significant pay increases. In one particularly confrontational 
dispute in 1937, a petition to management for higher wages and better conditions by 
spinners at Lourdes, who were amongst the most poorly paid and who worked in the 
most unhygienic conditions in the factory, led to all 37 workers on the shift being 
dismissed. In response, over 1 000 men and women at Lourdes and El Salto came out in 
an indefinite strike to demand the rehiring of the dismissed workers and wages 
improvements (Obrero Textil 04/04/37, 1:8: 3). Workers in the textile sector, therefore, 
increasingly posed a challenge to the conditions of low wages, poor working conditions, 
and strict managerial authority upon which the growth of the sector relied. Most 
importantly, these protests were posing a threat that was only suppressed through either 
overt political violence from the state or the granting of significant concessions.  
The establishment of the National Federation of Textile and Clothing Workers 
(FENATEX) in 1938 was the most visible outcome of this growing working class 
militancy in the textile sector. In the words of its former president, FENATEX was 
“constituted in the heat of political struggle… [with] unions from Santiago, Valparaíso 
and Concepción and the Cleaning and Clothing Federations participating… to unify 
their struggle around common problems” (Fernando Bombilla cited in Frias et al 1987b: 
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27). The significance of this new federation, moreover, was its organic link to 
increasing workplace conflict. Efforts to organise workers and obtain legal recognition 
of their political institutions were persistent features of earlier struggles. Therefore, 
FENATEX, formed in the context of deepening and increasingly radical opposition to 
firms and the state, represented the growing political influence of workers in this 
leading sector. Most importantly, its emergence contributed to a significant 
transformation of ISI that followed the electoral victory of the Popular Front in 1938. 
As workers in the textile sector confronted the limits on what could be achieved by the 
conservative restoration and the strengthening of managerial authority in the workplace, 
their struggles enabled the establishment of a potentially progressive transformation in 
ISI. Workplace conflict engendered the emergence of a radicalised political institution 
of labour with unprecedented influence, FENATEX, which was linked to the struggles 
of textile workers, to the CTCH and the broader efforts to establish national labour 
federations, to the PC activists that had politicised these workplace struggles, and to the 
progressive coalition of the Popular Front that would come to power in 1938. In 
confronting strategies of firms and the state, therefore, textile workers had engendered 
imperatives that produced a progressive trajectory of ISI that sought to increase the role 
of the state in domestic manufacturing and to support workers’ political organisation.  
 
Consolidating Expansion and Working Class Struggle 
 
This section will explore the phase of ISI in which earlier workers’ mobilisations were 
increasingly constrained beneath the short-lived populist coalition between the state and 
the political institutions of labour and in which policies most explicitly supporting the 
textile sector’s emergence were implemented. Persistent low demand and worker 
militancy were partially resolved through the establishment of institutionalised wage 
bargaining and the more thorough enforcement of prevailing labour legislation, enabling 
increased production and expanded technological investment. Yet the partial nature of 
this resolution exacerbated the stagnation that became central to this consolidation. In 
response, firms sought to shift the burden of resolving this emergent double crisis onto 
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workers, only worsening it in the process. Squeezes on wages and attempts to 
consolidate control within the workplace intensified tensions and led to an upsurge in 
workplace conflict, which, in turn, resulted in new strategies being pursued by firms 
whereby they attempted to impose distinctive forms of disciplinary modernisation. 
 
Popular Consolidation and the Emergence of Disciplinary Modernisation 
Two phases can be identified in the consolidation of the textile sector. The first, 
following the electoral victory of the Popular Front, saw high rates of aggregate growth 
and focused on consolidating the industrial structure. The most significant measure 
aimed at fomenting further rapid growth and technological upgrading was the 
establishment of CORFO, which supported, in particular, imports of intermediate and 
capital goods and imposed restrictions on consumer goods imports. The second phase 
focused primarily on production structure and a substantial reorganisation of the 
workplace around new machinery and “rationalisation”. This was a distinctive form of 
disciplinary modernisation, in which earlier concerns with extensive growth were 
replaced by imposing new forms of control. To achieve this, the strategies of firms and 
the state took on an increasingly confrontational position towards workers, explicitly 
seeking to exert discipline in the workplace through the production process.  
After 1938, extended state support for industrial manufacturing consolidated the 
emergence of textile production as a leading sector of manufacturing. CORFO was 
integral, particularly supporting the growth in high value artificial fabrics. Textiles were 
one of the four sectors identified as being likely to benefit from import substitution and 
were central to its annual “Industrial Development Plans”. In 1939 CORFO provided 
funds and credit equal to that provided to the metalworking sector and increased limits 
on imports. Between 1940 and 1943 the agency went one step further and, rather than 
supporting pre-existing production, directly encouraged improvements in quality and 
the establishment of new firms. These new firms included Hilanderías Rudolff, 
Sociedad Lavedad de Lanas, Talleres Minerva, Sociedad Serícola Ltda, and Hilandería 
de Lino La Unión, whilst Said e Hijos received direct support for machinery imports 
(Ortega et al: 91-94; Toledo Obando 1948: 61-62). As a result, textile imports fell 
dramatically from a value of CH$326 300 million pesos in 1929 to only CH$86 300 
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million pesos in 1942 as they were replaced by products from the growing number of 
domestic producers (Vitale 2011: 544). Direct state support, therefore, consolidated the 
earlier growth within the textile sector, making it one of the leading sectors of ISI. 
Growth and restructuring in the textile sector was particularly significant during the first 
half of the 1940s. By 1944, textiles had become the second largest manufacturing sector 
behind foodstuffs in terms of total value of production, with all branches seeing 
substantial increases (Toledo Obando 1948: 51; see Table 55). Modern sectors in cotton 
weaving and artificial fabrics, in particular, benefitted from the support provided by 
CORFO. For example, between 1941 and 1946, Yarur registered profits of CH$230 
million pesos and, by 1950, controlled over 65 per cent of all textile production 
alongside Caupolican Chiguayante (Vitale 2011: 545). However, important problems in 
the sector also emerged at this time. Low growth in clothing production and the failure 
to stimulate exports limited demand, whilst under-utilisation of installed capacity 
limited output (Frias et al 1987a: 25; CEPAL 1962: 35). Moreover, whilst aggregate 
real wages did increase relative to firms’ profits, increasing employment levels meant 
that workers’ real incomes did not rise at the same rate as overall average incomes (see 
Table 56; Vitale 2011: 547). Low levels of purchasing power amongst workers, the 
main market for basic consumer goods, thus meant domestic demand was restricted 
regardless of state-supported investment in advanced technology or new establishments.  
Table 55: Textile Production Growth, Chile, 1941-1950 (Vitale 2011: 544) 
Branch of Production Total Output 1941 (metres) 
Total Output 1950 
(metres) 
Cotton Spinning and Weaving 30 399 691 69 690 938 
Artificial Silk Fabrics 804 934 6 826 815 
Cloth and Spun Wool 4 465 909 7 688 424 
 
Table 56: Real Wages and Profits in the Textile Sector, Chile, 1940-1950 (Mamalakis 1978: 215-218 
& 235-238) 
Year Aggregate Real Wages (Millions 
of 1940 Chilean Pesos) (1) 
Aggregate Real Profits (Millions 
of 1940 Chilean Pesos) (2) (2):(1) 
1940 76.0 42.8 0.56 
1941 88.8 81.2 0.91 
1942 102.2 58.1 0.57 
1943 101.2 79.4 0.78 
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1944 116.8 80.9 0.69 
1945 140.4 93.1 0.66 
1946 142.2 77.7 0.54 
1947 164.9 102.7 0.62 
1948 196.8 153.8 0.78 
1949 216.2 87.3 0.40 
1950 234.3 86.4 0.37 
 
Therefore, it was this continuing prominence of low wage, labour intensive production 
that placed limits on the further growth of textile production. Large plants such as Yarur 
continued to hire workers who had recently moved to the cities from the countryside 
and women, who came to make up the majority of the workforce and received 30 per 
cent lower wages than their male counterparts (Salazar & Pinto 2010a: 178). To offset 
the emerging limits constituted by this low domestic demand, firms sought to deepen 
workplace control. Pamphlets for workers at two small textile firms, for example, 
illustrate the strict managerial authority that was enforced. For example, there were 
limits on movement, including “conversations that prejudice the complete development 
of the working day”, instructions for workplace conduct open to broad interpretation, 
including “good conduct, order and discipline”, limits on any “societal, social, or 
political activities”, and a prohibition on leaving the workplace “for whatever reason” 
(Mazzei y Piovano Ltda 1941: 6-8; Visonet Ltda 1942: 7-8).  The enforcement of this 
managerial authority, therefore, represented an attempt by firms to resolve the emergent 
double crisis by further restricting workers’ influence within the workplace. 
These measures to exert control within the workplace, moreover, were supported by two 
important pieces of legislation that were passed following the breakdown of the Popular 
Front. Decree 952 from the Ministry of the Economy and Commerce prohibited the 
import of all items that could be produced at equal or higher quality in Chile, which 
effectively removed foreign competition for textiles and, with the foreign exchange 
savings it permitted, allowed the purchase of primary materials and low cost imported 
machinery, the latter of which was, in turn, permitted by Law 8732 from the National 
Council for External Trade (Toledo Obando 1948: 59 & 71-74). Textile firms, therefore, 
were able to focus their attention on importing advanced technology for their 
establishments to replace labour intensive production processes, to enforce new forms 
of discipline, and to displace the low-skilled workers at the heart of earlier conflicts.  
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This replacement of workers with machinery resulted in the growing automation of the 
industry during the 1940s. New machinery was increasingly common, particularly in the 
cotton weaving sector, which was comprised by the late 1940s of the largest firms in the 
sector. Nevertheless, the importance of automated machinery in everything from sock 
making to twine illustrates the increased automation underway in the textile sector as a 
whole (CEPAL 1962: 4-5; see Table 57). Moreover, the advantages of automated 
production are clearly stated in the industry journal, Chile Textil. Automation would 
allow workers to attend “multiple looms”, reducing the need for labour, increase 
productivity, leading to “higher daily wage… without the need to raise production 
costs”, and, most significantly, ensure “absolute scientific control of production… as 
the operator knows exactly how much production amounts to each period” (Chile Textil 
07/47, 36: 13). These concerns demonstrate the motivations behind the import of 
advanced machinery, with firms seeking to address the emergent double crisis by 
introducing technology that would increase production and discipline the workplace. 
Table 57: Automated and Manual Spindles and Looms, Chile, 1947 (adapted from Chile Textil 
09/47, 38: 7) 
Spindles in Textile Spinning 
Total 109 447 
Manual Looms in Textile Weaving 
Cotton 1636 
Silk 1315 
Knitwear 402 
Woven Fabrics 53 
Woollen Fabrics 1061 
Automated Looms in Textile Weaving 
Cotton 1370 
Silk 99 
Knitwear 10 
Sock makers 1187 
Twine 47 
Braiding 16 
 
New forms of workplace discipline, moreover, were an important concern for smaller 
firms where machinery, primary material and labour costs were the same, but profits 
were typically lower. The main problem, according to Chile Textil, was the combination 
of these factors and the need for the rational organisation of the workplace: 
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“it is a known fact that the majority of large factories use the services of ‘Rationalisers’ in 
their most complete form. It is known, moreover, that ‘Rationalisation’ results in a very 
useful tool for management… many factories, large and small, are run by Directors that 
practice more art than science, and that act in agreement with their personal ideas. If these 
Directors could base their decisions and projects on real and exact data supplied by a 
‘Department of Rationalisation’ their future success, rather than depending on assumptions 
and ‘hunches’, would be practically assured” (Chile Textil 04/51, 81: 8-9) 
By the beginning of the 1950s, therefore, the strict control imposed by the patrón was 
being replaced in the workplace by these imperatives of disciplinary modernisation. The 
main priority in the textile sector, as such, was shifting towards the imposition of new 
forms of workplace organisation and relations in production premised on the import of 
modern machinery and the widespread adoption of “rationalisation”.  
This initial consolidation of ISI, first around expansive policy supports from CORFO 
and later around disciplinary modernisation, produced a distinctive double crisis. On the 
one hand, a relatively coherent industrial structure had been established between firms 
with access to modern technology and credit. On the other hand, efforts to exert control 
in the workplace through traditional paternalist techniques and new forms of discipline 
served only to exacerbate the tensions firms sought to repress. The double crisis that 
was facing the Chilean textile sector, therefore, belies the ascription of such tensions to 
the oft-cited exhaustion of the easy phase of ISI. Instead, it was firms’ efforts to resolve 
the problems of workers militancy through new forms of workplace discipline that 
consolidated a new locus of conflict within the social spaces of textile production. 
 
Pacification of Labour and the Backlash of the Working Class 
Two concomitant phases for workers can also be identified in this consolidation of the 
textile sector. The first saw the establishment of important political institutions of 
labour. These provided workers with a powerful voice, allowing mobilisations to extend 
far beyond the individual workplaces and imbuing them with the distinct meanings of 
Chilean socialism, but also marking a shift away from earlier worker militancy. 
However, in the second phase, workers demonstrated the limits of the constraints 
inadvertently imposed by these political institutions. Two important factors enabled this 
resurgence. First, the radical political ideas that continued to circulate sustained the 
wider meanings of this conflict. The ideas disseminated by the PC gave meaning to 
continual resistance against the patrón and disciplinary modernisation. Second, the 
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growing prominence of workplace conflicts in the cotton weaving factories reflected the 
changing experiences of work that had begun to emerge. These firms were leading 
growth and transforming workplace conflict and the working class in the textile sector.  
In the late 1930s and early 1940s, workers achieved important material and 
organisational gains as a vital pillar of the Popular Front. CEPAL (1962: 9), for 
example, stated that it was “natural” that the textile sector would experience an 
accelerated period of growth as it satisfied the basic needs of the “popular masses”. 
However, the growth of demand to support this expansion was far from natural. Wage 
increases were part of a deliberate effort to resolve growing workplace conflict (see 
Table 56). FENATEX, moreover, represented the rise of a “new unionism” in which 
relatively spontaneous and isolated strike actions were displaced by organised 
negotiation through institutional channels in line with enforceable labour laws (Pizarro 
1986: 104-105). The federation was linked to the political currents in the Popular Front, 
but with the PC at the fore. However, there were limited internal struggles and so a 
relatively peaceful relationship between leaders persisted (Frias et al 1987b: 33). The 
result, as such, was an organisation that could mediate the militant radicalism of 
worker’s mobilisations, but also politicise it further around the prevailing radical ideas.  
Alongside FENATEX, political institutions of labour in large factories were also 
established during this period. As a result, workers in these firms came to be 
represented by institutions that followed their own independent trajectories (Frias et al 
1987b: 26 & 28). Rather than being based in a federation headquarters distant from the 
factory and representing the relatively diverse interests of workers across the sector, 
these political institutions could directly engage with the workers they represented. 
Moreover, workers in large plants tended to retain earlier socialist political ideas (ibid: 
22). However, the influence of these political institutions was continually stymied. At 
Yarur, for example, despite establishing an independent leadership in 1939 and 1946, 
intransigence from management meant attempts to secure state mediation resulted in 
partial victories and its presence was short-lived (Winn 1986: 40-41). Textile workers in 
these firms, despite facing such limitations on their institutional representation, retained 
an important degree of political autonomy in opposing disciplinary modernisation. 
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The failure to pacify workers within the sector, despite the establishment of increasingly 
prominent political institutions of labour and some relative wage increases, meant 
disciplinary modernisation was met by this working class. Textile workers’ 
mobilisations had come a long way from the relatively sporadic strike actions that 
characterised their struggles during the 1930s. Political institutions represented their 
interests in the most prominent large factories, whilst FENATEX mediated their 
conflicts in conjunction with a sympathetic state. In the silk weaving sector, the heart of 
earlier conflicts, workers spent 42 days on strike from 3rd November 1946 and achieved 
significant concessions. Many of these, however, were not implemented by factory 
owners, who instead sabotaged production to keep prices and profits high, whilst 
forcing workers to work longer hours and under-utilising installed capacity (Tribuna 
Textil 01/11/47, 1:1: 3). Moreover, at Sedylan workers protested against the detention of 
their union leader and attempts to lower wages. In response, factory owners called in the 
military to occupy the workplace and intimidate protesting workers (Tribuna Textil 
04/51, 2:3: 8). The limits of imposing disciplinary modernisation, therefore, were 
continually emphasised in this burgeoning confrontation from within the workplace.  
After 1946, moreover, this confrontation took on greater meaning for strategies of firms 
and the state in the textile sector. It was increasingly targeted at government 
intransigence and the emergent alliance between firms and the state. For example, an 
article discussing successes in meeting workers’ demands at the Kalin Kattán factory 
described how government officials were engaged in “word games” to avoid enforcing 
legitimate demands (Tribuna Textil 02/48, 1:8: 3). These demands, moreover, were 
concretely targeted at the organisation of work. One prominent campaign stemmed from 
an agreement reached at the 2nd Textile Workers Congress for the pursuit of a 40 hour 
week. It was argued that cuts to the working week were not opposed to the rising 
production requirements of the industry, but rather that workers engaged in the more 
modern 40 hour working week would contribute to rising productivity (Tribuna Textil 
15/11/47, 1:3: 3). The idea that improved working conditions were crucial to advancing 
the economy, as such, highlighted the opposition to the efforts of firms to resolve the 
deepening double crisis against the increasingly well-organised working class.  
This opposition to disciplinary modernisation was manifested, moreover, by the shift in 
the locus of these conflicts to cotton weaving. New managerial techniques, combined 
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with the prominence of organisation in large firms, meant that it was the cotton, rather 
than silk, sector that was at the fore of these new workplace conflicts. Strikes at Kallin 
Kattán, Dunay, Moises Yuni, Subelman y Fliman, Comandari, and Hilandería Nacional 
responded to attacks on working conditions, wages, and new forms of political 
organisation, with solidarity funds supporting their continuation beyond what was 
possible in previous decades (Tribuna Textil 15/11/47, 1:3: 1; Tribuna Textil 28/11/47, 
1:4: 1; Tribuna Textil 11/48, 1:13: 1; Tribuna Textil 01/51, 2:2: 4; Tribuna Textil 06/51, 
2:5: 8). Meanwhile, workers at Textil Progreso succeeded in extracting concessions 
following a 22 day strike, including a minimum daily wage for workers (Tribuna Textil  
07/11/47, 1:2: 4). Attempted repression and continuing protest resulted in employers 
being forced to meet pay deals and rehire fired protesters (Tribuna Textil 12/47, 1:6: 2; 
Tribuna Textil 01/48, 1:7: 2; Tribuna Textil 02/48, 1:8: 2). Moreover, at Sumar, 
increasing tensions over the failure of firms to implement agreements over pay and 
working time led to persistent protest into the 1950s (Tribuna Textil 01/51, 2:2: 4). The 
resurgence of workplace conflict and its relocation to the leading cotton weaving sector, 
therefore, highlighted the impact of new relations in production that were constituting 
shared experience within this leading sector in the consolidation of a working class. 
The character of growth and development in the sector and the deepening attempts to 
impose disciplinary modernisation, moreover, allowed these protests to be imbued with 
a radical meaning. The continuing militancy of the working class was at the forefront of 
ideas shaping their mobilisations. For example, the workers’ press praised the “ardent 
combative spirit of workers, united in the discipline and enthusiasm shown in these 
heights of conflict” (Tribuna Textil 11/48, 1:13: 1). Anti-imperialist and nationalist 
ideas also re-emerged as central to the political meanings ascribed to these movements. 
An increasing concern with the “Yankee imperialism” was prominent in the workers’ 
press at the time, as well as with the dominance of monopolies (Tribuna Textil 06/51, 
2:5: 3; Tribuna Textil 05/51, 2:4: 2). For example, the role of American technical 
advisors attempting to transform the sector as an “experiment”, implementing 
rationalisation plans that would lead to the firing of dozens of workers in a single 
factory, was condemned (Tribuna Textil, 04/51, 2:3: 3). The backlash against efforts to 
shift the trajectory of ISI in the textile sector produced a resurgence of mobilisations 
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given meaning by these ideas. Job cuts, wage squeezes, and the transformation of work 
were politicised in this growing discontent throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s.   
The growth and development of the textile sector was, therefore, consolidated around 
the initial pacification of the working class. However, in engagement with PC activists 
and radical ideas, workers highlighted the limits of firms’ strategies aimed at one 
particular resolution to the ostensible “exhaustion” of the easy phase of ISI. In response, 
firms began to articulate and develop new ways to exert and impose their control within 
the workplace around rationalisation, productivity, and workplace reorganisation. In 
their engagement with the autonomous and radical political subject of the working class, 
these strategies only engendered further conflict. This shifted, moreover, to the leading 
sectors of production where larger, modern establishments predominated. As a result, 
the militancy of the working class, the most prominent pillar of the double crisis, was 
not restrained but intensified, deepening it within the sector and the trajectory of ISI. 
 
Continued Decline and Re-Organised Struggle in Textile Production 
 
This section will examine the intensification of disciplinary modernisation. The 
resurgence of workplace conflicts will be shown to be the outcome of earlier efforts to 
impose intensifications of work and discipline in the sector, which were increasingly 
accompanied by political repression and a further squeezing of real wages. In this 
context, ISI was reoriented around a coalition between the state and firms that sought to 
reverse many of the limited progressive measures that had been implemented two 
decades earlier. Rather than resolve low demand and worker militancy, these strategies 
only increased both. As stagnation in the sector deepened, so too did the militancy of 
the working class. Most significantly, these conflicts had moved into the cotton weaving 
factories that dominated employment and production and that were most deeply affected 
by these changes. As they combined with radical mobilisations beyond the workplace, 
textile workers directly confronted the limits of disciplinary modernisation. 
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The Ongoing Double Crisis and the Consolidation of Disciplinary Modernisation 
The consolidation of the textile sector had occurred in the context of widening political 
repression, deepening workplace discipline, and intensifying social conflict. In 
response, firms across the sector resorted to an increasingly explicit assault on the 
perceived causes of the double crisis with the most concerted attempts to restructure the 
workplace. Rationalisation was pursued at a sector-wide level, tackling the proliferation 
of small, inefficient firms and low levels of international competitiveness. Productivity 
demands were increased using the advanced technology that was widely available, 
particularly in the cotton weaving plants. Workplace reorganisation was promoted with 
increasing vigour to tackle these endemic problems within the workplace and to re-
impose the authority of management over the resurgent working class. Yet rather than 
herald a new phase in the consolidation of ISI, they represented an intensification of the 
previous measures, imposed, as they were, through paternalistic managerial authority.  
There was a continuing consolidation of disciplinary modernisation across the textile 
sector that saw it moving increasingly away from labour intensive to new forms of 
capital intensive relations in production. It remained a vital sector in terms of 
employment and production and supplied a significant proportion of domestic demand 
during the 1950s. Yet it was the limits placed on that demand that led to its decline 
relative to industry overall (CEPAL 1962: 1-2). Output and productivity, as a result, 
stagnated between 1958 and 1964 (see Table 58). This was primarily caused by the 
mass production sectors of spinning and weaving, with the more specialised knitting 
sector experiencing some growth. In general, the latter were consumed by groups with 
relatively high incomes, whilst the former tended to be consumed by the “popular 
masses” that suffered wage squeezes and a decline in living standards throughout these 
years (CEPAL 1962: 9-10). The problem of low demand that had begun to manifest 
itself in the 1940s, therefore, was exacerbated during the 1950s and 1960s, forcing firms 
to increase their attempts to address the double crisis they faced. As a result, the 
strategies of intensifying disciplinary modernisation were pursued with growing vigour. 
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Table 58: Output, Employment, and Productivity in Textile Production, Chile, 1958-1964 (adapted 
from Stallings 1978: 254-259) 
Year 
Manufacturing Value-
Added (Millions of 1965 
Escudos) 
No. of Workers 
(Thousands) 
Productivity (Value-
Added per Worker in 
1965 Escudos) 
1958 348 38.6 9 016 
1959 401 39.5 10 152 
1960 359 37.1 9 677 
1961 380 41.3 9 201 
1962 403 41.0 9 829 
1963 454 42.7 10 632 
1964 462 44.9 10 290 
 
To resolve these problems, three main issues were identified in Chile Textil. First, there 
was a proliferation of small firms that undermined the market for large firms. Second, 
there were significant numbers of advanced machinery, but too few well-trained 
technicians. Third, the lack of rationalisation of the industry was causing a “crisis of 
competition” with foreign imports (Chile Textil 01/54, 113: 44). As such, these 
problems were interpreted as requiring a thorough transformation of the workplace. It 
was argued that this had been ignored for too long by textile firms throughout the 
sector. Chile Textil claimed that profitability would be determined by production as, not 
only was the factory a place in which items for sale were created, it was also where 
prices were determined and profits were realised (Chile Textil 01/54, 113: 44). 
Rationalisation in the workplace, in response, was promoted with increasing veracity. It 
was justified continually in Chile Textil, with explanations of the need for “technical 
discipline” in the workplace, for new methods of workplace organisation to maximise 
workers’ monitoring of automated machinery and to improve productivity, and for 
implementing the ideas of Taylor and Emerson in production processes (Chile Textil 
01/54, 113: 43-44; Chile Textil 04/54, 116: 12-13; Chile Textil 11/56, 146: 28; Chile 
Textil 11/59, 182: 12). Demands for workplace reorganisation as a means to resolve the 
double crisis through increasing workplace discipline and productivity, therefore, were 
at the core of changes to relations in production in the textile sector in this period. 
Three examples demonstrate how this new rationalisation was implemented. First, an 
automated production line in a sack making factory saw employees reduced from 350 to 
206, without having to change the machinery. Second, new methods and incentives in a 
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textile spares workshop saw a 40 per cent rise in production with a 20 per cent reduction 
in personnel, with a further 12 per cent increase in output coming from a redistribution 
of machinery. Third, a cotton spinning factory saw a 13 per cent output increase with 
minor personnel decreases and a significant increase in the quality of the product. These 
changes, moreover, had an even more significant impact in clothing, with a 60 per cent 
increase in production and 40 per cent cost savings. Rationalisation was, therefore, seen 
as constructing a new “nexus between man and machine” to advance productivity and 
profitability (Chile Textil 11/56, 146: 31). As a result, rationalisation was increasingly 
central to efforts to address stagnation and consolidate workplace discipline. 
Transformations to the workplace reached their zenith in the 1960s with the systematic 
implementation of scientific production techniques. The sector was still riven by the 
problems that had plagued it in the preceding decades: high costs, low productivity 
levels, excess and obsolete equipment, lack of capacity to compete with foreign 
competitors, excess and poorly distributed personnel, and the wide diversity of 
products. For example, to produce 100 yards of cotton fabric required 2.33 hours of 
work in the United State, 2.74 hours in Japan and 12.85 hours in Chile (Frias et al 
1987a: 26; CEPAL 1962: 5). However, in the cotton sector, 81 per cent of spinning and 
83 per cent of weaving establishments possessed modern machinery, with Chile 
possessing the second highest proportion of automatic weaving machines in Latin 
America (ibid: 4 & 35). Workplace reorganisation to improve utilisation, therefore, was 
seen as the solution. At Yarur, there was the first direct introduction, with the support of 
US advisors, of Taylorist techniques, leading to the dismissal of over 1 000 workers 
(Winn 1986: 44-46). This was implemented alongside traditional forms of control, 
moreover, with strict supervision that meant workers could not even speak to one 
another during working hours (ibid: 80). These attempts to increase productivity were, 
as such, clearly oriented towards the imposition of control within the workplace. By 
restricting their abilities to communicate and organise in the workplace through the 
process of work itself, the factory became an increasing site of this new discipline. 
Most interestingly, these changes to work also were seen as requiring a transformation 
in the actual worker. Chile Textil explained how work could be monitored and 
controlled through changes in workplace psychology. It was argued that earlier attempts 
at rationalisation had not necessarily been successful as factories were returning to the 
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older machinery and production methods following limited success in the utilisation of 
new and cheaper machinery (Chile Textil 1962, 210: 15). Thus three alternative ways to 
approach these problems were suggested: the adequate capitalisation of capital 
investments, their correct utilisation under proper management, and the training and 
“professional formation” of the female weavers (Chile Textil 1962, 210: 15). Training 
these new workers and their adaptation to the demands of modern industrial work was a 
central concern, particularly in terms of the influence of these factors over the 
productivity increases that could be gained through rationalisation (Chile Textil 1962, 
210: 19). This was particularly pertinent, moreover, as many older, experienced workers 
were being replaced with recent migrants from the countryside (Figueroa 1961: 38-41). 
Rationalisation and modernisation of production, therefore, necessitated not only the 
import of advanced machinery and reorganisation of work but also the reconfiguration 
of workers. Yet the growing conflicts within and around the sector clearly highlighted 
their focus on disciplinary benefits as much as the ostensible productivity gains. 
This intensification of disciplinary modernisation marked the turn to an overt assault on 
the working class. It was a clear attempt to resolve the problems facing textile 
production in favour of leading firms within the sector. Firm strategies, which included 
the imposition of Taylorism and industrial psychology, created increasing tensions 
around the double crisis that already had brought the ostensible “easy phase” of ISI to 
an end. In response, the largest and most influential firms intensified these forms of 
disciplinary modernisation. Yet to adequately resolve this crisis in their favour, it was 
necessary to successfully implement these strategies within workplaces where a militant 
working class continued to prevail. Within the workplace, then, struggle and conflict 
instead came to the fore, marking not just the end of the beginning of the consolidation 
of disciplinary modernisation, but also the beginning of its end.  
 
The Beginning of the End of Disciplinary Modernisation in Textile Production 
The intensification of disciplinary modernisation heralded the beginning of the 
“inevitable” breakdown of ISI. Efforts to resolve the double crisis of demand and 
worker militancy through an explicit confrontation within and beyond the workplace led 
to the increasing radicalisation of the working class. Protests that had begun to emerge 
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within the largest and most sophisticated sectors of textile production were increasingly 
prominent. Linked to the emergence of the CUT, to the continued presence of the PC, 
and to the relatively high levels of political autonomy that persisted amongst workers 
within these factories, these workplace conflicts extended the breadth of conflict against 
firm and state strategies. As workplace conflict became more widespread, moreover, 
workers pushed firms into intensifying efforts to limit their radicalisation. This 
intensification of conflict, however, served only to further radicalise the working class. 
The breadth and significance of workplace conflicts in the textile sector increased 
significantly during the 1950s. The formation of the CUT was an important turning 
point for workers throughout the country and for textile workers in particular. A crucial 
example of their renewed militancy and its increasing politicisation came with the direct 
attacks levelled against the Prat Plan in 1954. In a clear and strongly worded critique, it 
was argued that not only was this Plan severely detrimental to the interests of workers, 
it was also detrimental to industrialisation as a whole (Unidad Textil 12/54, 1: 2). It was 
claimed that it failed to address important issues related to currency value and its effects 
on industry and workers’ wages. Moreover, the workers’ press offered a series of 
alternative proposals to address the problems in the sector. In eight concrete steps, it 
was argued that primary export supply should be secured, the import of foreign 
machinery should be halted, national primary materials should be protected, monopoly 
prices should be regulated, credit should be advanced, both in the long and short term, 
backlogs in domestic silk production should be tackled, and agrarian reform should be 
vigorously pursued (Unidad Textil, 12/54, 1: 3). Workplace conflict, therefore, was 
increasingly being mobilised beyond the workplace, connecting it not only to the 
changes in production, but also to the policies of the state that bolstered firms’ control. 
This took on increasing significance as conflicts increased within the leading sectors of 
cotton weaving. By the early 1960s workers at factories employing over 200 workers 
represented 62.1 per cent (23 781) of those employed in the sector, whilst workers in 
factories with less than 100 workers represented only 27.5 per cent (10 546) of the total 
(38 312) (CEPAL 1962: 12). Most importantly, these large factories were relatively 
few, meaning that the upsurge in workplace conflicts within and around these firms 
were increasingly concentrated. At Sumar, for example, a strike in response to employer 
belligerence that had continued from 1951 saw 1 500 textile workers walk out and then 
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occupy the factory for several days, resisting the efforts of the police to remove them. 
The workers had limited formal political experience, yet they mobilised with an 
“obvious sense of class” (Vitale 2011: 569). The intensifying imposition of new forms 
of workplace discipline within these factories, therefore, demonstrated the limitations of 
this resolution to the double crisis. It was only consolidating the militant working class, 
as workers in large factories were increasingly mobilising in large numbers and 
challenging the control exercised by firms and the state with growing veracity.  
This continued into the 1960s, with similar strikes at other large factories throughout the 
sector. These occurred at Hirmas in 1961 and 1962 and at Yarur in 1962 over the 
introduction of Taylorist managerial and production techniques, including the demand 
at the former for workers to attend twenty weaving machines instead of seven with no 
associated pay rise. In the strike at Hirmas in December 1961 over 1 800 workers were 
involved and succeeded in gaining important concessions from their employers, whilst 
at Yarur in 1962 it was over 3 500 (Frias et al 1987b: 31; Winn 1994; Central Única 
1961, 1:2: 12). There was also an 89 day mobilisation at Textil Progreso just prior to the 
1964 presidential elections, which emphasised the previously unprecedented challenge 
to the discipline and control of workers within the sector (Textil Progreso 1972: 7). 
Despite attempts to nullify the threat from the working class by employing recent 
migrants or young women with little prior political experience, accumulated experience 
concentrated in these workplaces and radical political ideas gave the struggles of these 
workers increasing influence (Principios 1962: 79-80). The politicisation of workplace 
grievances that had occurred through the previous decade had, therefore, consolidated 
an increasingly coherent working class that contested the prevailing trajectory of ISI. 
The ideas that had politicised the grievances and given meaning to the struggles of 
workers throughout the sector then took on a renewed significance. Hostility towards 
the legal foundations of the labour movement and the state were expressed in much 
harsher tones. In 1954, for example, the inadequacies of the Labour Code were argued 
to be so bad that it failed to meet the basic legal standards laid out by the United 
Nations Human Rights Declaration (Unidad Textil 12/54, 1: 1). This radicalism and 
militancy, then, was at the forefront of increasing opposition, not only to firms, but also 
to the state. Many of the problems facing workers were associated with the anti-national 
monopolies, with resolutions calling for their regulation and the extension of credit to 
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the smaller “national” firms (Unidad Textil 12/54, 1: 1-3). Workplace conflicts, as a 
result, were reformulated into a wider conflict that continued to be understood around 
radical ideas of Chilean socialism. These ideas were mobilised to politicise workers’ 
grievances and gave them growing coherence to the working class in the textile sector. 
It was the workplace conflicts that occurred in response to the intensification of 
disciplinary modernisation that engendered these political tensions and heralded the 
beginning of the breakdown of ISI. Overall, changes within the sector had led to the 
dramatic increase in output, increasing technological sophistication, and, in less 
significant terms, improved wages. However, the strategies pursued by firms created a 
rising tide of tensions around efforts to resolve the double crisis in their favour. As a 
result, the intensification of disciplinary modernisation marked a significant turning 
point. It demonstrated the limited extent to which firms and the state could proceed in 
imposing control within the workplace. Most significantly, it demonstrated the role 
played the working class in determining these failed attempts. Resistance and 
mobilisation were increasingly reoriented against workplace reorganisation in the 
largest factories, as the persistence of radical political ideas and political autonomy 
shaped the articulation of these grievances by an increasingly coherent working class.  
 
The Emergence and Consolidation of the Chilean Textile Sector 
 
This chapter has demonstrated the importance of the working class to the emergence 
and consolidation of ISI in the Chilean textile sector. In the first phase of its emergence, 
extensive growth was encouraged deliberately and inadvertently by the state, bringing 
with it new centres of conflict. Older and more marginal sectors, particularly in silk 
weaving, saw the most vigorous patterns of conflict as workers resisted the increasing 
demands that were being imposed through traditional managerial techniques. These 
growing conflicts, politicised by the activists operating within the newly formed 
political institutions of labour, created the conditions for the emergence of a short-lived 
progressive solution. Rather than engender a new phase in ISI, however, it led to the 
growing pacification of workplace conflict. Utilising this pacification, firms, backed by 
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the state, began a second phase in the consolidation of ISI that marked the end of its 
earlier extensive growth. Disciplinary modernisation, in which firms pursued 
rationalisation, productivity increases, and workplace reorganisation, sought to resolve 
the double crisis pervading the sector. It led, however, to the resurgence of workplace 
conflicts in a process reflecting the deep-rooted radical autonomy of Chilean textile 
workers. This resurgence, moreover, forced firms and the state to adopt increasingly 
confrontational strategies imposing repressive measures beyond the workplace and 
increasingly intensifying new strategies of discipline within it. These conflicts 
engendered the coherent formation of a working class in this sector, confronting the 
limitations of disciplinary modernisation and heralding the beginning of the end of ISI. 
For firms and the state, therefore, it was workplace conflict in Chilean textile production 
that determined the articulation of their particular strategies. First, the so-called “easy” 
phase of extensive growth necessitated the imposition of control over a growing number 
of workers. Paternalistic managerial techniques, coupled with restrictions on political 
organisation, only went so far in securing control. Direct confrontation in the workplace 
between management and workers became increasingly disruptive to the rapid growth 
that had occurred. Second, in response to these engagements, firms sought to impose a 
stricter form of discipline through the production process itself. Concerns with 
competitiveness and output were, ultimately, secondary to the need to exercise control 
over a restive working class that formed the central pillar of the double crisis. Low 
demand could be addressed without rising wages if, first of all, the workplace could be 
brought firmly under their control. Third, this raises important questions about the role 
of the state. Industrial policy is, typically, seen as distant from changes within the 
workplace. Yet the decisions taken to provide protection to emergent sectors, to supply 
firms with credit, and to facilitate imports of technology and machinery were 
intrinsically connected to workplace reorganisation. It was in the workplace that such 
policies manifested themselves most concretely and, as such, where the state entered 
into conflict with workers most affected by the changes they produced. 
Workers, therefore, determined the strategies of firms and the state in the most concrete 
and direct manner from within the workplace. Workers were not simply disruptive 
limits on the actions and decisions of firms and the state. As has been shown, it was the 
engagement between these actors, and the struggles that were engendered, which 
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disrupted and placed limits on the consolidation of disciplinary modernisation and ISI. 
Whilst firms and the state attempted to exert control and discipline in the workplace as a 
means of constituting a trajectory of ISI favourable to their aims, workers sought to 
secure advantages within it and also to go beyond it. Resistance in the workplace and 
mobilisation outside it was, therefore, about far more than increasing wages or 
improving conditions of work. These struggles constituted the distinctive political 
subjectivities of workers and their formation as a working class. Textile workers in 
Chile retained a prominent degree of autonomy that allowed for opposition to firms’ 
efforts to impose various forms of discipline and control. Moreover, this meant that the 
political institutions of labour remained highly responsive to the militancy that had been 
engendered, with radical political ideas of a distinctive form of Chilean socialism 
acquiring new meanings around this workplace conflict. These factors, as a result, set 
the terms for the culmination of this trajectory of ISI in the 1970s around increasingly 
direct confrontation and the consolidation of this radical working class political subject. 
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Chapter 5 
The Limits of Modernisation in Metalworking and 
Automobile Production in Argentina 
 
The metalworking and automobile sectors in Argentina exemplified the experiences of 
ISI central to the perspectives of institutions, ideas, and class. First, they were amongst 
the leading firms established during the nineteenth century, with metalworking rising to 
prominence through inadvertent state support (Katz & Kosacoff 1989; Díaz Alejandro 
2000). Second, early experiences of metalworking provided a major source of 
ideological critiques that helped consolidate later forms of ISI, with the automobile 
sector, backed primarily by foreign investment, being the main beneficiary (Sikkink 
1991). Third, metalworking was a consolidated monopoly backed by a fragile social 
coalition, whilst automobile production was controlled by foreign firms that led the 
establishment of new forms of dependence (Galeano 1997; Cardoso & Faletto 1979). 
This chapter argues, however, that these key features were constituted by workplace 
conflict, with important implications for the rise of important leading firms, the 
consolidation of their inefficient production and industrial structures, the entry of 
foreign firms, the persistence of monopolies, and the role of technological investment. 
There has been a significant recent upsurge in labour history research on this period in 
Argentina, with important contributions on workplace conflicts in the metalworking and 
automobile sectors. These have moved beyond much of the earlier historical research, 
which typically centred on the important role of the Peronist labour movement and its 
relationship with the state. Instead, these new studies emphasise the significant degrees 
of workers’ political autonomy. They explore the changing conditions of work in these 
sectors, the motivation behind spontaneous forms of resistance and more organised 
  145 
 
 
 
 
mobilisations, the political ideas that shaped workers’ subjectivities, and the influence 
of the working class over industrialisation (Iñigo Carrera 2012; Schiavi 2008; Schneider 
2005; Basualdo 2010; Basualdo 2011a). In this chapter, moreover, this research is 
complemented by further primary research. The industry journal, Metalurgia, for 
example, provides important insights into the decisions of firms around changing 
production processes. These sources, therefore, offer invaluable insights into work, 
resistance, subjectivity and the political influence of workers over ISI in Argentina. 
The chapter will argue that workplace conflicts in these sectors led to the consolidation, 
in the case of metalworking, of fragmented relations in production and between firms 
and, in the case of automobiles, of locally-specific forms of disciplinary modernisation. 
In response to the unprecedented position gained by the political institutions of labour 
under Perón, firms attempted to exert discipline and control over workers. In the 
process, workers’ political subjectivities, which had been initially consolidated around 
Peronism and ideas of economic nationalism, were continually reconstituted. In the 
metalworking sector, the predominance of the political institutions of labour meant 
workers’ influence around resurgent workplace conflict was successfully constrained. In 
the automobile sector, the antagonistic relations in production, the less stringent forms 
of institutional mediation and control, and the more widespread presence of radical 
ideas meant that struggles within the workplace took on a far wider significance. 
However, in both sectors, alongside successive governments, firms were continually 
forced to respond to the mobilisations of the working class. As a result, workplace 
conflict determined the extent and persistence of repression beyond the workplace, the 
consolidation of stagnation in metalworking, the attempts to establish disciplinary 
modernisation around the new technologies and managerial techniques of automobile 
firms, and the formation of a militant, but continually fragmented, working class.  
 
The Fragmentation of Metalworking and the Working Class 
 
This section will identify the central facets of the metalworking and automobile sectors 
as they emerged before and after the Depression. It will demonstrate how this crisis had 
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a limited effect on their trajectories and how workers, despite their limited political 
representation at the time, played an important role in their respective rise and decline. 
Most significantly, it was the shifting locus of conflict to metalworking and the 
increasing prominence of mobilisations around it that engendered the emergent alliance 
between firms, the state, and the political institutions of labour that would determine the 
future trajectory of ISI. It was the pacification of earlier workplace conflicts beneath the 
emergent political institutions of labour with the backing of the state that permitted the 
consolidation of the “social coalitions” around the growing state apparatus. 
 
Metalworking and Automobiles Before and After the Great Depression 
The metalworking and automobile sectors played a central role in the emergence of 
industrial manufacturing in Argentina prior to the 1930s. They were an illustration of its 
early growth with limited state support and little direct protection. However, it was after 
the Depression that metalworking saw its decisive growth, which, in many ways, 
appeared to typify early experience with the “easy phase” of ISI. The decline of 
international trade meant a plethora of small, independent workshops were established 
to provide important inputs and consumer goods. However, it was not direct state 
support that led to the emergence of these small, inefficient domestic firms and local 
production networks. Instead, it was the relationship between a minority of large 
foreign- and state-owned firms and the plethora of small and medium-sized firms that 
led to metalworking’s sudden surge and emergence as the leading sector of ISI.  
Metalworking and automobiles were small but significant sectors of manufacturing 
during the early decades of the twentieth century in Argentina. In 1914, for example, 
they constituted 7.7 per cent of output and 12.5 per cent of employment, compared to 
foodstuffs and beverages, which together constituted 53.3 per cent of production and 
34.5 per cent of employment. At this stage, moreover, small, labour-intensive 
establishments predominated (Díaz Alejandro 1970: 212-213). Ownership, however, 
made the sector particularly distinctive. The 1914 industrial census shows that 77 per 
cent of firms in the sector were controlled either by foreign investors or recent migrants, 
higher than the average of 66 per cent foreign ownership across manufacturing (ibid: 
215, table 4.5). The significance of foreign investment, moreover, continued into the 
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1920s, particularly in automobile assembly (Ferrer 2008: 204). Ford established sales 
operations in 1914 and assembly operations in 1917 and 1922, with General Motors 
(GM) in 1925 and Chrysler in 1929 quickly following. Between 1925 and 1929, as a 
result, Argentina became the largest market for the US automobile industry behind 
Canada. By 1926, moreover, it was generating US$6 million in profit for Ford, the 
firm’s highest in South America (Nofal 1989: 8-9). Foreign-owned automobile firms, 
therefore, were an important feature of early industrial growth across Argentina. 
The impact of these firms was particularly significant not only in terms of the scale of 
production, but also in terms of the technical contribution to the economy overall. For 
example, growth in assembly production meant that, by 1930, there were over 435 000 
automobiles in the country, or one for every 35 inhabitants, whilst domestic networks 
were established, such as the partnership between Chrysler and Fevre y Basset. 
Relationships such as these, as such, led to a growing diffusion of new, more 
sophisticated production technologies, organisational changes in the workplace, and 
new strategies in commercialisation (Belini & Korol 2012: 57-58). The 1920s, 
moreover, saw the emergence of the first large-scale, mass-production manufacturing 
facilities in the country. The State Aeronautical and Mechanical Industries (IAME), 
established in Córdoba in 1927, was the first example in metalworking, and, until 1932, 
was the largest manufacturing plant in the country (Brennan & Gordillo 2008: 18). By 
adopting new work processes from foreign firms and locating them outside Buenos 
Aires in a state-controlled factory, the nascent trajectory of ISI in metalworking and 
automobiles was established. Foreign firms played an important role in its early 
formation in terms of technology and work process, but it was the state that was 
necessary to broader changes in the scale of production and industrial structures.  
The Depression had a limited impact on these established structures. Continuing growth 
meant that, by 1935, metalworking and mechanical industries constituted 23 per cent of 
establishments, 20 per cent of personnel, and 14 per cent of output. Automobile 
production, however, remained primarily foreign-owned and domestic metalworking 
firms were typically smaller establishments with obsolete technology, irregular supply, 
and low scale and quality (Girbal-Blacha 2004a: 49-51). One example was the San 
Martín Metalworking Workshops (later TAMET). This firm employed over 1 500 
workers producing a wide variety of products, including bolts, pipes, screws, rivets, and 
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galvanized sheeting. Production output was high and conducted using imported 
machines, such as Siemens furnaces, which, in turn, produced 20 000 tons of laminated 
steel a year and 10 000 tons of piping. However, whilst 150 000 tons of goods were 
estimated to be produced annually, there was substantial product diversity (La 
Argentina Metalúrgica 10/32, 1: 4: 9-11). This TAMET plant, therefore, offers an 
example of the early limits on growth in the sector, with the wide variety of products 
and production processes undermining technological or organisational transformation.  
The one sector that was significantly impacted upon by the Depression, however, was 
the automobile sector. The state exacerbated problems faced by these foreign firms in 
the context of international crisis. Tariffs were imposed on fully assembled vehicles, 
road-building projects were reduced in 1931, and a tariff structure that favoured parts 
manufacturing undermined the potential for extending assembly or vehicle production. 
As a result, there was a shift in activities towards parts manufacture. Production at Ford 
and GM slowed, but this was offset, to an extent, by the entry of multinational parts 
manufacturers such as tyre producers Goodyear, Pirelli, Firestone, and Michelin (Nofal 
1989: 10-12). Overall, this helped consolidate the overall structure of the metalworking 
and automobile sectors during the 1930s as dominated by a few large firms amongst a 
plethora of smaller workshops. Moreover, as large firms in the automobile assembly 
sector went into decline in the 1930s, domestic metalworking firms using outdated or 
self-made technology, primitive factory layouts, and the enforcement of strict 
managerial authority came to the fore (Katz & Kosacoff 1989: 48-49). It was 
metalworking, as a result, that, between 1939 and 1945, experienced the most rapid 
growth of any manufacturing sector (Brennan & Rougier 2009: 65). The outcome, 
therefore, was the consolidation of a fragmented sector and a continuing dissemination 
and strengthening of these persistently inefficient production and industrial structures.  
The establishment of the metalworking sector offers an important corrective to the 
typical perspective on the “easy phase” of ISI. The significance of foreign and state-run 
firms demonstrates that there was little that was “natural” about the early growth of this 
new leading sector. Instead it was led by firms established during the early decades of 
the twentieth century with the backing of either foreign partners or the state. What 
emerged, however, was a fragmented industrial structure with a degree of modern 
technology and workplace organisation. In the larger firms of the automobile sector and 
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metalworking, relations in production were relatively advanced. However, in the 
predominant small and medium-sized establishments, outdated workplace organisation 
prevailed. It was in this context that metalworking became a new locus of conflict. 
 
The Emergence of Metalworkers and the Establishment of Workplace Conflict 
Workplace conflict within the automobile and metalworking sectors in Argentina was 
widespread, well-organised, and radically politicised from its very beginning. Radical 
political ideas were continually prominent as the Communist Party led much of the 
initial workplace organisation in larger firms across the sector through the 
Metalworking Industry Workers’ Union (SOIM). This continued the important tradition 
of radical forms of organisation that characterised earlier mobilisations within the 
automobile sector, but, with low levels of representation and the relative failure of 
important strikes, more “institutionalised” solutions were sought. The CGT, and the 
nascent Metalworkers’ Union (UOM), established increasingly important institutional 
channels with the state to resolve persistent conflicts. As a result, workplace conflicts 
became increasingly constrained beneath these emergent political institutions of labour. 
As a small but significant feature of the manufacturing sector prior to 1930, the 
metalworking and automobile sectors were an important site of workplace conflict. For 
example, at the GM plant in Buenos Aires, over 1 300 workers belonging to the “United 
Metalworkers Resistance Union” mobilised between February and 5th December 1929. 
This began in response to the firm reneging on an agreement in which workers had 
obtained a salary raise and an eight hour working day. In particular, GM refused to 
allow the return of dismissed workers. Workers, in response, began a ten month strike 
against the firm, attacking its productive capacities through blockades, boycotts, and 
sabotage. Despite repression that resulted in 436 arrests and detentions, the demands of 
the strikers were eventually met, with GM agreeing to the following: equalisation of pay 
between male and female workers, the reinstatement of dismissed workers involved in 
the strike, a starting salary of eighty-seven and a half centavos per hour rising to one 
peso after three months, an overtime increase of fifty per cent, and compensation of five 
thousand US dollars for costs incurred by the workers (La Continental Obrera 12/29, 1: 
5: 6-7). The significance of this victory against one of the most important foreign firms 
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in Argentina, and in spite of the harsh repression faced by the strikers throughout, was a 
crucial demonstration of the nascent political influence of the working class.  
The emergence of this influence, and the growing threat posed by the working class, 
became increasingly apparent after the Depression. However, with the decline in 
automobile production, it was workers in the domestic metalworking plants that became 
increasingly prominent. Reflecting the combativeness of workers throughout 
manufacturing and the continued growth of the sector throughout the country, protests 
proliferated. For example, at TAMET over 800 workers came out in solidarity strikes on 
20th May 1932, whilst at another large firm, Tandil, in Buenos Aires province, 
metalworkers undertook strikes demanding the organisation of a union (Camarero 2012: 
9; Iñigo Carrera 2012: 53). The SOIM, representing around 3 000 workers, then played 
an important role in extending these mobilisations in the build up to the 1936 general 
strike (Iñigo Carrera 2012: 170 & 183). During these mobilisations in 1936, 
metalworkers organised widespread solidarity strikes in response to police repression 
and the mass arrests that occurred in January (ibid: 224-225). The upsurge in growth 
within the metalworking sector during the 1930s was, therefore, accompanied by an 
upsurge in working class mobilisation, radically politicised within the SOIM. 
Following this mobilisation in 1936, moreover, workplace conflict in the sector 
increased significantly, with a rising number of strikes in various metalworking firms. 
According to the figures provided by Durruty (1969 cited in Munck et al 1987: 115, 
table 10.5), the number of strikes in the metalworking sector between 1937 and 1943 
were second only to construction. There were fifty-one strikes compared to eighty-five 
in construction and forty-eight in the declining textile industry, of which the majority 
were linked to wage demands (20) or solidarity with other striking workers (14). This 
spread of workplace conflict after 1936 marked an important shift. Whilst the radical 
workers in the automobile assembly plants of the early twentieth century had begun to 
disappear with the concomitant decline of that sector, workers in the factories of 
metalworking mobilised with growing veracity. Although, by 1941, only 4 459 of the 
228 356 workers across the sector were represented by the SOIM (Munck et al 1987: 
108), the emergent threat posed by their mobilisations continually belied their numerical 
disadvantage in what was becoming the leading sector of industrial manufacturing.  
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One of the most important demonstrations of the emergent working class was the 1942 
general strike. Despite the limited union membership at the time, this eighteen day 
strike incorporated over 70 000 workers across the sector. Work rhythms and 
productivity had increased dramatically and produced the conditions for this conflict. At 
TAMET, installed capacity had almost doubled from 2.77 HP per worker in 1935 to 
around 5 HP per worker in 1942. Ongoing protests throughout the beginning of the year 
contested these changes and led to large numbers of suspended workers, 1 500 at the 
SIAM, for example, whilst the mass assemblies organised by SOIM attracted large 
crowds, with one estimate at around 15 000 workers, all calling for the strike that 
occurred in June and July that year. Yet despite significant pressure coming from below, 
and regular mobilisations and assemblies, the strike was unsuccessful in meeting its 
demands (Gurbanov & Rodríguez 2007: 4-12). The resulting suppression of the radical 
working class organised around the SOIM, as a result, engendered a turn to increasingly 
institutionalised solutions to the problems faced by workers throughout the sector. 
Most significantly, this led to a breakaway group forming the UOM in March 1943. 
Despite the radical origins of leaders such as Ángel Perelman and Hilario Salvo, this 
group turned to the state in their attempts to oust the SOIM (Horowitz 1983: 106; 
Schiavi 2011: 20). The failure of the 1942 strike, therefore, marked the beginning of the 
pacification of workplace conflict. However, whilst the political radicalism of the 1930s 
was increasingly constrained beneath the UOM, it did not disappear. Much of the 
initiative for the 1942 strike came from below, primarily over growing dissatisfaction 
with the imposition by firms of strict workplace authority and intensifying work 
rhythms. Therefore, as the sector grew into one of the most important in Argentina, 
metalworkers, organised in the UOM and retaining a significant militancy, were able to 
exercise a continuing, albeit reconstituted, degree of political influence over ISI.  
Mobilisations led by SOIM, then, had a profound effect on the constitution of the sector. 
On their own terms they were relatively unsuccessful. However, in the longer term, they 
enabled the establishment of a political actor capable of directly influencing the policies 
of the state. The UOM was borne of mobilisations that had seen tens of thousands of 
workers mobilising. It was, therefore, the beginning of only a temporary pacification of 
workplace conflict. Most importantly, it was a manifestation of the tensions that would 
come to characterise metalworking. On the one hand, the metalworking sector would 
  152 
 
 
 
 
receive increasing support from the state and concessions to workers, which served, in 
the short term, to pacify conflicts beneath the political institutions of labour. On the 
other hand, it would become one of the most important sites for the formation of a 
radical working class, with the persistence of workplace conflicts that had begun in this 
period imbuing later struggles with this same radicalism that is often overlooked. 
 
Consolidating State-Led Industrialisation and Workplace Conflict 
 
This section will explore the consolidation of the populist trajectory of ISI. It will argue 
that, despite the ostensible political influence of the working class in the newly 
consolidated social coalition, this period was dominated by efforts to stimulate growth 
reliant initially upon workers’ acquiescence. Limited gains for workers enabled 
metalworking firms to retain control in the workplace. Yet with worsening stagnation, 
firms and the state increasingly turned to disciplinary modernisation. Rationalisation, 
workplace reorganisation, and productivity demands led, in particular, to tentative 
efforts to attract foreign investment. Workers, in response, challenged the imposition of 
these relations in production. The consolidation of ISI in Argentina around this “urban 
political constituency”, therefore, was continually belied by the conflictive relations that 
persisted as firms attempted to reassert control and as workers, within and beyond the 
political institutions of labour, regularly mobilised to confront these strategies.  
 
The Limits and Significance of “Populist” ISI in Metalworking and Automobiles 
Two phases can be identified in the consolidation of the metalworking sector. The first 
was characterised by concerted support for the earlier growth through tariffs, subsidies, 
credit, and state ownership. Lending, in particular, targeted the consolidation of the 
prevailing industrial structure. Large firms and the plethora of small establishments 
were the main beneficiaries. Yet within only a few years, growing crises engendered a 
second phase. Firms, represented by an employers’ association with close links to the 
state, began to transform the ostensibly populist trajectory. Concerns with workplace 
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control were particularly prominent, with proposals to transform production processes at 
the fore. Alongside stabilisation and rationalisation, there were appeals for foreign 
investment, particularly focusing on the automobile sector that would bring with it new 
production and managerial techniques to strengthen control within the workplace. 
By 1946, the metalworking and mechanical sectors were a highly significant leading 
sector. Between the industrial censuses taken in 1935 and 1946, they had expanded 
from 23 to 27 per cent of establishments and from 20 to 22 per cent of employment 
(Belini and Korol 2012: 99). It was after 1946, however, that concerted industrial policy 
measures were targeted at this sector. Tariffs, quotas, and exchange controls, in 
particular, were utilised to support the earlier growth (Belini & Korol 2012: 137; 
Brennan & Rougier 2009: 47; Girbal-Blacha 2003: 50). There was, moreover, an 
increase in direct state support targeting the consolidation of the prevailing industrial 
structure. In 1946, Industrial Credit Bank of Argentina (BCIA) loans below $5 000 
pesos constituted 36.7 per cent of total lending, whilst loans above $1 million pesos 
constituted 33.2 per cent, with the latter, until 1950, distributed amongst only thirty-
seven firms (Girbal-Blacha 2004b: 81-84). Alongside small firms, credit and protection 
were particularly extended to large domestic firms, including SIAM Di Tella that 
expanded its activities with direct state support in, for example, the production of 
industrial piping at its subsidiary SIAT (Brennan 2007: 51 & 57; Rougier 2008: 77-87). 
Also, state-run firms grew in significance, with DINIE taking over formerly German-
owned firms and creating, in 1947, the steelworking firm SOMISA (Belini 2001: 101; 
Belini & Korol 2012: 128; Girbal-Blacha 2003: 77). The result, therefore, was rapid 
growth throughout the metalworking sector around the prevailing industrial structure. 
The most significant tendency in this period, therefore, was the consolidation of earlier 
trends in metalworking toward the growth of large firms backed by the state. By 1955, 
for example, of the 100 largest firms in the country, basic metal production, 
metalworking products, parts, and machinery (including automobiles) accounted for 11 
per cent of firms and 23.4 per cent of manufacturing value added. This compared to 34 
per cent and 22.9 per cent in foodstuffs, beverages, and tobacco and 19 per cent and 
21.5 per cent in textiles and leather products (Schvarzer 1977: 329). Moreover, in 1953, 
SIAM announced profits of $48 544 000 pesos, ACINDAR $45 602 000 pesos, Klocker 
$22 000 000 pesos, TAMET $20 344 000 pesos, and La Cantábrica $18 907 000 pesos 
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(Schiavi 2008: 95, ff. 198). Growing output and productivity, particularly relative to 
traditional sectors, as well as soaring profits, reflected the prominence of these firms to 
the growth of the metalworking sector as it consolidated its leading role in the economy 
(Belini & Korol 2012: 150; see Table 59). Moreover, not only did these changes 
represent the increasing importance of large metalworking firms with state support and 
access to modern technology, they also highlighted the consolidation of growth within 
the sector reliant upon traditional forms of workplace organisation.  
Table 59: Value-Added and Employment in Selected Sectors, Argentina, 1946-1954 (adapted from 
Belini & Korol 2012: 150, table 6) 
Sector 
Value Added 
1946 
(percentage) 
Employment 
Share 1946 
(percentage) 
Value Added 
1954 
(percentage) 
Employment 
Share 1954 
(percentage) 
Food and 
Beverages 24.0 21.0 19.6 18.3 
Textiles 13.9 13.0 13.1 14.4 
Chemical 
Products 7.5 4.2 7.7 4.4 
Metals 8.3 10.1 9.5 11.2 
Vehicles and 
Machinery 7.3 9.9 10.5 14.4 
Machinery 
and Electrical 
Equipment 
1.6 1.7 4.5 3.4 
 
The growing concern of leading metalworking firms with workplace organisation 
became particularly prominent towards the end of the 1940s. In the Argentine Chamber 
of Metalworking Industries (CAIM), there was a concern that the “populist alliance” 
was preventing the implementation of “necessary” policy measures (Brennan & Rougier 
2009: 66-70 & 84). In their monthly publication, Metalurgia, the CAIM stated that 
wages could not be absorbed by profits and called for rationalisation. Workers, they 
argued, must be obligated to change tasks at the behest of employers and be prepared to 
attend more than one machine in advanced sectors, whilst the role of the internal 
commissions be restricted (Metalurgia 1-2/49, 14:104: 3-9). The timing of these 
demands, moreover, is of no coincidence. After the crises at the end of the 1940s that 
pervaded manufacturing in general, and metalworking in particular, efforts were being 
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made by firms to consolidate control within the workplace. For example, costly labour 
and a failure to rationalise production was blamed for the demise of one firm producing 
flywheel gears for diesel motors, whilst the success of Casa Pesin, a firm producing a 
variety of high technology products, was claimed to be the result of the “rational” 
organisation of the new factory (Metalurgia 7/49, 14:109: 15-16; Metalurgia 5/49, 14: 
107: 29-30). Therefore, as crisis hit the metalworking sector by the end of the 1940s, 
firms increasingly raised demands for workplace rationalisation and reorganisation.  
By the beginning of the 1950s, firms intensified their efforts to reverse of many of the 
“populist” aspects of ISI. In Metalurgia, the CAIM made strong claims that to address 
the “pause in development” workers must act with “greater restraint and understanding” 
as the sector was restructured around productivity increases, workplace rationalisation, 
and fewer workers operating under strict discipline (Metalurgia 5/50, 15:118: 127; 
Metalurgia 9/51, 17:133: 3). These attitudes were also reflected in the state strategies 
adopted to address the crisis. The second “Five Year Plan” placed modern sectors, such 
as steel and automobiles, at its heart. The state directly supported advanced sectors, such 
as steel, and implemented new foreign investment laws that explicitly favoured foreign 
automobile firms (Brennan & Rougier 2009: 58). As a result of these changes, 
manufacturing recovered at an annual average growth rate of 5.1 per cent, higher than 
the annual rate for aggregate GDP at 4.7 per cent (Cortés Conde 2009: 188). It was, 
moreover, non-traditional sectors at the forefront of new innovations for workplace 
discipline driving this growth. Between 1950 and 1955, they had an annual growth of 
8.4 per cent compared to 0.9 per cent in traditional sectors, with metalworking 
experiencing an even higher rate of 11.9 per cent (Schiavi 2008: 63). State intervention, 
as such, was bolstering sectors leading the imposition of disciplinary modernisation.  
In particular, the leading sectors of this recovery were the large-scale modern 
workplaces of steel and, most importantly, automobile production. Production prior to 
1952 had been limited. Domestic firms had continued to operate in automobiles, 
alongside parts manufacturers and small repair workshops. These firms had produced 
goods such as lorry trailers, whilst Mercedes Benz Argentina (MBA), International 
Harvester, Ford, and GM produced commercial vehicles at a rate below 50 000 units per 
year (Metalurgia 5/49, 14:107: 23; Metalurgia 6/50, 15:119: 17; Jenkins 1984a: 41-44). 
After 1952, however, small mechanical workshops linked to transport were increasingly 
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supported by state credit, whilst the state also held meetings with parts manufacturers 
throughout 1953 (Girbal-Blacha 2003: 90; Metalurgia 9/53, 19:155: 41). Decree 
3693/59 brought the automobile sector under state protection, whilst promotion policies 
in 1951 and Law 14.222 permitted profit remittance by automobile firms after 1953 
(Gordillo 1991: 166; Catalano & Novick 1998: 30-31). Two firms responded to these 
incentives, with the most significant investment being Kaiser (later IKA) in 1955 to 
retool IAME factories in Córdoba, a change that caused employment in non-traditional 
sectors to rise in the city by 63 per cent (Nofal 1989: 16; Brennan & Gordillo 2008: 21-
23; Jenkins 1984a: 42; Belini & Korol 2012: 148). Foreign firms in the automobile 
sector, therefore, came to the fore, bringing important transformations in the workplace. 
The consolidation of the metalworking and automobile sectors, first around the 
ostensibly populist Peronism and then through concerted efforts to introduce new forms 
of disciplinary modernisation highlighted the limitations of “populist” ISI. Earlier 
acquiescence had been achieved only through the partial resolution of workers’ 
grievances. Yet with stagnation and attempts by firms to resolve it in their favour, the 
social coalition that had supported this initial phase unravelled. A new alliance between 
firms and the state, as a result, confronted workers with new relations in production. 
The fragile coalition behind Peronism began to break down as the capabilities to 
mediate and constrain the working class were weakened. Disciplinary modernisation, 
therefore, directly engendered a new locus of conflict in the metalworking sector. 
 
The Resurgence of the Working Class in Metalworking and Automobiles 
The two phases of this consolidation were mirrored by the concomitant reconfiguration 
and resurgence of the working class. In the first phase, workers were incorporated into 
the rapidly growing political institutions of labour, particularly within the UOM. 
However, this was not simply a case of the passive incorporation and pacification of 
working class radicalism within this institution. Persistent mobilisations within and 
beyond the workplace instead created the space around which the UOM was 
established. The second phase was a resurgence of radical mobilisations. New labour 
histories have shown that, despite appearances to the contrary, radical political ideas and 
working class autonomy persisted even during this ostensible heyday of the Peronist 
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social coalition. The result, therefore, was a return to workplace conflict mobilised 
within and beyond the institutional forms of representation that had been established. 
The political influence of metalworkers increased dramatically after 1943. Unionised 
metalworkers numbered only 5 992 across five unions in 1945, but by 1946 this number 
rose to 21 855, and by 1954 it was over 118 000 (Doyon 2006: 119, 247 ff. 7 & 266). 
Workers acting both within and beyond the UOM, moreover, continued to play a 
leading role. For example, according to one of the UOM leaders, on 17th October 1945: 
“the masses had swallowed the (official) trade union organisation and the thousands of 
factory delegates were at the head of the crowds, which came together from hundreds of 
streets and districts at the Plaza de Mayo” (Ángel Perelman 1961 cited in Munck et al 
1987: 129) 
Despite the rapid rise to prominence of the UOM, it was the “social and organisational 
strength of the working class” that was crucial throughout the next decade (James 1988: 
19). Moreover, following the absorption of the SOIM in 1946, there were growing 
tensions within the institutions. The UOM was “in 1947 a young union, representative 
of a branch that occupied a strategic position… but still in formation”, with 
Communists occupying positions in the internal commissions (Schiavi 2011: 20-21 & 
27). These tensions, moreover, were reflected in interventions carried out by the CGT, 
and five separate interventions carried out by the UOM leadership into local sections 
between 1947 and 1948 (Doyon 2006: 313 & 369). These interventions, therefore, 
demonstrated the continued presence of radical currents still within the UOM. 
The 1947 metalworkers’ general strike illustrates this persistence. This five-day strike, 
in which the entire metalworking sector was closed down, was the culmination of 
struggles to secure recognition of earlier agreements and expanded representation. 
Demonstrating its growing influence, Hilario Salvo called for the workers’ right to go 
further in their demands and mobilisations than Perón or the CGT desired. This led to 
clashes with the CGT, but garnered reserved support from Communist activists. Lasting 
only five days, the general strike on 11th November had a powerful impact. 
Significantly, it was one of the first strikes to include workplace occupations, with 
workplace control and the influence of internal commissions being one of the main 
issues in the strike (Schiavi 2011: 21-40; McGuire 1997: 68). Workers mobilising 
beyond the constraints of the UOM, therefore, still posed a threat to firms and the state.  
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Workplace conflict within the metalworking sector, moreover, persisted into the early 
1950s in response to the disciplinary modernisation being pursued by firms and the 
state. The CAIM, for example, complained about the “extreme liberty that the internal 
commissions enjoy in the factories”, particularly against the attempts to enforce 
rationalisation and workplace reorganisation (cited in Basualdo 2010: 91-93). Strikes, in 
response to this increasingly combative stance taken by firms, became increasingly 
militant and widespread. Metalworkers in Rosario, for example, engaged in a fierce 
dispute with the central leadership in 1952, supporting the claims of Communist-backed 
Hilario Salvo (Munck et al 1987: 139; Schiavi 2008: 87). Moreover, events that began 
with small wildcat strikes later in 1952 eventually forced the resignation of CGT leader 
Juan Espejo, as a large group of metalworkers celebrating the anniversary of the 17th 
October 1945 greeted his appearance with jeers and continued to protest outside its 
headquarters until he resigned (Snodgrass 1997: 175). Therefore, despite the 
constraining influence of the UOM, workers continued to demonstrate their autonomy.  
Moreover, there was a persistent role for dissident activists and radical political ideas. 
Their importance became increasingly apparent, with two groups of particular 
importance. First, the morenista Trotskyists of the Revolutionary Workers’ Party (POR) 
led by Nahuel Morena had, since 1944, been pursuing a strategy of inserting themselves 
into the UOM. By the mid-1950s, they were operating in some of largest factories, such 
as Phillips, SIAM and TAMET, with Nahuel Morena describing the growing “clasista” 
mentality of workers across the sector alongside “combative delegates and good internal 
commissions”. Second, the Communist Party, despite its repression under Perón, 
remained a relatively important force. These delegates were present in factories 
throughout the decade and tended to be very well-respected by workers, although 
mainly for their defence of economic gains rather than their political ideas. As tensions 
increased, moreover, these radical currents were able to gain an influence that belied 
their relatively small presence (Schiavi 2008: 74-84). This presence, combined with 
continuing autonomous mobilisations, therefore, represented a significant turning point, 
as the attempts to impose disciplinary modernisation were met by this working class. 
Alongside this important, but nascent, shift, a “new” working class was in formation in 
the automobile sector. Unlike the metalworking sector, automobile workers were 
represented by Union of Mechanics and Automotive Transport Workers (SMATA). 
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This was far more decentralised, with local branches responsible for negotiations and 
final agreements. Such a form of organisation was seen by employers as a useful feature 
to enable control over workers, but actually allowed more democratic and participatory 
procedures (Brennan 1996: 294). Thus its structure and leadership aided the articulation 
of discontent as much as the “one union per company” model of representation that had 
been established across the sector, with significant space for anti-bureaucratic and anti-
capitalist positions (Evans et al 1984: 139; Catalano & Novick 1998: 29 & 49). Most 
significantly, moreover, this emergence of SMATA and workers’ mobilisations in the 
automobile sector was occurring during an upsurge in political tensions around ISI. 
The culmination of these tensions was the metalworkers’ general strike of 1954. The 
constraining influence of the CGT and the UOM within the sector was increasingly 
apparent to workers, with them being understood by now as little more than a branch of 
the state. Workers thus engaged in autonomous mobilisations without its authority. At 
TAMET, they demanded a pay rise of $0.60 pesos per hour, whilst at SIAM, which had 
not even had an internal commission since 1952, workers’ attempted to force the 
reinstatement of recently fired workers (Schiavi 2008: 90-91). There were stoppages at 
Caige y Camea and Merlini, and growing unrest at Phillips. The end of April then saw 
further partial and total strikes at Decaer, Storer, Caige, Cesnac, Febo, Silviania and 
Merlini. Moreover, on 4th May, strikes in Rosario and Tucumán employed increasingly 
radical strategies, such as the “progressive partial strike”, which culminated in a seven 
hour stoppage on 10th May (Schiavi 2009: 29- 31). Therefore, in overcoming the limits 
of the political institutions of labour, metalworkers began to represent an increasingly 
coherent challenge to the disciplinary modernisation strategies of firms and the state. 
Workers’ demands in this strike focused primarily on wages, changes to work 
processes, and the issue of control in the workplace. They demanded wage increases of 
40 per cent to address the effects of inflation ignored by the UOM (Snodgrass 1997: 
177). One of the most prominent concerns, however, was over the introduction of the 
“production card” that would record individual daily output, which was an important 
manifestation of new relations in production (Schiavi 2009: 29). In response, the UOM, 
having brought the strikes under control on 12th and 13th April, accepted only a 12 to 15 
per cent pay rise, which led to violence within the union headquarters resulting in three 
workers dead and forty eight injured. Despite the imprisonment and deportation of 
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“foreign Communist agitators”, militancy remained strong and more than 50 000 
workers engaged in wildcat strikes. In Avellaneda district alone, 500 delegates forced 
the UOM to accept strikes (Snodgrass 1997: 178; Schiavi 2009: 33). Interestingly, 
moreover, strike committees were established in leading factories, including TAMET 
and SIAM. These were comprised, primarily, by members of the internal commissions, 
particularly from the Communist Party (Fernández 2007: 143-145; Schiavi 2009: 20-
48). Pressure for the strike, therefore, came from below, with the radical political ideas 
being disseminated by internal commissions and workplace delegates playing a key role 
in politicising and facilitating the autonomous mobilisation of the working class. 
The resurgence of the working class and its radical political autonomy marked a turning 
point in the consolidation of ISI in Argentina. The 1954 metalworkers’ strike 
highlighted the limits on the consolidation of either the ostensible populism that had 
placed limits on the workplace control of firms and on the new forms of disciplinary 
modernisation that undermined the acquiescence of the working class. The inability of 
firms to exercise workplace control meant that they could not sustain their earlier 
growth, even with growing state support, whilst efforts to reassert this control only 
exacerbated workplace conflict. The UOM, moreover, could only exert its authority in 
mediating the demands of workers if acquiescence was ensured through continual 
concessions. Once this was undermined, however, the radicalism that had characterised 
workers’ mobilisations during the 1930s returned. The response of firms and the state, 
therefore, was the deepening of disciplinary modernisation in the consolidation of 
metalworking and the re-establishment of the automobile sector.  
 
Repression and the Resurgent Radicalism of the Working Class 
 
This section will examine the intensification of disciplinary modernisation and the 
conflicts around it. In metalworking, efforts to reassert control within the workplace 
through a combination of new production processes and overt attacks on workplace 
representation only intensified conflicts, weakening the constraints that could be 
imposed by the UOM. In automobiles, TNCs transformed relations in production not 
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only in the large factories that were established, but also in local workshops, parts 
manufacturers, and, increasingly, in the metalworking sector. In both sectors, firms 
made use of the shift in political momentum to reorganise the workplace and intensify 
work. The relative institutional weakness of SMATA, moreover, allowed this to be 
more comprehensively implemented in the automobile sector. The result, therefore, was 
to further consolidate tensions in the resurgent workplace conflicts of the metalworking 
sector and around the increasingly radicalised workers in the automobile sector. 
 
Disciplining Workers in the “Modernisation” of Metalworking and Automobiles 
The consolidation of ISI in the metalworking and automobile sectors was characterised 
by a distinctive disciplinary modernisation, manifested particularly in the growth of the 
automobile sector. Leading automobile firms increased production, established 
domestic networks for parts and components, and introduced new technologies and 
production processes. These firms took on a leading role, producing cars and 
commercial vehicles for the domestic market. Nevertheless, the networks that were 
established reproduced the inefficiencies that had pervaded metalworking. A minority 
of large, foreign firms headed up a network of smaller firms and, despite increasing 
technology imports, most remained reliant on traditional methods of workplace control.  
There were important changes to the role of the state in the metalworking sector after 
1955. For example, the role of DINIE decreased. Whilst the value of its metalworking 
output increased from $168.2 million pesos to $192.8 million pesos, the total share of its 
overall activity declined from 16.5 per cent to 13.8 per cent between 1954 and 1957 
(Belini 2006: 96). The CAIM responded positively to such changes, cautiously 
welcoming the proposals of the new regime. For example, the potential dangers of 
exchange rate liberalisation were acknowledged for a sector that relied heavily on 
imports. Yet these changes were understood as “essential and urgent” and demands 
were proposed at a meeting with the new Minister of Industry, including primary 
materials supply, energy supply and cost, modernisation of machinery, and the 
prioritisation of the Steelworking Plan (Metalurgia 10/55, 21:177: 3 & 14). These 
demands, as well as the willingness of firms to work with the military regime, 
demonstrated the shifting role of the state and its re-emergent alliance with firms. 
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As a result of this burgeoning new alliance between firms and the state, metalworking 
and automobiles underwent a period of substantial growth. Whilst overall annual 
growth rates between 1956 and 1961 were at 4.2 per cent, in non-traditional sectors this 
rose to 9.7 per cent, whilst in metalworking this rose even further to 12.1 per cent. Steel 
production benefited, in particular, with SOMISA tripling its output (Schiavi 2008: 63; 
Zarrilli 2004: 130). Most importantly, however, much of this growth after 1959 was 
stimulated by changes to foreign investment laws that permitted the unlimited 
remittance of profits and the repatriation of capital (Jenkins 1984a: 48). As a result, over 
200 foreign firms opened factories between 1958 and 1963, bringing advanced quality, 
skills, and work processes that impacted significantly on the structure and performance 
of the sector (Katz & Kosacoff 2000: 302; Katz & Kosacoff 1989: 52-54). Non-
traditional sectors came to contribute around 80 per cent of value added in 
manufacturing between 1950 and 1970, with metalworking contributing around 33 per 
cent by 1964 (Ferrer 2008: 331; see Table 60). Vehicle production soared, moreover, 
with foreign firms engaging in joint ventures or opening new subsidiaries including 
Ford, GM, Citroën, Peugeot, Chrysler, MBA, and FIAT (Nofal 1989: 26-27; see Table 
61). Foreign investment, therefore, proceeded far more rapidly than before, 
transforming this alliance between firms and the state increasingly in their favour. 
Table 60: Selected Manufacturing Sectors, Argentina, 1954-1964 (adapted from Belini & Korol 
2012: 180, table 9) 
Sector 
Establish-
ments 
(thousands) 
1954 
Establish-
ments 
(thousands) 
1964 
Workers 
(thousands) 
1954 
Workers 
(thousands) 
1964 
Value-
Added 
(%) 
1954 
Value-
Added 
(%) 
1964 
Food, 
Beverages & 
Tobacco 
22.9 25.9 275.7 272.2 23 24 
Textiles, 
Clothing & 
Leather 
29.4 18.5 312.2 227.2 22 14 
Metalworking 
& Mechanical 48.2 56.7 421.2 470.3 25 33 
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Table 61: Vehicle Production per Firm, Argentina, 1960-1966 (adapted from Nofal 1989: 32-33, 
table 1.17) 
Firm 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
Ford 11 767 13 441 11 767 9 110 26 825 30 424 30 459 
IKA-Renault 33 205 42 201 39 987 27 684 50 042 56 625 40 085 
FIAT 4 272 11 339 14 185 18 544 23 397 28 868 36 303 
SAFRAR (Peugeot) 1 912 5 000 8 812 8 406 2 693 6 647 11 013 
Chrysler 4 330 7 382 10 028 8 258 10 484 16 163 14 376 
Mercedes Benz 2 566 3 700 2 367 1 648 2 222 3 075 2 403 
DINFIA-IAME 3 704 3 243 3 743 4 226 3 867 3 266  2 646 
General Motors 11 056 13 457 12 063 9 146 19 322 25 212 21 596 
Citroën 965 4 229 5 422 3 313 6 947 4 645 6 214 
IASF 904 3 050 4 075 3 437 6 020 5 494 4 735 
SIAM Di Tella 4 102 14 082 7 146 8 503 11 676 13 110 9 593 
Isard 3 140 5 170 5 601 2 287 2 368 539 --- 
Others 6 412 9 894 4 664 337 620 468 30 
Total 69 336 136 168 129 880 104 899 166 483 194 536 179 453 
 
However, the ostensible surge in growth led by foreign firms was problematic. Whilst 
there was an initial surge in investment after 1959, between 1960 and 1962 only 17.3 
per cent of this came from abroad. Moreover, much of the foreign investment was in the 
form of second-hand plant and equipment (Belini & Korol 2012: 182; Guillen 2001: 4). 
As a result, the overall impact of these firms was mixed.8 Outdated technology meant 
production facilities were around 10 to 15 per cent of the “typical” size, with less 
automated production lines. Moreover, only IKA, Ford, and GM were producing more 
than 10 000 units in 1960 and these three firms comprised around 80 per cent of total 
production. But even these firms were producing on a low scale, with their nineteen 
factories producing fewer than 3 000 units annually (Katz & Kosacoff 1989: 54; Table 
61; Zarrilli 2004: 131). The rapid growth of the automobile sector, therefore, served 
primarily to consolidate pre-existing problems in the fragmented industrial structure. 
This proliferation of low scale and fragmented production, moreover, had a much wider 
effect. It stimulated growth in tyres, fuels, and engines, as well as encouraging increases 
in steel and machinery production (Belini & Korol 2012: 183). Yet local component 
suppliers were trapped in a cycle of inefficient production, producing to blueprints 
                                                          
8
 See Fishwick (2014) for further details on the causes and consequences of foreign investment in the 
automobile sector during this period. In particular, these decisions were motivated by changes at global 
and local levels, but it is their profound impacts at the local level will be explored in depth in this chapter. 
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provided by these foreign firms (Jenkins 1984b: 68). The proliferation of model types, 
which rose dramatically from 16 to 56 between 1959 and 1962, meant they were 
subjected to rapidly changing product requirements (Nofal 1989: 31). This was 
compounded, moreover, after 1961 when six of the major automobile production firms 
left and after 1964 when only twelve of the original twenty-one firms remained 
(Gordillo 1991: 178; Belini & Korol 2012: 182-183). The impact on the metalworking 
sector was even more significant. Output fell by over 9 per cent in less than two years, 
whilst employment fell from 309 000 workers in 1959 to only 121 000 in 1966 (Zarrilli 
2004: 125; Cortes Condé 2009: 221; Munck et al 1987: 157-158, table 12.1). As an 
example, SIAM entered into crisis as it lost its protection and access to credit, with the 
high levels of productive capacity that had been built up during the 1940s stymied by its 
declining financial resources (Brennan & Rougier 2009: 139-143). Disciplinary 
modernisation, therefore, resulted in a crisis for older firms that had been established 
during the earlier phase of populist ISI, consolidating the prominence of foreign firms.  
As a result, economic recovery was led by these large foreign firms in the automobile 
sector that strengthened their position in the economy as a whole. Vehicle production 
soared once again, whilst between 1960 and 1966 the share of local parts production 
rose from 26.3 per cent to 48.9 per cent. In real terms, local purchases rose by more than 
ten times between 1960 and 1966 whilst automobile production rose by a little over six 
times (see Table 61; Catalano and Novick 1998: 33; Nofal 1989: 149, table 5.4). This 
recovery, however, consolidated many of the earlier trends. Foreign firms in 1960 had 
accounted for only one-third of vehicle output, but by 1965 this had almost doubled to 
around 60 per cent (Jenkins 1984a: 50; Nofal 1989: 38). The fragmentation of 
production and concentration of ownership, therefore, further exacerbated problems of 
limited scale. Between 1963 and 1966, for example, the number of car model types rose 
from 30 to 43 and the number of commercial vehicle model types rose from 29 to 34, 
despite fewer firms operating in the country (Nofal 1989: 40). By 1965 five tractor 
plants were producing 13 500 units across fifteen different models annually, which 
compared unfavourably to plants in Europe and North America that could each produce 
around 20 000 (Belini & Korol 2012: 184). As a result, the inefficiencies of 
fragmentation and low scale pervading the automobile sector were consolidated. 
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The impact of this fragmentation was, moreover, keenly felt within the workplace. A 
1967 study noted that almost a quarter of machinery in the sector was more than 10 
years old, whilst one US union leader noted that much of it was being specifically built 
as “special low production machinery” (Jenkins 1984a: 52; Frank 1972: 109). As a 
result, work was characterised by simplified and repetitive tasks, reminiscent of Fordist 
automated production, but on a slower work cycle with older obsolete tools and more 
manual handling (Nofal 1989: 90). To ensure productivity without further technical and 
organisational investment, moreover, automobile firms resorted to a so-called “proto-
Taylorism” (Catalano & Novick 1998: 32). Production processes were characterised by 
their relative inefficiency, with productivity increases and workplace control requiring 
strict authority to be exercised by managers and foremen (Brennan 1994: 90-91; 
Brennan & Gordillo 2008: 314-316). The rapid growth led by these foreign firms in the 
automobile sector produced a deepening of confrontation within the workplace. 
The locus of conflict that had been established in the consolidation of disciplinary 
modernisation grew exponentially. Automobiles were the most rapidly growing sector 
of the economy that, backed by foreign investment, began to transform production and 
work. This transformation, however, did not resolve the persistent inefficiency of 
production. Despite having access to advanced technology and increasing output within 
the sector, even the largest firms continued to rely on traditional methods of strict 
control within the workplace. The persistent inefficiencies that had been consolidated, 
therefore, were not the outcome of dependency or an exhausted “easy phase”, but were 
deliberately reproduced as a means to sustain workplace control. 
 
Metalworkers and Automobile Workers in the “Peronist” Resistance 
Disciplinary modernisation engendered a resurgence of working class mobilisations. In 
the metalworking sector, the declining constraints of the UOM enabled a re-emergence 
of workplace conflicts that challenged the efforts of firms to exert managerial authority. 
Nevertheless, institutional constraints were quickly, although partially, re-established, 
leading to a decline in the militancy of workers within these firms. In the automobile 
sector, however, workplace conflicts took on growing significance as new ideas 
engaged with experiences of the increasingly strict discipline in the workplace. This led 
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to new strategies of resistance, including increasingly violent occupations of factories, 
as workers came into direct confrontation with leading foreign firms and the state. 
The mobilisations through the latter part of 1955 and early 1956 emphasised the new 
grievances relating to disciplinary modernisation. Strikes occurred at Phillips from 30th 
December 1955 to middle of January 1956 incorporating 2 300 workers. Radical 
activists had a clear influence over this mobilisation, with members of the 
Revolutionary Socialist Party calling on workers to “stay firm and united” against the 
“imperialist bosses, the intervention of the union [by the government] and the ‘free 
unions’” (Lucha Obrera 25/1/56, 1:8: 2). At Autoar, progressive strikes targeted 
attempts to increase work rhythms and arbitrary firings, whilst workers at many other 
metalworking firms, including Catita, Atimsa, Philips, SIAM, Klockner, Fanal, Piazza, 
Carma, and Siambretta mobilised against the disciplinary relations in production 
(Schneider 2005: 89-90). Most significantly, these struggles were mobilised from 
below, with internal commissions and workplace delegates giving meaning to workers’ 
demands (Gaspari & Panella 2008: 14). This was evidenced in the 1956 metalworkers’ 
general strike, which lasted over 50 days from November. Despite lacking centralised 
leadership, it incorporated a variety of activists from Peronist-era leaders, to those close 
to Augusto Vandor, who would come to represent the new bureaucracy of the 1960s, to 
Communists and Trotskyists. It also displayed a high degree of coordination. 
Metalworkers in Avellaneda, Capital Federal, La Matanza and Vicente Lopéz, for 
example, established assistance committees to secure funds and food for the working 
class neighbourhoods (Schneider 2005: 94). The strike, therefore, highlighted the 
resurgent political influence of workers confronting the strategies of firms and the state. 
The outcome of the strike, however, highlighted important changes in this political 
influence. The reconstitution of the UOM placed constraints on workers’ mobilisation 
(ibid: 95-96). Yet workers demonstrated how they could transcend these. For example, 
the increasingly radical militancy had forced a transformation of the UOM, with the 
internal commissions and workplace delegates playing an integral role and 
consolidating links with the radical “Commandos of the Resistance” (ibid: 104; Salas 
2006: 76-77). It was pressure from below combined with the increasing prominence of 
radical ideas that became increasingly significant. At ACINDAR, for example, one 
particular grievance centred on attempts to raise the requirements for productivity-
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linked wages. This led to workers, rather than the UOM, protesting against these 
changes. The firm met these demands, which also included extra pay for unsanitary and 
dangerous work, but tensions over productivity-linked wages persisted (Basualdo 
2011a: 241-242). In contesting the enforcement of disciplinary relations in production, 
workers were pushing far beyond the constraints of the UOM in the pursuit of their 
demands. 
The metalworkers’ general strike of 1959 confirmed this transformation of workers’ 
political influence. The resurgence of mobilisation culminated in the general strike that 
was called on 3rd April 1959. This strike called, in particular, for an end to the 
dismissals and suspensions against the workplace delegates and internal commissions, 
as well as raising concerns over productivity increases. It was followed by a twenty-four 
hour general strike on 20th July and by another for several days on 25th August. Around 
250 000 workers mobilised, closing 63 000 metalworking plants across the country. 
Moreover, there was a significant degree of coordination with, for example, workers in 
meatpacking plants providing striking metalworkers with food. Workers’ demands 
focused on productivity increases, rationalisation of work processes, and the role of the 
internal commissions. The protests, in particular, were less about salaries and more 
against firms regulating and controlling the workplace (Schneider 2005: 125-130). This 
1959 strike, therefore, demonstrated the threat posed by the working class and the limits 
of imposing new disciplinary relations in production throughout the sector. 
Most significantly, however, the defeat of the metalworkers in this strike led to the 
strengthening of the UOM. For example, the UOM signed an agreement in 1960 that 
permitted restrictions on the internal commissions by facilitating a wholly centralised 
system of wage bargaining and agreeing to age restrictions on the workplace delegates 
to marginalise younger, more radical activists (Munck et al 1987: 154). The agreement 
also permitted the rationalisation of the work, increases in production rhythms, and the 
restructuring of the workplace (Schneider 2005: 146-148). As a result, the UOM 
became increasingly complicit in the imposition of disciplinary modernisation. Yet, 
whilst workers were placed under the increasing constraints of this institution, their 
militancy did not simply disappear. Although the new UOM under Vandor was not in 
itself radical there remained a “stronger disposition toward confrontation… most visible 
[in] the struggles in the streets” (Grau et al 2006: 148). Moreover, protests against 
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disciplinary relations in production were increasingly mobilised without the support of 
the UOM (Schneider 2005: 152-155 & 169). However, whilst this demonstrated the 
continuing combativeness of the working class, renewed constraints had clearly placed 
limits upon radical mobilisations, particularly in the stagnating metalworking sector. 
In the automobile sector, however, these constraints were far less pervasive. As a result, 
strikes increased in the sector during the 1960s, just as the constraints on metalworkers 
were being consolidated. Workers at GM, Fevre y Basset, and Ford in Buenos Aires 
undertook short strikes, usually consisting of twenty-four hour stoppages, throughout 
1961 aimed at returning dismissed or suspended workers to their posts (Schneider 2005: 
168-169). Workers at MBA were important, targeting efforts by firms to reorganise 
production and increase productivity (Rodríguez 2011: 136). Automobile workers were 
also becoming increasingly prominent in Córdoba. For example, the 1959 general strike 
at IKA saw the first use of the “active strike” where workers came out onto the streets, 
holding vast, open general assemblies (Brennan 1994: 62; Brennan & Gordillo 2008: 
37-39). Automobile workers’ strikes in Córdoba were particularly important, as it was 
the factories where “the real community that bound the autoworkers together… where 
they spent most of their waking hours and the better part of their lives” (Brennan 1994: 
340). As firms deepened disciplinary modernisation in this new leading sector, 
workplace conflict and the emergent working class became increasingly significant. 
This growing significance, moreover, was not just in the automobile sector, but also in 
other sectors at the forefront of the resurgent industrial growth after 1963. At 
ACINDAR, for example, the firm sought to exploit the limited influence of the UOM in 
the area to undermine the internal commissions. The result, however, was the formation 
of an independent union in the factory, organised by a Peronist leadership, but outside 
the UOM. Workers occupied the factory with four hour strikes per shift, four hours of 
mass meetings within the workplace, and picketing outside it. Iron bars and Molotov 
cocktails were also used as weapons in defence of the occupation (Basualdo 2011a: 
242-243; Munck 1987 et al: 156). Activists at the Autoar plant, moreover, protested the 
salary debt of the firms and the inaction of the UOM by seizing control of the factory, 
whilst at Aceros Sima there were strikes over unpaid bonuses, the changing of shift 
patterns, and the failure to provide proper work clothes. Two delegates were fired as a 
result and, when workers refused to accept the agreements reached by the UOM 
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leadership, a seventy two hour occupation began on 17th April. Managers and senior 
engineers were held hostage, with internal surveillance ensuring machines and tools 
were not damaged (Schneider 2005: 205-213). Occupations at these plants demonstrated 
the shifting locus of conflict accompanying the emergence of these leading sectors. 
The most important manifestations of this shift, moreover, were the factory occupations 
at IKA and Ford. At IKA, not only did workers occupy the factory, but production 
continued under the guidance of workers for its twenty-four hour duration. Over 1 500 
workers had been suspended, activists in the plant were fired, leading figures were 
jailed, all as a precursor to the desire of the firm to shut down the plant within the next 
15 days (Schneider 2005: 205-206). Workers prevented this closing down and, most 
importantly, provided further evidence of their political influence over the trajectory of 
ISI in one of the country’s leading firms (Brennan 1994: 94). At Ford, the number of 
hostages taken by workers represented an increasing militancy of conflicts, although a 
few days later, after agreeing to workers’ demands to end the occupation, the factory 
was closed as the firm reorganised the workplace and fired 200 workers involved in the 
occupation. Significantly, however, this occupation was the culmination of small 
conflicts not represented in data on strikes and work stoppages (Schneider 2005: 245). 
The restructuring of the leading automobile sector was resisted with varying degrees of 
success in these two leading firms, with mobilisations against firms’ strategies within 
and beyond the political institutions of labour continuing with increasing veracity. 
These persistent conflicts, moreover, combined with the radical political ideas that took 
on renewed meaning in the course of these conflicts. For example, the crises in the 
sector after 1962 had led to increasing calls for worker participation, from Trotskyist 
factions demanding direct control to more moderate demands for oversight and control 
over lay-offs (Gordillo 1991: 178-179; Brennan 1994: 97). The issue of workplace 
control, moreover, was extended beyond the factory, targeting foreign firms and the 
political institutions of labour (Brennan 1994: 52; Gordillo 1991: 183). As a result, 
James Brennan (1994: 76) argues that what was created was “not a class consciousness 
but certainly a union consciousness”. However, as has been shown in this chapter, this 
distinction is problematic. Workers’ persistent political autonomy, the increasing 
significance of radical ideas, and limited pacification of this struggle had important 
implications for the formation of the working class and for its abilities to determine the 
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trajectory of ISI. Foreign firms dominated the sector, but the deliberate fragmentation of 
work and representation they imposed engendered collective experiences that allowed 
workers to press for mobilisations within and beyond the institutionally weak SMATA. 
These conflicts, therefore, marked the beginning of the end of the consolidation of 
disciplinary modernisation in the metalworking and automobile sectors. Workers 
constituted an increasingly coherent and autonomous working class, whilst firms and 
the state continued to respond with a deepening of discipline and a persistence of 
repression. Pervasive constraints in metalworking meant that, despite their numerical 
advantage, workers in this sector were less significant in challenging these strategies. 
Instead, it was workers in the steel and automobile sectors of Córdoba and Buenos Aires 
that came to the fore. As a result, these increasingly militant workplace conflicts were 
transformed into a deeper struggle that would determine the eventual breakdown of ISI. 
 
Consolidating Metalworking and Automobile Production in Argentina 
 
This chapter has shown the importance of the workplace in the emergence and 
consolidation of metalworking and automobile production in Argentina. In the first 
phase of its emergence, extensive growth proceeded with little or no direct state support. 
Conflicts focused on grievances related to traditional production processes, which were 
politicised around prevailing radical ideas. Despite the immediate failure of these 
conflicts, however, in the longer term they engendered growing state support for 
metalworking. Extensive growth continued as metalworking firms and workers 
constituted leading sectors of the social coalition supporting the consolidation of ISI. 
This was initially constituted around populist measures, but stagnation and fears over 
workplace control forced firms to pursue stabilisation, rationalisation, workplace 
reorganisation, and productivity increases. Finally, the intensification of this 
disciplinary modernisation was pursued through foreign investment by automobile 
firms. These firms brought advanced technology that was disseminated alongside new 
relations in production. They also produced a surge in manufacturing output, but, with 
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the need to impose increasingly strict discipline in the workplace, radical working class 
mobilisations engendered new conflicts and the beginning of the breakdown of ISI.  
For firms and the state, it was the persistence of workplace conflict that determined their 
decisions in the emergence and consolidation of ISI. First, the period of extensive 
growth provides an important corrective to the typical perception of the “easy phase”. 
The emergence of a plethora of inefficient small and medium-sized firms was not a 
response to direct policy measures of protection, but instead was in response to the 
industrial structures established around predominant large firms. Moreover, traditional 
forms of workplace control prevailed despite the prevalence of advanced technologies. 
Second, the extensive growth led by the populist social coalition raised new fears about 
workplace control. Rationalisation, productivity, and workplace reorganisation were 
direct responses to the limitations of traditional forms of control. Despite the constraints 
imposed on radical mobilisation, workers remained an unresolved threat. This was 
manifested in the automobile sector where, despite weaker forms of representation, 
workers confronted leading firms and challenged workplace discipline. Third, these 
conflicts were central to the decisions taken by the state. By supporting firms in the 
imposition of constraints on mobilisation and direct assaults on new forms of political 
organisation, it played a leading role in the workplace conflicts pervading the sector. 
Attacks on internal commissions and attempts to undermine the political institutions of 
labour were a vital complement to firms’ efforts to exert control through production 
and, in the words of a military leader, “to reassert the right of managers to manage”. 
It was in the workplace, therefore, that workers engaged with these actors. They forced 
the state to support the extensive growth of metalworking by challenging the traditional 
industrial and production structures that had prevailed. The populist consolidation of ISI 
was the direct outcome of workers’ struggles. Workers did not simply acquiesce to this 
consolidation, but were active in its constitution. Moreover, they continued to challenge 
the imposition of workplace control, forcing firms and the state, once again, to pursue 
new methods for imposing it. New technologies, managerial techniques, and workplace 
reorganisation were the outcome of conflicts that posed a significant threat to the ability 
of firms to assert their authority within the workplace. Most importantly, in the course 
of these conflicts, the political subjectivities of the working class were continually 
reconstituted around ideas of Peronism and the Left. The meanings of these ideas, 
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moreover, were continually transformed in the outcomes of the workplace conflicts. 
Initially these bolstered the coalition supporting ISI, but in response to the disciplinary 
strategies of firms and the state, they politicised workers’ grievances and established a 
new locus of opposition in the automobile and metalworking sectors. Moreover, the 
varying capabilities of the political institutions of labour to impose constraints meant it 
was the smaller number of workers in the automobile sector that would confront this 
trajectory of ISI and establish the conditions for its violent breakdown in the 1970s. 
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Chapter 6 
Failed Revolutions in Chile and Argentina 
 
The breakdown of ISI in Chile and Argentina has been the subject of much 
condemnation, but, for the most part, this condemnation has derived from the limits that 
pervade understandings of its emergence and consolidation. As such, it is the 
“exhaustion” of the easy phase, the failures of political and economic institutions, the 
limits of consensus around political ideas, or the intractability of class conflict that 
explains the inevitable breakdown of ISI. First, its collapse is blamed on deep-rooted 
internal contradictions embedded within the archetypal model of ISI that unravelled 
around economic crises and political tensions in countries throughout the region 
(Haggard 1990). Second, its failures relate to the accumulation of political tensions 
around institutions that were consolidated in the tumult of the twentieth century and that 
could no longer withstand their intensity (Thorp 1998). Third, new ideas aimed at 
overcoming the model’s earlier limitations could not find significant traction within 
prevailing institutions or the wider political context, only exacerbating the growing 
tensions (Sikkink 1991; Hira 1998). Fourth, the tensions between competing social 
classes that constituted the dominant social coalition creating ISI could not be overcome 
and, in more radical perspectives, would only have been resolved through revolutionary 
change (Silva 2007; Cardoso & Faletto 1979). This chapter will argue, however, that it 
was the failure to establish control within the workplace that brought ISI to its brutal 
end, not as an inevitable collapse or as an underlying potentiality, but rather as the 
outcome of conscious political action and the intensification of workplace conflicts. 
The chapter will build on the empirical material that has been used to explain the cases 
of Chilean textile production and the automobile and metalworking sectors in 
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Argentina. In Chile, recent studies on new forms of workplace organisation and political 
subjectivity provide an important basis for rethinking the influence of the working class 
in this deeply conflictive period (Winn 1986; Gaudichaud 2004; Gaudichaud 2005; 
Castillo 2009). This is complemented, moreover, by primary research using workers’ 
newspapers that allow further insights into the specific formation of these aspects within 
the textile sector, including Hombrenuevo, FENATEX, and Revista del Aréa Textil. In 
Argentina, the upsurge in labour history also offers insights into the experiences of 
workers in the metalworking and automobile sectors. These examine the increasingly 
violent upheavals that characterised the breakdown of ISI and the influence of new and 
existing forms of workplace organisation (Carrera 2010; Basualdo 2011a; Rodríguez 
2011; Mignon 2013). These studies are also complemented by further primary research, 
including workers’ newspapers such as Semanario CGT, that provide insights into the 
competing ideas prevailing in the political institutions of labour at this time. These 
materials are invaluable resources for understanding workplace conflict, political 
subjectivities, and the political influence of workers over the breakdown of ISI. 
The chapter will argue that this breakdown was the result of the failure of firms and the 
state to impose control within the workplace. In both Chile and Argentina, these 
ongoing efforts and their failure to pacify the working class produced new forms of 
mobilisation that posed a growing threat. In Chile, textile workers were at the forefront 
of struggles to transform relations in and of production through innovative new forms of 
self-organisation. In Argentina, workers in the metalworking and automobile sectors led 
much of the opposition to the intensification of workplace discipline in increasingly 
violent confrontations. The historically-constituted differences around work, resistance, 
and political subjectivity, moreover, meant that workers posed distinctive threats in the 
forms of their mobilisation. In Chile, textile workers were able to establish cohesive 
political institutions of the working class. In Argentina, the constraints imposed by the 
political institutions of labour, particularly in the metalworking sector but also within 
the automobile sector, stymied the establishment of similar institutions, but did produce 
increasing conflict. From within workplace, therefore, workers in Chile and Argentina 
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emerged as potentially revolutionary working classes, with the need to combat these 
political subjects determining the timing and ferocity of the breakdown of ISI.9  
 
Reform, Revolution, and the Rise and Fall of Socialism in Chile 
 
This section will explain the breakdown of ISI in Chile around the political tensions 
created within and around the workplaces of textile production. As the failure to 
implement strategies of stabilisation, rationalisation, and workplace reorganisation 
became increasingly apparent, firms and the state moved to support a reformist political 
strategy that would offer limited concessions whilst retaining the core features of 
production and workplace control within the sector. Yet this intensified the radical 
politicisation already underway amongst the working class. Its upsurge, in response, led 
to the continuing mobilisation of workers, for the first time since the late 1930s, in 
explicit support of “their” government. These protests, as a result, extended far beyond 
the institutional limits the new government sought to sustain, as conflicts within and 
around the workplace intensified. The result was the establishment of new political 
institutions not of labour, but of the working class. The revolutionary potential that 
these manifested, despite their fragile and nascent form, engendered a backlash against 
the working class that constituted the violent end of ISI.  
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 This thesis will not explicitly tackle the details of the violent assault on both the political institutions and 
political subject of the working class that accompanied the end of this period as it is a subject worthy of 
far more detailed analysis than is possible within the confines of this work. These events, instead, will 
comprise a future research project so, in the meantime, I will defer to very important historical and 
contemporary research that has been conducted to date. On Chile, the edited collection by Winn (2004) 
explores the impact of the political and economic repression on workers following the 1973 coup, whilst 
the book by Garcés and Leiva (2005) provides an in-depth account of its impact on one particularly active 
district of Santiago. On Argentina, numerous works have been produced that examine the conflicts 
between Peronist and leftist guerrillas and the state (see, in particular, Gillespie 1982), but in terms of the 
deliberate targeting of workers in the metalworking and automobile factories that comprise the subject 
matter of this thesis, recent research by a new generation of labour historians is providing renewed 
insights into the significance of these workers (see Basualdo 2011b & Azpiazu, Schorr & Basualdo 2010). 
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From Reformism to the (De-)Politicisation of the Working Class 
The consolidation of disciplinary modernisation in the textile sector had created 
widening conflicts within and around the workplace. The political autonomy retained by 
workers, the relatively fragmented forms of political representation, and the prevailing 
radical socialist ideas produced a significant threat to workplace control by firms and 
the state. In response, a reformist strategy was implemented in an effort to pacify 
workers across the sector. However, the rationalisation and reorganisation of the 
workplace continued. Its resulting failures led to the establishment of the socialist 
government of the UP. The UP politicised struggles in the textile sector, pursuing 
nationalisation of the largest monopoly firms, increasing output through reactivation, 
and encouraging worker participation. The result was a new alliance between the state 
and the political institutions of labour that transformed the textile sector.  
The electoral victory of the PDC and the “Revolution in Liberty” did little to assuage 
the conflicts intensifying around disciplinary modernisation in the textile sector. In fact, 
this ostensibly reformist strategy was accompanied by a consolidation of these new 
relations in production. At Yarur, for example, following the crushing of the strike 
action in 1962 through the use of traditional methods of “coercion, co-optation, and 
political influence”, the dismissal of over 1 000 “rebel” workers meant that the needs of 
the Taylorist system being introduced by American advisors Burlington Mills were met 
within three years. By 1965, moreover, this system would be copied by its competitors 
throughout the country, combining the increases in work rhythms of Taylorism with the 
strict discipline of paternalist management techniques (Winn 1994: 30-31). Moreover, 
the state was instrumental in supporting such strategies. CORFO, for example, played a 
vital role in the renewal of technological capacity despite the fact that, according to 
OECD statistics, the sector was already “capital-intensive” and that continuing under-
utilisation of installed machinery was a far more pressing problem (Ortega et al 1989: 
196; Chile Textil 1966, 254: 11-13; Winn 1986: 25-27). Firms and the state, therefore, 
remained focused on workplace reorganisation to deepen control over workers. 
Despite efforts at reform and this deepening of political control in the workplace, the 
double crisis persisted. Growth in manufacturing value-added and employment was 
stagnant, but, most significantly, so was growth in productivity (see Table 62). This was 
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despite the import of new machinery, the transformation of the workplace, and the 
support of the new government for textile production. Firms, as such, prioritised 
workplace control. For example, the Yarur company journal, Revista Yarur, emphasised 
benefits of the Taylorist system that sought the “perfection” of the worker, productivity-
linked pay, relocation of workers within the production process, and a scientific 
reorganisation that was claimed to “maximise productivity” (Revista Yarur 03-05/68, 
14: 12-13 & 18). In response, workers’ mobilisations persisted throughout the sector. In 
silk production, stagnation of wages, the automation of work and expansion of the 
number of machines to be monitored by workers, poor working conditions, including 
faulty and dangerous electrics and no heating, and abuses in small factories led to a 
strike in over sixty factories in 1965 (Central Única 1965, 1: 3: 10). In cotton 
production, moreover, protests at Sumar in 1965 led to the reincorporation of two 
dismissed leaders, on full pay and with previous status retained (Central Única, 1965, 1: 
2: 5). Changes implemented by the PDC did not resolve the double crisis and, most 
significantly, did not suppress the intensification of workplace conflict. 
Table 62: Output, Employment, and Productivity in Textile Production, Chile, 1964-1970 (adapted 
from Stallings 1978: 254-259) 
Year 
Manufacturing Value-
Added (Millions of 1965 
Escudos) 
No. of Workers 
(Thousands) 
Productivity (Value-
Added per Worker in 
1965 Escudos) 
1964 462 44.9 10 290 
1965 501 49.7 10 080 
1966 533 51.5 10 350 
1967 558 51.9 10 751 
1968 547 51.8 10 560 
1969 569 52.8 10 777 
1970 525 53.0 9 906 
 
Following the electoral victory of the UP, however, the strategies of the state changed 
dramatically. The textile sector was at the forefront of the plans aimed at 
nationalisation, reactivation, and increasing worker participation. As a result, many 
large firms were nationalised. Eighteen of the ninety firms targeted for nationalisation 
were textile factories. Nineteen firms were eventually incorporated into the APS, 
thirteen from the original list (Yarur, Sumar, Hirmas, Tejidos Caupolican, Rayón Said, 
Textil Progreso, Paños Oveja Tomé, Rayonhil, Lanera Austral, Textil Comandari, Paños 
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Continental, Pollak) and six outside it (FIAP, Bellavista Tomé, Fabrilana, Sedamor, 
Hilanderías Andina, Confecciones Romitex) (Frias et al 1987b: 35). As a result, the 
APS controlled 48.8 per cent of textile sector output and 43.2 per cent of employment 
by 1970 (Frias et al 1987a: 27). These firms had dominated the sector, determining 
output, industrial structure, and production processes, but now the UP, backed by 
workers and in control of these firms, directly led the development of the textile sector. 
In particular, the UP led a reactivation of the sector as output between 1970 and 1971 
surged. The National Planning Office (ODEPLAN) showed in 1971 that in the APS this 
rose in some cases by over 30 per cent (National Planning Office 1973: 325). Official 
publications showed this rise affected all branches. Spinning and weaving in the wool 
sector increased by 34 per cent and 37.7 per cent, thread fibre and weaving in artificial 
fibres increased by 21 and 67.7 per cent, and cotton weaving and spinning increased by 
7 per cent and 1.9 per cent. Individual firms also saw dramatic increases in output 
(Revista del Aréa Textil 1973, 1:1: 3; see Table 63). These surges in output, therefore, 
demonstrate the successes of UP strategies of nationalisation and reactivation after 1970 
in response to changes being wrought to resolve the double crisis. 
Table 63: APS Output for Selected Firms, Chile, 1970-1971 (FENATEX 09/71, 3: 4-5) 
Firm Duration Changes in Output 
Paños Oveja 1970 to 1971 Fabric (metres): 110 000 to 140 000 
Bellavista 1970 to 1971 Fabric (metres): 90 000 to 196 800 
FIAP 1970 to 1971 Fabric (metres): 70 000 to 128 900 
Fabrilana February 1971 to June 1971 Processed wool (kilos): 38 120 to 81 019 
Sumar Seda February 1971 to July 1971 Patterned wool (metres): 227 564 to 435 420 
Sumar Algodón May 1971 to July 1971 
Spun cotton (kilos): 330 296 to 357 725 
Cotton fabric (metres): 1 518 053 to 1 823 596 
Algodones 
Hirmas June 1970 to June 1971 
Yarn (kilos): 386 043 to 473 310 
Finished fabric (metres): 1 665 559 to 1 711 786 
 
The most important changes, however, were linked to the increase in participation. 
Many of the firms integrated into the APS had been first occupied by workers. Sedamor 
and Yarur were the first textile firms to be taken over and incorporated into the APS, 
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with the former becoming the most profitable state-run textile factory in 1971 and the 
latter the first to implement worker participation (Espinosa & Zimbalist 1978: 41-42; 
Winn 1986: viii). The textile sector overall was the first to implement such participation 
with the formation of the “Textile Committee”. This was followed up, in July 1972, 
with the “First Textile Workers’ Meeting” (Frias et al 1987b: 38). For example, at 
(now) Ex-Yarur there were 1 750 workers and 500 salaried employees, 836 weaving 
machines, and 36 136 spindles. These were organised into twenty one “Production 
Committees” and teams of “Coordination Committees”. Production, as a result of this 
reorganisation, rose by 20.6 per cent to 150 200 kg of processed cotton weekly, with a 
20 per cent rise in mass consumption goods output, and an increase in shifts to 
maximise use of installed capacity (Central Única 7-8/71, 3: 12-13). These strategies 
aimed to resolve the double crisis, not through new managerial and production 
techniques, but, instead, through increases in output to meet workers’ demand. 
Efforts to transform relations in production, moreover, were increasingly apparent in the 
APS. Import costs were reduced at Ex-Sumar Nylon as new techniques for machinery 
repair displaced expensive foreign parts imports of electronic relays, saving the plant 40 
to 50 000 escudos annually (Central Única 6-7/72, 9: 7; Crea de los Trabajadores de 
Ex-Sumar 15/08/72, 1:5: 3). At Ex-Yarur, the maintenance division was transformed 
into a spare parts factory producing three quarters of previously imported spare parts. 
Worker initiative also drove other changes, including new ventilation systems, 
production processes, and even accounting systems (Winn 1986: 212-214). There were 
benefits to output and for workers from these new relations in production. Ex-Sumar 
Planta Poliester saw usage of installed capacity rise to 95 per cent, with an increase in 
output of between 15 per cent and 20 per cent. Textil Progreso raised output by 19 per 
cent within the first year of its incorporation into the APS and constructed a paediatric 
clinic, a nursery for forty children, provided transport for workers, and improved 
medical services. At Rayón Said, production increased by over 50 per cent, which 
enabled the recruitment of forty new workers (Central Única 6-7/1972, 9: 7; FENATEX 
07/71, 1: 2). Workers, therefore, in supporting the state were also beginning to resolve 
the double crisis by transforming relations in production to meet their own needs. 
The working class explicitly offered its support for the expansion of ownership and 
participation. For workers, the struggle over wages and working conditions was being 
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displaced by a recognition that the solution to these problems lay in direct workplace 
control. This was reflected in FENATEX (07/71, 1: 7) where voluntary work in the 
factories, and the need for its expansion, was discussed. Hombrenuevo (04/09/71, 1:1: 
2), a publication from workers at the Textil Progreso factory, took such a position even 
further, explicitly demanding the intensification of nationalisation across the economy, 
the unification of nationalised textile firms around a centralised sales board, and 
improved wages. However, these positions also reflected the deepening tension that 
emerged as leading figures within the UP sought to depoliticise the workplace. For 
these actors, participation was a technical contribution towards the management and 
organisation of production, contained within the constitutional path to socialism 
(Castillo 2009: 83). For example, Mireya Baltra, the PC Labour and Welfare Minister, 
argued that raising production output and increasing working hours would bring the 
working class to power (Silva 1999: 153). As a result, the CUT and FENATEX played a 
transformed role, seeking to mediate and depoliticise the radical mobilisations and 
demands for extended control over the process of production itself. As expressed by 
Peter Winn (1986: 241), “from the ‘vanguard of the working class’, the CUT was 
transformed into the national supervisor of productivity and the watchdog of the 
workers, whose function was to keep labour on a leash”.  
This beginning of the “peaceful road” to socialism engendered new and unexpected 
conflicts that led to the breakdown of ISI in Chile. The locus of this conflict shifted 
dramatically, with a new alliance between the state and the political institutions of 
labour transforming ownership, industrial structure, and relations in production. 
Moreover, in defending “their” government, workers’ struggles began to extend beyond 
the UP’s political and institutional limits. Nationalisation, reactivation, and the 
introduction of participation within the workplace gave increasing impetus to workers’ 
struggles, as well as imbuing them with new meaning. The state and the political 
institutions of labour, in confronting firms and seeking to wrest control over these social 
spaces of production, came into increasing confrontation with workers seeking to regain 
control within them. The overcoming of disciplinary modernisation, therefore, served to 
consolidate the working class as a potentially revolutionary political subject. 
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The Battle for Production and the Political Institutions of the Working Class 
Workplace conflict had continued to intensify around the implementation of 
disciplinary modernisation in the textile sector. The UP intensified the politicisation of 
these conflicts, with the proclamation of the “Battle for Production” giving them new 
meaning. This slogan, despite helping to generate support for the UP from within the 
workplace, embodied the new locus of tensions between workers, the state, and the 
political institutions of labour. Workers, in particular, re-interpreted it as a justification 
for moving beyond the institutional constraints of the Chilean political system and the 
limits increasingly being imposed by leading members the UP. As a result, new forms 
of mobilisation and organisation emerged, with attempts to take control of production 
by occupying factories, reorganising the workplace, and consolidating new imperatives 
for output in the formation of an alternative trajectory. 
The locus of conflict in the textile sector underwent a fundamental shift during the early 
1970s. From struggles over disciplinary modernisation, it moved to the meaning of 
workplace control, focused around the Battle for Production. This slogan was originally 
promoted by the UP and the CUT to encourage increases in output and defence of the 
factories from the direct and indirect attacks by their former and present owners (Santa 
Lucia 1976: 136). However, in the context of workplace conflicts, these calls were taken 
as a rallying cry for seizing control of production in its entirety, primarily as a call to 
increase the pace of the factory occupations and for “direct revolutionary action” 
(Gaudichaud 2005: 97; Winn 1986: 237). For example, in FENATEX (02/72, 6: 11) 
calls for the Battle for Production emphasised organising “Production Oversight 
Committees” to prevent sabotage, but in Hombrenuevo (04/09/71, 1:1: 2) it was 
identified with directly advancing the worker beyond merely “one more machine”. The 
Battle for Production, as a result, was a formative idea around which textile workers 
came to constitute a radical, and revolutionary, political subject. 
In particular, tensions were increasing over the character of worker participation. 
Workers were demanding “real” participation, which included production to meet the 
needs of the workers themselves and formal demands in “First Textile Workers 
Meeting” on the 14th and 15th July that criticised its “superstructural” level (Mario 
Olivares in Gaudichaud 2004: 167-168; Castillo 2009: 245-246). Most importantly, 
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worker participation schemes had marginalised workers outside of the APS. It has often 
been argued that these workers lacked the necessary “political consciousness” and 
adopted an “individualistic and rightist orientation rather than socialist” (De Vylder 
1976: 48). However, the history of struggle that has been documented within smaller 
plants across the sector belies this perception. As they were forced to submit to the 
alliance with “progressive” industrialists, these workers “generated a popular movement 
that adopted its own dynamic, distinct from the process led by the government and 
Popular Unity”, becoming, as a result, the “most radicalised fraction” of the working 
class (Gaudichaud 2005: 87; Castillo 2009: 81 & 180). Despite the continuing efforts to 
depoliticise the workplace, therefore, it was these workers, alongside those in the APS, 
which offered the most fundamental challenge to workplace control. 
This challenge to control was premised around debates about the meaning of “popular 
power” within and beyond the socialist transition of the UP. This was based on “an 
incipient popular political project” that, in turn, was “based on mutual solidarity, 
democratic control of production, and participation” (Castillo 2009: 269). Workers’ 
involvement in the political sphere, as a result, was triggered not by “formal 
institutional pathways”, but instead by the persistence of their autonomy in this 
transition to socialism (ibid: 249). Experiences of increased participation, as well as the 
sense of being marginalised through the formal processes that were being implemented, 
subverted the very practices and meaning of participation (Moulian 2006: 268). As a 
result, workplace conflicts in the textile sector took on a new significance with the 
consolidation of this potentially revolutionary political subject. Textile workers were no 
longer simply contesting disciplinary modernisation and attempting to overcome the 
limits it imposed upon them, but instead they were leading changes in the sector. 
The most concrete manifestation of these changes was the formation of the cordones 
industriales. The role of these political institutions remains controversial and sparsely 
researched. Their ‘formal’ existence, or at least the period of their political prominence, 
was a little under a year after the October “Bosses’ Strike” in 1972. Yet their 
significance belies their short existence. For those who have focused their research on 
the political institutions of labour, they were a defensive mobilisation against the 
sabotage of employers and a means of coordinating the fragmented unions (Angell 
2010: 48). However, for those who have studied them in depth, interviewing 
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participants or through documentation produced at the time, they represent nascent 
political institutions of the working class. Franck Gaudichaud (2005: 97), for example, 
argues that whilst they were acting to defend the UP, they encompassed far more radical 
aims, including the unification of the working class. For Sandra Castillo (2009: 158-
159), these political institutions of the working class represented a “new popular 
organisation, with specific characteristics that gave them their own internal dynamic”. 
Thus they demonstrated an autonomy that belied any notion they were beholden to the 
state, to the political institutions of labour, or to any narrow defensive interests.  
These institutions, however, did not emerge spontaneously (Gaudichaud 2005: 97). 
Political activists were significant in the formation of the cordones industriales. 
Members of the PS and activists from groups such as the Revolutionary Left Movement 
(MIR) were crucial. A MIR activist named “Luciano”, for example, played a key role in 
fomenting a factory seizure in a medium-sized firm controlled originally by a PDC-led 
union (Luciano in Gaudichaud 2004: 114). These activists from the MIR and the 
Revolutionary Workers’ Front (FTR) were increasingly active throughout the sector 
(Cancino 1988: 217). This even led the PC former union president of Sumar-Algodón to 
claim that “people that led the debate… were intellectuals, children of the bourgeoisie, 
children of the wealthy who had come to lead the organisation of the workers” (Juan 
Alarcón cited in Gaudichaud 2004: 99). Thus the involvement of radical political 
activists in the formation of these organisations is undeniable. But their role should not 
be overplayed, as alone they were insufficient. These activists, the “children of the 
bourgeoisie”, were only able to operate within a space created by the struggles within 
the sector and the political autonomy that workers continued to demonstrate. 
The cordones industriales were organised around a wide variety of firms, including 
those already incorporated into the APS. Textile workers were represented in Cordon 
Macul, by Textil Progreso in Cordon Vicuñua Mackenna, by Ex-Yarur in Cordon 
O’Higgins, by Ex-Sumar in Cordon San Joaquín, and by Said and Perlak in Cordon 
Cerrillos-Maipú (Castillo 2009: 143 & 221-222). Moreover, the experience of Ex-Yarur 
in October 1972 is particularly illustrative of their crucial role: 
“at Ex-Yarur, organization reached a new level in the formation of self-defence brigades, 
whose worth was proved by the mobilization in minutes of one thousand workers armed 
with pointed staves to repel an attempted assault on the industry in mid-October. Within the 
factory, Ex-Yarur gave priority to the national effort to combat the strike, retooling its 
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machine shops for the assembly of trucks, turning the industry garage over to the 
maintenance of requisitioned vehicles, and using the enterprise’s walled-in grounds as a 
safe parking space for other government trucks. At the same time production levels were 
maintained although distribution was made more difficult by the loan of Ex-Yarur trucks – 
and drivers – to the Ministry of the Economy. An angry workers’ assembly voted to erase 
the names of striking merchants from their list of clients and to distribute their quotas 
directly to pobladores [slum-dwellers] and peasants instead. Many workers volunteered for 
after-hours labor in the nearby Central Railway Station, loading and unloading goods” 
(Winn 1986: 237-238) 
These actions demonstrate a depth of organisation and political strategy belying the 
cordones’ embryonic form. Not only did workers defend themselves, they also co-
ordinated activities beyond the workplace and transformed relations in production. 
There were, however, some limits on this nascent process. Bureaucracy and the black 
market stymied efforts to develop alternative methods of supply, whilst Ex-Sumar 
workers complained of a lack of engagement from senior figures, of difficulties 
expressing problems in mass meetings, and a lack of “worker discipline” (Silva 1999: 
267-268). Yet what is significant is that these changes were being led by the working 
class moving towards a potentially revolutionary transformation of production. In 
Cordon Cerrillos-Maipú delegates were elected to inclusive general assemblies to 
demand the cordones’ unification and to dispute interventions from the UP and CUT 
(Hernán Ortega cited in Gaudichaud 2004: 200-201; Castillo 2009: 150). In a similar 
manner to those at Ex-Yarur, workers from Ex-Sumar were involved in seizing the 
buses to bring workers to the factories, maintaining the functioning of production and 
extending political control in Cordon Cerrillos-Maipú (Castillo 2009: 179). As a result, 
new forms of participation and control were established. Materials and expertise were 
lent between factories as production was continued without the presence of owners. In 
Cordon Cerillos-Maipú, production, distribution, and supply was coordinated by 
workers, whilst at Ex-Sumar, trade and credit arrangements were made between 
factories. Technical advisors gave assistance to smaller firms, whilst questions were 
raised regarding the division of labour, factory hierarchy, and the legitimacy of 
ownership (Hernán Ortega in Gaudichaud 2004: 202; Castillo 2009: 175 & 234-235; 
Gaudichaud 2005: 95). In particular, these examples demonstrate the significant role 
played by the working class in maintaining the necessary infrastructure of the workplace 
in the face of persistent, and often violent, constraints imposed on its transformation. 
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The working class was mobilising around a new “popular sociability” manifested in, 
and constituted by, the new social relations of the cordones industriales in a way that 
was fomenting new values, new ties of solidarity, and a new set of social practices 
(Castillo 2009: 231 & 241-242). On a concrete level, these relations in Cordon 
Cerrillos-Maipú allowed workers to force a change of policy regarding the 
incorporation of firms into the APS, encouraged the consolidation of other cordones, 
and marginalised the political institutions of labour (Angell 2010: 47). At the same time, 
workers sought to sustain their autonomy from the APS and the state, requesting the UP 
not appoint an “interventor”, but rather to allow workers to manage production 
themselves (Abraham Perez in Gaudichaud 2004: 276). This autonomy from the state 
and the CUT was manifested most significantly in opposition to the Prats-Millas Plan. 
This sought to reduce the number of firms in the APS by half, marking a substantial 
threat to earlier gains achieved by the workers (Santa Lucia 1976: 146-147). In 
response, not only did the cordones industriales make known their strong opposition, 
they also developed their own alternative proposals: non-devolution of industries, 
discussion of problems with coordinators, collaboration and consultation with workers, 
worker self-management, worker control of production and popular control of prices, 
and further expropriations (Castillo 2009: 264). Through these political institutions of 
the working class, therefore, textile workers increasingly manifested their revolutionary 
potential to transform the workplace and the trajectory of industrialisation. 
The cordones industriales were central to the culmination of conflicts that led to the 
breakdown of ISI. These political institutions of the working class posed perhaps the 
greatest threat not only to workplace control, but also to the prevailing political order. 
The changes that had been brought about were characterised by workplace organisation 
that prioritised the needs of workers, networks that supported production and 
employment in small and large firms, and rapidly rising output that relied on growing 
demand. Complementing these changes, moreover, was the consolidation of radical 
political subjectivities shaped by the specificities of Chilean socialism and workers’ 
collective experiences within these emergent political institutions of the working class. 
The threat posed by this combination of control within the workplace and the 
consolidation of these revolutionary political subjects, therefore, demonstrated that 
  186 
 
 
 
 
attempts to exert control within the workplace were insufficient, heralding a violent end 
to ISI supported by leading firms and foreign and domestic political actors. 
 
Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Chilean Textile Production 
The violent backlash that marked the end of ISI was the culmination of failed attempts 
by firms to impose discipline and control over the working class within the workplaces 
of textile production and beyond. Workers in these firms had come to the forefront in 
contesting the imposition of paternalistic managerial techniques and disciplinary 
modernisation. In doing this, moreover, they had come to constitute a radical and 
autonomous political subject intent on transforming relations in and, to a growing 
extent, of production. The establishment of the cordones industriales within and around 
the attempts of the UP to take control of the monopoly-controlled textile sector from 
leading firms marked the culmination of workplace conflicts within ISI. Workers, in 
response, sought to transform the workplace and redirect the technological and 
productive capacities to meet their own needs. Innovations in the workplace, the move 
from demands for productivity to demands for increased output, and the consolidation 
of production networks that supported workers in marginal sectors of the economy 
demonstrated the emerging success of these transformations of the workplace.  
The breakdown of ISI in Chile, from this perspective, therefore, cannot be understood 
as the inevitable failure of traditional manufacturing characterised by “protected 
inefficiency”, uncompetitiveness vis-à-vis international production standards, and a 
reliance on reproducing low-wage, low-skilled employment. Instead, whilst these 
features were constant in the emergence and consolidation of the sector, they were 
features that came from attempts to exert control over a militant working class. The 
double crisis was directly linked to these strategies of firms and the state, with the 
increasing political tensions deriving from their failure to placate or pacify the working 
class. Workplace conflict produced the breakdown of ISI inasmuch as its successes 
under the UP in beginning to construct an alternative future for production, for 
industrialisation, and for the working class, posed a growing and tangible threat to the 
prevailing relations of power and domination in Chile. The changes that began to 
emerge from within the workplace in the 1970s demonstrated that stagnation, decline, 
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and collapse were only the inevitable outcome of strategies pursued to these ends, rather 
than through the pursuit of any alternative trajectory of development. The changes 
occurring in the 1970s showed that without resort to overt violence, the working class 
could transform the social spaces of production and the trajectory of industrialisation. 
 
Fragmenting Manufacturing and the Working Class in Argentina 
 
The section will explain the breakdown of ISI in Argentina around the political tensions 
engendered from within the workplaces of metalworking and automobile production. As 
conflicts intensified in new leading sectors of manufacturing, primarily in automobiles 
and steelworking, firms and the state resorted to increasingly repressive strategies inside 
and outside the workplace. In response, working class mobilisations became 
increasingly militant, posing a renewed challenge not just to the managerial authority of 
firms, but also to the political authority of military government. This upsurge led to new 
autonomous forms of mobilisation and organisation, whilst the political institutions of 
labour sought to renew constraints upon the working class. As a result, renewed efforts 
to impose control led to spiralling confrontations against a fragmented working class, 
which culminated in the violent breakdown of ISI.  
 
Authoritarian Modernisation and (Re-)Disciplining the Workplace 
The consolidation of disciplinary modernisation around the automobile sector had given 
rise to a new locus of workplace conflict. In response, the new military government 
consolidated the social coalition between the state and foreign firms alongside a 
deepening of stabilisation, rationalisation, and, most importantly, workplace 
reorganisation. The initial effect of this was a surge in output, particularly in the 
automobile sector. The number of cars produced for the domestic market increased, 
encouraging domestic production of parts and components, and increasing technological 
investment. Yet despite these “successes” for industrial manufacturing, these changes 
did not address the inefficiencies of existing industrial and production structures. 
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The policy measures implemented by the incoming military government of the self-
styled “Argentinian Revolution” after 1966 had a significant impact on the 
metalworking and automobile sectors. In metalworking, it exacerbated and consolidated 
the decline of some of the largest firms in the sector. TAMET declared in 1970 that it 
was unable to pay the interest on its debts to the Industrial Bank, La Cantábrica could 
not afford to modernise its technology and compete in the production of agricultural 
machinery, leading to its nationalisation in mid-1973, and SIAM continued its 
downward spiral into bankruptcy that led to its liquidation in 1976 (Brennan & Rougier 
2009: 138-139). The latter is particularly indicative of the consolidated stagnation 
within metalworking. The firm, by 1966, was in a dire state financially. Long term debt 
obligations and difficulties in negotiating credit agreements with international lenders 
meant that it increasingly had to disinvest from smaller plants, particularly those in 
which it did not have a majority shareholding. For example, it liquidated its shares in 
Tem Lucas and Martín Amato y Cía, two plants linked to the automobile sector 
(Rougier & Schvarzer 2006: 70-71). Moreover, Electrodoméstica, one of SIAM’s oldest 
and most iconic plants, was in severe trouble, with one contemporary observer stating 
“it would be best to put a bomb under it to make it disappear and start anew” (Torcuato 
Sozio cited in ibid: 72). Therefore, despite being one of the largest metalworking firms, 
its multiple holdings meant that its financial situation worsened dramatically, reflecting 
the widespread stagnation that was pervading the sector. 
SIAM’s continuing survival throughout this period, moreover, illustrates the new 
priorities of the state in supporting metalworking. Credit agreements reached by SIAM 
in 1966 were dependent on continued contracts of its subsidiaries SIAT and 
Electromecánica with the state. Moreover, a decree-law passed in November 1967 
established special assistance for large domestic firms, such as SIAM, depending on 
their “social preponderance, economic magnitude, technological development or 
national, regional or zonal significance”. SIAM was only able to survive with state 
intervention to the extent that, by the end of 1971, the National Development Bank laid 
out its three options as liquidation, nationalisation, or increased support from the state 
that would imply huge outlays with little or no guarantee of returns (ibid: 73-97). Firms 
and the state, therefore, chose to confront the stagnation of the sector, and the failure of 
disciplinary modernisation, with an intensification of efforts to exert workplace control. 
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The response of leading firms within the automobile sector is particularly indicative. 
For example, at the largest producer in the country in 1966, IKA-Renault, the choice 
was framed as “one of ‘rationalizing or dying’”. Rationalisation was to be intensified 
under the new regime, with efforts introduced to speed up the production process 
(Evans et al 1984: 143). This, however, did not imply a reordering of the fragmented 
industrial structure that persisted, and actually worsened, after 1966 as fewer firms 
produced more models. Even as output rose dramatically between 1968 and 1973, cars 
remained expensive, selling at prices roughly 122 per cent higher than in the firms’ 
countries of origin (Jenkins 1984a: 53-55). Moreover, in 1967 there were eleven firms 
operating in the country producing 81 models and, by 1973, there were only nine firms 
producing 123 models. As a result, average vehicle output per model type increased 
marginally from 2 164 to 2 388 (Table 64). This consolidated inefficiencies in domestic 
output in the sector, therefore, belying the potential gains from its rapid growth. 
Table 64: Automobile Production per Model, Argentina, 1966-1976 (adapted from Nofal 1989: 32-
33 & 40) 
Year No. of Models (Cars/Commercial Vehicles) 
Total 
Production 
Average Output per 
Model 
1966 77 (43/34) 179 453 2 331 
1967 81 (46/35) 175 318 2 164 
1968 80 (43/37) 180 976 2 262 
1969 106 (54/52) 218 590 2 062 
1970 110 (56/54) 219 599 1 996 
1971 110 (49/61) 253 237 2 302 
1972 119 (53/66) 268 593 2 257 
1973 123 (51/72) 293 742 2 388 
1974 117 (48/69) 286 312 2 447 
1975 110 (45/65) 240 036 2 182 
1976 108 (45/63) 193 517 1 792 
 
The effects of the continued fragmentation of industrial structures were felt, most 
strongly, in the workplace. Whilst the sector was characterised by important increases in 
productivity and production processes, the limits of its technological development soon 
became apparent. Far fewer engineers were employed in automobile subsidiaries than in 
the firms’ home countries, with their main function the pursuit of “adaptive changes”. 
For example, obsolete machinery for stamping bodywork was simply reinstalled in local 
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subsidiaries. As a result, and combined with the outdated factory design employed, 
annual output at GM in Buenos Aires matched two days’ output in the United States 
(Schvarzer 1996: 258-261). These strategies, however, were far from accidental. 
Investment and the import of technology by foreign firms led only to “islands of 
mechanization”, around a few modern production processes, such as semi-automatic 
welding, automatic painting, electrocoat for rust prevention, multiple nut runners, 
automatic tyre mounting and inflation, and electronically-assisted scheduling. Obsolete 
technology, moreover, was well-suited to low-volume production requirements (Nofal 
1989: 89-91). Isolated, but relatively modern production processes, therefore, 
exacerbated the fragmentation of industrial structure and the workplace. 
One illustrative example was the SARFAR factory controlled by Peugeot in Buenos 
Aires. This was divided into three production units: mechanical operations that involved 
manufacture of engine parts, body stamping operations, and assorted operations 
including painting, soldering, upholstery, and three separate assembly lines. These 
sectors were widely differentiated in terms of the intensity of the production process. 
On the assembly lines, work rhythms were manipulated by the firm to increase 
production. Soldering and painting, as well as stamping, were also very demanding. The 
mechanical plant, where motor parts were manufactured, was one of the least intense 
areas of production (Carrera 2010: 44). This structure also reflected general trends in the 
sector. Whilst some specialisation occurred between 1969 and 1972 as medium-sized 
cars were manufactured by IKA-Renault, FIAT, Peugeot, Ford and others, “on the 
whole…technical innovations were merely attached to the existing fixed-capital 
investment without any major re-engineering in the plants” (Nofal 1989: 99). The 
structure of production complemented the fragmentation of the sector as a whole. 
It was necessary, therefore, for new forms of workplace organisation and managerial 
techniques to be implemented far more rapidly and far more widely. Design was firmly 
separated from execution, manual work was fragmented into small, simplified 
operations conducted within specified times, and workflows were controlled by 
employers through assembly lines and other mechanical measures (Nofal 1989: 95 & 
106). These measures, combined with the obsolete technology that enforced slower and 
more intensive production processes, as such, required a strict discipline in the 
workplace. The intensity of these disciplinary relations in production within the 
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automobile sector is demonstrated by a study conducted by William Form (1972: 732) 
in the mid-1960s at IKA-Renault. He shows that only 16 per cent of the 315 workers 
surveyed across different production processes felt they could “move freely about their 
work stations”, a number which fell to only 2 per cent in assembly operations. This 
compared to an average of 76 per cent in India, 47 per cent in the USA, and 26 per cent 
in Italy. Moreover, only 11 per cent of workers at IKA spoke to 11 workers or more in 
the course of their work, falling to 1 per cent within semi-automatic machine operations. 
This fragmentation of production processes and intense monitoring that restricted 
movement and communication represented the deepening of workplace control. 
The new and rapid growth led by the automobile sector during this period, therefore, 
consolidated the inefficiencies of earlier manifestations of disciplinary modernisation 
around an intensification of this workplace control. Most significantly, the changes 
wrought by the ostensible success of this sector brought to the fore the new locus of 
political tensions that it now constituted. The surge in output and productivity was 
premised on the imposition of ever-increasing demands through workplace 
reorganisation and direct attacks on traditional and emergent political institutions. Firms 
had initially sought to restrict mobilisation. However, the effect of these decisions, 
when combined with the rising tide of radical political subjectivities and intensifying 
grievances within the workplace, was to produce some of the most militant and 
widespread protests in the history of Argentina.  
 
Cordobazo, Clasismo, and the Limits on the Working Class in Argentina 
The impact of changes within and around the workplaces of metalworking and 
automobiles brought an upsurge in conflict and the emergence of new forms of 
organisation. First, in the cordobazo, automobile workers occupied factories and built 
barricades in the streets. This protest, and the mobilisations that continued in the 
following years, then consolidated new working class subjectivities around clasismo. 
These mobilisations were characterised by an engagement between political activists of 
the Left and workers primarily in the automobile and steel sectors. These sectors had 
been less influenced by earlier constraints of the political institutions of labour and, as a 
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result, began to develop new forms of political organisation and mobilisation against 
firms, the state, and against these institutions themselves.  
Workers in the leading firms in the metalworking and automobiles sectors experienced 
dramatic changes after 1966. At ACINDAR and Metcon, a steelworks owned by Ford, 
workplace reorganisation saw mass firings in 1967 and 1968. Over 700 were dismissed 
from the latter, whilst 80 were fired from the former, including the entire internal 
commission. In response, the ACINDAR Workers’ Group (GODA), which had close 
ties to the Maoist Communist Vanguard, became increasingly prominent (Basualdo 
2011a: 243-244). At Caren, a metalworking firm in Buenos Aires, workers formed 
independent strike committees that mobilised workers in assemblies against the 
demands of the UOM (Schneider 2005: 296). In the automobile sector at Citroën, 
workers protested efforts to increase productivity, with radical activists and student 
movements playing an important role (Schneider 2005: 285-285; Carrera 2010: 61-64). 
At MBA, tensions were engendered directly by the organisation of work, including the 
firm’s control over training, which related to wage levels, and concerns over 
productivity increases (Rodríguez 2011: 129-130 & 136). Workers in both sectors were 
subject to increasing discipline and were mobilising around radical political ideas.  
The constraining influence of the political institutions of labour, moreover, remained 
firmly in evidence. For example, members of internal commissions at various firms that 
challenged the UOM’s authority and sought to go further in their demands were 
dismissed with its complicity (Schneider 2005: 282). At Peugeot, SMATA internal 
commissions were also complicit in the implementation of workplace discipline, whilst 
at IKA-Renault, following a strike in 1967, over 4 000 workers were dismissed also 
with the complicity of SMATA (Carrera 2010: 52-53; Mignon 2013: chapter 4). As a 
result, workers began to seek out new forms of political representation. In Morón, 
metalworkers from La Cantábrica, IMSA, and Olivetti sought to reconstitute the local 
UOM (Semanario CGT 1/8/68, 1:14: 4). By the end of 1968, the resulting 
“Metalworkers’ Vanguard” and the “Morón Trade Union Coordination Committee” 
mobilised alongside the CGTA, calling primarily for a reconstitution of the political 
institutions of labour led by the working class (Semanario CGT 7/11/68, 1:28: 3). 
Automobile workers also offered their adherence to the CGTA (Evans et al 1984: 137-
138). For example, in August 1968, workplace delegates from firms including MBA, 
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Chrysler, GM, Ford, Citroën, Easton, and Harvester Internacional mobilised in its 
support (Semanario CGT 5/9/68, 1:19: 3). Workers, therefore, confronted the strategies 
of disciplinary modernisation beyond the traditional political institutions of labour, 
posing a growing threat to the alliance between foreign firms and the state. 
The most significant example, however, was in the automobile sector of Córdoba. The 
press sub-secretary of SMATA Córdoba reported that over 3 000 of their members 
adhered to the CGTA, backed by the widespread opposition to Vandor and the CGT 
throughout the city (Semanario CGT 15/8/68, 1:16: 4). Many workers at the plant were 
also students and political activists, moreover, providing an important link between the 
radical political ideas of the Left beyond the CGTA (Brennan & Gordillo 2008: 127; 
Evans et al 1984: 138). Mass participation through open assemblies and internal 
democracy, moreover, enabled the voicing and embedding of these radical ideas, 
creating a “heightened sensitivity to their status as a disenfranchised class” that was 
compounded and strengthened by a “captious leftwing opposition in the plants… [and] 
a combative union style and discourse in order to maintain its standing among the rank 
and file” (Gordillo 1991: 171; Brennan 1994: 96; Brennan & Gordillo 1994: 482). This 
political space, inspired but not led by CGTA, was rooted in the historical experience of 
automobile workers in the city and had profound consequences for the working class. 
These consequences were highlighted most forcefully in mass uprisings after 1969 in 
Córdoba. The cordobazo, as it came to be known, was the culmination of struggles 
against intensifying discipline within the workplace, against the constraints being 
imposed by the political institutions of labour, and the resurgence of the working class 
around radical political ideas. For firms and the state, moreover, it was the most 
fundamental challenge to their authority to date. The cordobazo began as workers at 
IKA-Renault left their posts in the morning of 29th May 1969 and marched, armed with 
tools and steel bars, into the centre of the city. Metalworkers also mobilised alongside 
workers from IKA-Renault, expressing frustration at the limitations of the UOM. 
Following the violent police response, several neighbourhoods were occupied. The 
occupation, led by the working class, lasted into the night until the army retook the main 
occupied areas by the evening of 30th May (Brennan & Gordillo 1994: 485-490; 
Brennan & Gordillo 2008: 91-95; Brennan 1994: 153). Not only did this protest 
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demonstrate the limits of strategies aimed at controlling workers in leading firms of the 
automobile sector, it also began, moreover, to transform the working class. 
Following the cordobazo, autonomous workers’ mobilisations proliferated. In Buenos 
Aires, internal commissions and workplace delegates from the Vicente López 
neighbourhood openly rejected workplace reorganisation through strikes that were 
opposed by the UOM. Also, following an assembly of over 2 000 workers in November 
1969, workers from GM openly opposed the suggestion of the SMATA leadership to 
accept the terms offered by the government and dissolve a strike (Schneider 2005: 314-
315). In Córdoba, moreover, factory occupations and the increasingly prominent role of 
the Revolutionary Communist Party (PCR) gave new meaning to the conflicts within 
the city. IKA-Renault factories Perdriel and Santa Isabel, alongside Transax, 
Thompson-Ramco, Perkins, and the FIAT factories, Concord, Materfer and Grandes 
Motores Diesel were occupied in 1970 and 1971, with autonomous “occupation 
committees” and “struggles committees” democratically elected from at Santa Isabel 
and Transax (Mignon 2013: chapter 5). Workplace conflict, therefore, was transformed 
in these struggles, as well as in the viborazo of 1971, that marked:  
“a true ‘cultural change’ in the interior of the working class, that transformed its very way 
of being within the factory, of its relations with firms and with work, [and] the forms of 
manifesting its own demands and of organising to satisfy them” (Mignon 2013: chapter 5) 
New forms of working class mobilisation undermined disciplinary modernisation. 
However, the political institutions of labour, combined with the fragmentation of work 
and production, imposed limits on the formation of coherent political institutions of the 
working class that could begin to construct an alternative. 
The experiences of clasismo in the Concord Workers’ Union (SITRAC) and Materfer 
Workers’ Union (SITRAM) of the FIAT factories were perhaps the most concerted and, 
potentially, successful efforts to establish such institutions. Prior to 1969, FIAT had 
taken extensive efforts to isolate the workers at its factories from the political 
institutions of labour. This backfired dramatically on 23rd March 1970, however, as, 
following the signing of an agreement rejected by the company-backed union, workers 
mobilised in street protests and assemblies, occupying the factories and demanding the 
removal of the pliant union leadership (Mignon 2013: chapter 4; Schneider 2005: 332). 
Workers at SITRAC-SITRAM were an escape from the “straitjacket” of Peronism and 
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intent on questioning the organisation of the production process and the authority of 
management (Brennan 1994: 177-180; Schneider 2005: 333; Mignon 2013: chapter 4). 
Yet whilst they continued to impede production throughout 1971, the end result was 
violent police and military-led repression that brought this short-lived experience to an 
end (Mignon 2013: chapter 5 & 6; Brennan 1994: 201). Workers in SITRAC-SITRAM, 
however, represented a new threat, which was only overcome by political violence. 
This threat took on increasing significance, moreover, as, in the aftermath of the 
cordobazo and viborazo, the SMATA leadership in Córdoba was also taken over by 
clasista workers. Clasismo emerged in Perkins and Thompson-Ramco in a “progressive 
advance” throughout the sector, in the largest IKA-Renault factories, and culminated in 
the election of a worker at the firm and executive committee member of the PCR, René 
Salamanca, as head of the Cordoban SMATA (Mignon 2013: chapter 4). It was the 
working class, most importantly, that drove the radical militancy of this institution, 
rather than any political leadership. For example, even after the imprisonment of 
Salamanca and his allies in 1974, workers, workplace delegates, and shop stewards 
continued to mobilise (Brennan 1994: 285-290; Evans et al 1984: 153). SMATA under 
Salamanca, however, did not constitute a political institution of the working class. In 
many instances, it was able to assimilate the more radical demands of certain sections of 
the working class and to mediate and pacify them through negotiations with firms and 
the state (Mignon 2013: chapter 6). As such, it represented the pacification, albeit an 
atypically radical pacification, of workplace conflict. By assimilating demands over 
workplace control, the “clasista” SMATA effectively depoliticised the workplace, 
which, in turn, allowed for its disarticulation after 1973 without the resort to violence.  
These changes to the working class, moreover, were also prevalent outside Córdoba. 
Automobile workers in Buenos Aires, including at Chrysler and GM, engaged in 
autonomous mobilisations. Some of these protests, at FAE, extended into surrounding 
neighbourhoods and, at GM and TAMET, involved factory occupations (Schneider 
2005: 330). Workers at Chrysler, represented by an internal commission and workplace 
delegates opposed to and independent of SMATA, engaged in a strike at the end of 
1970 supported by residents of the surrounding area of La Matanza, which included 
metalworkers from SIAM. “Support commissions” were established, a daily “Strike 
Bulletin” was published, and meetings were held across the district throughout the 
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fifteen day protest. Again, it was only violent repression that brought it to an end (ibid: 
335). By 1972, factories throughout Buenos Aires reached a near “permanent state of 
mobilisation” as occupations, protests, and work stoppages proliferated. Yet whilst 
efforts were made to organise these into a clasista organisation, they were unsuccessful 
(ibid: 352-353). By 1974 and 1975, however, clasista “coordination committees” had 
been established in the automobile sector. Workers from MBA formed the core of a 
committee established in La Matanza, for example, as these political institutions spread 
amongst automobile workers in Córdoba and the north and west of Buenos Aires 
(Rodríguez 2011: 139-143; Evans et al 1984: 154). The working class, nevertheless, 
continued to be fragmented by the political institutions of labour, which restricted and 
undermined the formation of alternative political institutions of the working class. 
A final, and particularly pertinent example, can be drawn from the steelworkers of Villa 
Constitución. At ACINDAR, by 1972, the GODA was replaced by the Group of 
Combative Steelworkers (GOCA). These workers came from the radical clasista left, 
including the Revolutionary Workers’ Party (PRT), the Socialist Workers’ Party (PST), 
and the Communist Workers’ Power Organisation (OCPO), and from the Peronist left. 
Not only did they press workers’ demands and politicise their grievances, they also 
connected with radical delegates at Metcon and other steel firms throughout Villa 
Constitución. The leadership of the UOM sought to undermine this organisation, 
denying elections, replacing elected representatives, and expelling the ‘communist’ 
internal commissions at ACINDAR. Nevertheless, on 7th March 1974, workers began a 
general strike and occupation of the ACINDAR factory against the UOM, which was 
again repeated on 11th with hostages and barricades. The culmination of these struggles, 
moreover, was the 1975 villazo, which began following the arrest and imprisonment of 
180 clasista activists. Led by strike committees, steelworkers engaged in a 59 day strike 
that was, once again, only halted by violent police repression (Basualdo 2011a: 246-
253; Santella & Andujar 2007). The violence of repression by the state thus marked the 
spiral into violent conflicts, derived from growing threat posed by the working class and 
marking the limits on disciplinary modernisation and the breakdown of ISI.  
The significance of clasismo in the political tensions that led to the breakdown of ISI is 
often overlooked. Workers’ new forms of subjectivity, mobilisation, and organisation 
had led to increasing confrontations with firms and the state. However, the working 
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class was weakened by the role played, historically and in the particular conjuncture, by 
the political institutions of labour. By regularly acting to discipline and contain workers’ 
political autonomy, these institutions succeeded in fragmenting the working class. 
Despite these weaknesses, however, clasista workers represented the consolidation of 
new political subjectivities and political institutions that posed a growing threat to the 
authority of firms and the state, engendering increasingly violent conflicts and 
constituting the conditions that heralded the violent and brutal end of ISI in Argentina. 
 
Control and Confrontation in Metalworking and Automobile Production in Argentina 
The violence of the backlash that occurred in Argentina was the outcome of efforts to 
discipline the working class inside and outside the workplaces of metalworking and 
automobile production. These attempts to exert control had been a relative success in 
Argentina. In particular, it was the political institutions of labour that, in frequent and 
uneasy alliance with the state and leading firms, had been able to constrain and 
fragment the mobilisation of the working class through its emergent new political 
subjectivities and forms of political organisation. The UOM, in particular, consistently 
applied its institutional strength to discipline autonomous forms of resistance that could 
challenge aspects of control within the workplaces of metalworking production. Yet 
they had failed inasmuch as the resurgence of radical political subjectivity and new 
forms of mobilisation, which, despite not representing political institutions of the 
working class, posed a growing threat. Workers mobilised with increasing prominence 
around ideas of clasismo and through organisations that challenged the political 
institutions of labour and forms of disciplinary modernisation.  
The breakdown of ISI in Argentina, from this perspective, cannot be understood as the 
inevitable limitations of state-led modernisation characterised by the vertical integration 
of production and inefficiently fragmented production processes. These features 
characterised the emergence and consolidation of metalworking and the automobile 
sector, but were focused, primarily, on reinforcing control over a working class whose 
autonomy was also being constrained beneath the political institutions of labour. The 
inefficiencies pervading these sectors were directly linked to increasing political 
tensions deriving from a growing failure to reinforce the mediation and pacification that 
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had previously been consolidated over the working class. Changes that began to 
transform the workplace, centred on the emergence of new leading sectors backed by 
foreign investment, created growing political tensions manifesting the resurgence of a 
radical autonomy. Workplace conflicts produced the breakdown of ISI inasmuch as this 
resurgence, caused by the weakening of the constraints imposed by the political 
institutions of labour as the inadvertent outcome of firms’ attempts to consolidate their 
control, posed a tangible threat to prevailing relations of power and domination in 
Argentina. The result, therefore, was a spiral of violent conflict that stymied any attempt 
to transform the workplace by firms, the state, or by the working class. 
 
The Culmination of Workplace Conflict and the Breakdown of ISI 
 
In distinctive but similar ways, the threat posed by the working class in textile 
production in Chile and metalworking and automobile production in Argentina 
determined the breakdown of ISI. The failure of previous attempts to consolidate 
control within the workplace had culminated in either the establishment of coherent 
political institutions of the working class intent on forging a new future for 
industrialisation or a spiral of increasingly violent political conflict. In Chile, it was the 
threat posed by the increasingly coherent political institutions of the working class that 
forced firms and the state to respond by instigating a brutal assault on the social spaces 
of production and the concomitant de-industrialisation of the 1970s and 1980s. In 
Argentina, it was the growing intractability of conflicts caused by two contradictory 
strategies for pacifying the working class that led to the violent attacks on the political 
institutions of labour and, most concretely, the workers themselves. In both cases, it was 
the failure of more benign strategies to control workers through managerial authority, 
limited concessions in wages and work, changing production processes, and the 
constraints of the political institutions of labour that created the conditions for a brutal 
crackdown on revolutionary forms of political subjectivity and political organisation.    
This perspective on the breakdown of ISI, therefore, challenges the typical narrative and 
replaces the cautionary tale that it produces with one of cautious optimism. First, it 
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highlights the intentional political agency that constituted the culmination of tensions 
behind this breakdown, rather than the passive sense of inevitability drawn from deep-
rooted internal, and intrinsic, contradictions of an abstract model or of institutional 
irrationality. In Chile, these tensions first derived from the attempts made, by firms, to 
intensify disciplinary modernisation and, by the state, to offer limited concessions that 
only expanded the space for conflict. They then emerged in the attempts of the state 
under the UP to depoliticise these struggles that had set in motion a transformation of 
the trajectory of ISI and of the working class as it consolidated its new-found control 
within and around the workplace. In Argentina, tensions were consolidated first by the 
deepening both of disciplinary modernisation by firms and of authoritarian political 
repression by the state. They were then shifted and were further exacerbated as growing 
resistance and mobilisation against these strategies enabled workers to challenge the 
constraints long-imposed by the political institutions of labour. 
Second, it relocates the source of these political tensions away from institutions 
continually buffeted by the winds of social conflict, from the frustrated attempts of 
political elites to generate consensus, and from the limited capacities of dominant 
economic actors to impose their will. By focusing on the intentional political actions of 
firms, the state, and workers, the concrete effects of decisions taken in the engagement 
from within the workplace are brought to the fore. In Chile, efforts by the UP to 
depoliticise workplace conflicts and to limit them to control over, rather than within, the 
workplace clashed directly with the new political subjectivities of the working class. 
Workers’ attempts to construct new political institutions then consolidated this new 
locus of political conflict. In Argentina, the persistence and intensification of firms’ 
pursuit of workplace control undermined the pacification of workers’ demands. 
Attempts by the state to attack these constraints served only to exacerbate the cracks 
that were forming and permit growing space for new political subjectivities to emerge. 
Workers’ frustrated mobilisations then consolidated another new locus of conflict, 
markedly different from their Chilean counterparts. 
Finally, and most importantly, these show that alternatives to the “inevitable” 
breakdown were possible. These alternatives were most clearly manifested in Chile. The 
cordones industriales, coupled with the changes to industrial and production structures 
being implemented by the UP, marked the potential to overcome the limits of ISI 
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through new relations in and of production. Within the textile sector, workplaces were 
transformed as economic and political spaces in which the working class exercised a 
growing level of control and coordination over their productive activity. In Argentina, 
such potential alternatives were less coherent, but they were still present in the struggles 
being mobilised by clasista workers. Relations of solidarity, concretely experienced in 
processes of production, were consolidated within and beyond the workplace in 
defensive mobilisations against the intensifying conflicts that pervaded the country. In 
the political institutions of labour over which these workers increasingly gained control 
in the automobile and steel production sectors, a new political subjectivity was in 
formation. Confronting these alternatives, or at least their latent potential, imposed new 
imperatives on firms and the state as they came together to violently bring an end to ISI. 
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Conclusion  
Industrialisation and Bringing the Working Class Back In 
 
Three significant contributions have been made in this thesis. The first is the elaboration 
of a novel methodological framework that brings labour relations theory, Marxist 
development studies, and labour history innovations into IPE as a means to interpret 
extensive primary and secondary empirical data. This framework enables the 
incorporation of labour in a meaningful sense, opening up the sphere of production as a 
space in which development “happens” and in which power and influence is exercised 
to determine developmental outcomes. The second is to demonstrate the continuing 
significance of the working class by taking seriously the role of workers’ mobilisation, 
not as a function of a process occurring beyond workers’ control, but as necessarily 
determining of the outcomes of development. By shifting our lens from the institutional 
configurations where labour is analytically and politically excluded, workers are 
elevated to active political subjects determining the world around them in the workplace 
and, by extension, the developmental trajectories of ISI in Chile and Argentina. The 
third, as a result, is to show how ISI was neither an aberration nor an accident, but 
rather comprised a “rational” and purposive set of competing strategies aimed at 
constraining the ongoing resistance of the working class in the workplace and beyond.  
The persistence of ISI in Chile and Argentina and the timing of its violent breakdowns 
were, therefore, outcomes of contested attempts by firms and the state to impose 
discipline and control within the workplace. In particular, these strategies were pursued 
through new technologies and managerial techniques that produced transformations 
across industrial manufacturing in the processes of production. Workers came into 
direct confrontation with the measures being imposed by firms and the state, beyond the 
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limits of their ostensible institutional weakness. Not only did workers undermine efforts 
to resolve crises through intensifying workplace discipline or squeezing wages in the 
drive towards improved productivity or stabilisation, they also opened possibilities for 
alternatives to such resolutions. The trajectory of ISI in Chile and Argentina was not the 
inevitable march toward failure condemned by its critics, nor was it determined by 
institutions, ideas, or class. Instead, it was determined within the workplace with 
profound implications for those actors – firms, the state, and workers – active within it. 
Whilst engagements between these actors began in the workplace, I have shown that 
they also had an impact far beyond them. Changes to production brought about changes 
to work which, in turn, gave rise to new forms of resistance and mobilisation. Firms and 
the state attempted to retain control over these growing conflicts within the leading 
sectors of manufacturing through traditional methods of repression and the imposition 
of workplace discipline. In turn, workers’ experiences of these strategies and their 
relationships with institutions and ideas determined the extent of their challenge to firms 
and the state. In Chile, this challenge was characterised by fragmented political 
institutions of labour, pervasive radical socialist ideas, and the relatively cohesive 
political autonomy of the working class. In Argentina, it was characterised by coherent 
political institutions of labour, the predominance of the nationalist political ideas, and a 
relative lack of political autonomy. Therefore, by contesting changes as these distinctive 
political subjects, workers directly constituted the trajectories of ISI by forcing firms 
and the state to pursue new strategies for political control in the workplace and beyond. 
I will conclude, therefore, by highlighting precisely how workers were able to determine 
these trajectories of ISI, emphasising the five key aspects of the integrated 
methodological framework I have developed for understanding workers’ political 
influence. The perspective I have developed reconnects work, resistance, and 
subjectivity and emphasises the political autonomy of the working class to go beyond 
understanding workers as an “interest group”, as “labour”, or as a “social subject”. 
Instead, it demonstrates how workers mobilised collectively as active political subjects 
and how this enabled them to contest the relations in and of production. ISI’s 
persistence and breakdown, in this view, cannot be understood as the continued pursuit 
of a model with intrinsic contradictions, as the accumulation of tensions around 
relatively stable political and economic institutions, as the failure to secure consensus or 
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of political elites to exert their will through clearly articulated ideas, or as the inherent 
weakness of social coalitions led by dominant social classes to impose their will.  
Alternatively, I have shown that the emergence of ISI was the consolidation of 
protection for domestic firms not just from the vicissitudes of the international political 
economy, but, most importantly, from the emergent industrial working classes. I have 
shown that the consolidation of ISI was not the contradictions of the exhaustion of an 
“easy phase”, but rather the imposition and deepening of this protection for firms and of 
their reproduction of “inefficient” production processes and networks that would secure 
their political control in the workplace. Finally, I have shown that the breakdown of ISI 
was neither inevitable, nor the simple accumulation of tensions and conflicts. Instead, 
the breakdown of ISI was the failure of firms and their political allies to exert control 
over the emergent political subjects of the working class and a direct response to the 
threat workers came to pose not just within the workplace, but also increasingly beyond 
it. Therefore, I have demonstrated the significance of these cases for understanding the 
role of the working class, for conceptualising the formation and composition of its 
political influence, and for recognising the constraints that were imposed upon it. Most 
importantly, I have shown how this alternative conceptualisation of the political subject 
of the working class can shed new light on the trajectories of ISI in Latin America. 
 
The Workplace Politics of Production in Chile and Argentina 
 
In this section I will detail the first and second significant contributions of this thesis, 
showing how the methodological framework developed in chapter 1 allows us to 
understand the continuing significance of the working class as an active political 
subject. The politics of production were characterised by varying degrees of 
personalised control and impersonalised discipline manifested either in strict managerial 
authority or workplace organisation. The experiences of work and resistance 
engendered by these relations in production produced a focus for workers’ discontent 
either against leading firms in the sector or the repressive state apparatus that sustained 
these relations. Such grievances were given meaning by prevailing socialist or 
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nationalist ideas disseminated by activists or institutions, but interpreted around the 
experiences and struggles of workers. It was these determinations that constituted the 
historical process of class formation, with workers in Chile mobilised around local 
conceptions of socialism targeting the domestic monopolies that prevailed in the textile 
sector and workers in Argentina mobilising around increasingly radical notions of 
nationalism to target the repressive alliance between foreign firms and the authoritarian 
state. The outcomes of these struggles, most significantly, were determined by the 
varying degrees of workers’ political autonomy. In Chile, this was far greater, resulting 
in the formation of radical political institutions of the working class, whilst in Argentina 
it was constrained by the more prominent and coherent political institutions of labour. 
 
Discipline and Control in the Social Spaces of Production 
The workplace provides an integral starting point for understanding not just the 
imposition of control over the working class, but also the limitations upon it. There 
were important differences between the workplaces of textile production in Chile and 
metalworking and automobile production in Argentina. This, however, isn’t as simple 
as posing a traditional sector of manufacturing, with its relative backwardness, outdated 
production methods, and endemic problems of scale and organisation, with relatively 
modern establishments producing durable consumer goods. In both cases there was a 
clear division, for example, between leading monopoly firms, either domestically or 
foreign-owned, and the plethora of smaller establishments and workshops incorporated 
into local production networks. These smaller firms provided parts or outsourced the 
production of simple inputs, such as in the automobile sector and some areas of 
metalworking in Argentina, produced lower-value consumer goods reliant upon the 
more sophisticated mass-production techniques of the larger firms, such as in the 
relationship between clothing and cotton textiles in Chile, or operated in more marginal 
sectors of the economy, such as silk weaving in Chile or less sophisticated areas of 
metalworking in Argentina. Even the automobile sector, the archetype of advanced 
industrial manufacturing during the twentieth century, shared these characteristics. 
Despite access to extensive international networks of capital, technology, inputs, and 
distribution, as well as to foreign parts suppliers that followed producing firms, these 
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firms continued to rely on small-scale domestic workshops, incorporated as outsourced 
suppliers and reliant on traditional forms of workplace organisation and control. 
Nevertheless, the differences across these sectors gave rise to distinctive relations in 
production and experiences of work that were also important. In the textile sector in 
Chile, there was a far more persistent and explicit paternalism permeating relations 
between workers and their employers. Leading firms within the cotton weaving sector, 
including Yarur, Sumar, Hirmas, and Said, relied on the paternalistic figure of the 
patrón to a very clear extent during the establishment and consolidation phases of ISI. 
Peter Winn (1986) has documented this with great depth for the case of Yarur, but it is 
also clear that this was not atypical within the sector. Managerial methods documented 
in smaller firms illustrate the prominence of strict forms of control imposed upon 
workers. The import of advanced machinery that made Chile one of the most 
technologically sophisticated textile sectors in Latin America, moreover, did not wholly 
displace this particularly intensive and “personalised” workplace control. By the 1960s, 
nevertheless, there was a shift toward the adoption of workplace discipline exercised 
through the production process. This marked an important turning point in workplace 
conflicts and moved the locus around which these were generated away from the figure 
of the patrón to the wider changes in production permeating the sector. The new 
emphasis on workplace discipline, combined with the long history of personalised 
control, characterised Chilean textile relations in production as ISI came to an end. 
In the metalworking and automobile sectors of Argentina, the influence of 
rationalisation within the production process, of concerns for raising productivity 
through the implementation of new forms of workplace organisation, and the far 
stronger presence of foreign firms characterised the workplace. Personalised forms of 
control and outdated workplace organisation did persist during the earlier establishment 
phases of ISI in metalworking. However, by the late 1940s and early 1950s this changed 
with the increasing clamour to reinstate workplace discipline alongside significant 
levels of foreign investment, calls that came both from leading firms and their 
representatives and from key actors within the state. Although the pace of this 
investment and the concomitant transformation of relations in production didn’t reach 
its peak until the consolidated phase of disciplinary modernisation during the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, when it did arrive its impact was profound. Absorbing particular 
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production processes and managerial techniques from the leading sectors of automobile 
production, domestic firms underwent dramatic changes. Integration into local 
production networks brought new competitive pressures and contractual demands upon 
these firms, but also led to the development of distinctive relations within the foreign 
firms that headed up these networks. These firms did not rely upon the most advanced 
technology, but rather imported outdated machinery and combined relatively advanced 
forms of discipline with traditional methods of control in these relations in production. 
 
The Significance of Experience in Work and Resistance 
Experiences of work and resistance were derived from the structurally determined 
imperatives of production and the impact of these relations in production within the 
workplace and beyond. First, the personalised forms of control, manifested in a variety 
of relations in production including the paternalistic patrón or the authoritarian attitudes 
of the management of foreign-controlled firms, produced a particular subjective focus 
for discontent. Second, the consolidation of disciplinary modernisation served to 
intensify impersonal forms of discipline that exacerbated the sense of exploitation and 
fragmentation, but which also induced a wider societisation and solidarity within and 
beyond the workplace. Grievances centred on an array of factors including traditional 
concerns over wages and working conditions, the lack of adequate representation and 
political organisation, attitudes and intransigence of employers, and the rigours of the 
production process itself. Resistance was manifested within the workplace prior to its 
mobilisation in strikes, protests, and other forms of political action. It was the 
combination of workplace grievances and resistance that produced mobilisations 
throughout these leading sectors of industrial manufacturing in Chile and Argentina.  
In the textile sector in Chile, the symbolic importance of the patrón gave a deeply 
personal character to resistance within the workplace. From the “ex-victims” of the 
1930s silk weaving sector harassed by their employers who stalked the factory floor, 
wristwatch in hand, imposing arbitrary fines and punishments, to the young female 
workers in the large cotton weaving firms of the 1960s exposed for the first time to 
strict production targets and the monitoring of an increasing number of advanced 
machines, a deeply ingrained managerial authority prevailed. Responses to any signs of 
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dissent were met by efforts to ensure the reinstatement of this authority, with opposition 
and conflict manifested in its stark rejection. Strikes and protests, as a result, quickly 
spread beyond individual factories to incorporate organised and unorganised workers 
throughout the various branches of this sector. They also tended to last for a significant 
period of time, from days to weeks to even months, with measures taken to prevent the 
reassertion of workplace control up to, and including, occupation of the factories. The 
shift to more impersonal forms of discipline, moreover, led to a move away from direct 
opposition to the owners of firms to the targeting of the monopoly control of the sector 
as a whole. Large firms came to be associated with this particular form of ownership, 
giving rise, by the 1970s, to a particular sense of conflict between the workers 
throughout the sector and their employers beyond conditions of work and wages and 
towards a fundamental effort to transform control over the production process itself. 
In the metalworking and automobile sectors of Argentina, repressive forms of control 
were exercised from within and beyond the workplace. Close relations between the 
political institutions of labour and the state helped to restrict antagonism towards the 
owners of firms. Coercive practices permitted the more widespread and less contested 
dissemination of workplace discipline imposed internally through the production 
process. Experiences of work were, therefore, less about conflicts over managerial 
authority and, instead, typified by resistance against the imposition of intensifying 
production rhythms and efforts to hold down wages relative to productivity. For 
metalworkers, this restricted scope for conflict was particularly pronounced, but for 
workers in the automobile plants inside and outside Buenos Aires, resistance was also 
targeted primarily at issues of workplace control. Particularly in Córdoba there was a far 
more homogeneous experience of work and disciplinary strategies that belied the 
relative novelty of the automobile sector. Workers here pioneered new strategies, 
including increasingly violent forms of factory occupation, which directly posed a 
challenge to the authority of some of the leading foreign firms. Nevertheless, these 
actions were typically suppressed by the repressive apparatus of the state and the 
political institutions of labour. As a result, by the 1970s, increasingly widespread 
workplace conflicts descended into an increasing sense of disarticulation as traditional 
bargaining systems began to crumble and the limitations and constraints they imposed 
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became increasingly apparent. The conflicts that emerged, then, became as much about 
confronting control in the workplace as about intensifying political conflict beyond it. 
 
Politicisation and the Subjectivities of the Working Class 
Workers’ engagements with prevailing political institutions of labour and the activists 
within them were significant in mobilising protest beyond the workplace. Most 
importantly, they were important in terms of the ideas these institutions and activists 
disseminated in the formation of distinctive political subjectivities. Distinguishing this 
process of politicisation from resistance and mobilisation is vital for understanding the 
political influence of workers as it was established from within the workplace. The 
emphasis in this thesis has been on distinguishing the material processes upon which the 
subjective interpretation of workplace conflict has been constructed. Such an analytical 
process, beyond simply representing an acknowledgement of the important role of ideas 
in giving meaning to mobilisation, allows for a specification of how and in what ways 
workers attempted to extend conflicts beyond the workplace. There is no foregone 
conclusion as to the political influence of the working class. This is determined, on the 
one hand, by the concrete material conditions of work, manifested in the production 
process, prevailing relations in production, and the continual experience of work and 
resistance. On the other hand, it is the outcome of the subjective interpretation of that 
experience of work, the meaning applied to it by prevailing political ideas, by political 
activists that come into contact directly with these struggles, and, in the course of this 
engagement, the changes wrought to the very meaning of the political ideas themselves. 
In the textile sector in Chile, prevailing socialist political ideas took on a specific 
meaning as they were mobilised within and around workplace conflicts. As has been 
shown, socialism, as an abstract political idea, retained a strong degree of salience 
throughout the country. Despite periods of political repression, the PC and PS played a 
role in the state and, to a greater extent, the political institutions of labour. It was the PC 
that was particularly prominent in the textile sector and, despite its period of relative 
repression during the 1940s and 1950s, it played an increasingly significant role in 
politicising the struggles against management authority and workplace control. First, 
anti-imperialism equated the monopoly control of the largest textile firms with the 
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predominance of foreign capital and influence of international political institutions over 
the economy. Second, nationalism contrasted the interests of firms and those of workers 
in terms that took on significance beyond issues of redistribution and work. Third, 
democracy took on a particular meaning in the relatively under-represented workplaces 
of the textile sector, incorporating calls for greater political organisation and respect for 
the legally instituted bargaining systems. The culmination of this politicisation was 
most apparent, moreover, in the 1970s when workers mobilised beyond the “peaceful 
road to socialism”. So-called “radicalisation” in this period did not emerge from the 
political militancy of these years, but, as has been shown, was linked more 
fundamentally to this ongoing politicisation that had begun in previous decades. 
In the metalworking and automobile sectors of Argentina, it was not socialism, but the 
nationalist ideas of Peronism that took the leading role in politicising the experience and 
resistance of the workers. The Peronist interpretation of the role of the worker, of the 
character and prospects for industrialisation, and of the relationship between firms and 
the state dominated the ideological sphere after 1946. It did, however, in terms of the 
relationship between workers, firms, and the state, reflect earlier ideological tendencies 
that had begun to consolidate themselves during the 1930s. As such, these ideas 
developed a saliency that belied their ostensibly external imposition, providing an 
interpretation of the meaning and limitations of workplace struggle, offering 
resolutions, and a distinctive vision of working class political influence. The pillars of 
anti-imperialism, nationalism, and democracy were prominent, but acquired 
significantly different meaning. The focus was firmly upon resistance and mobilisation 
as a means to secure negotiated settlement. The ideology of Peronism, despite the 
ostensible instability of this period, emphasised restraint and social peace for national 
economic development. Despite the prominence of Peronism, however, other radical 
political ideas retained an influence. Radical Trotskyist groups, the Communist Party, 
and dissident Peronists came to the fore after 1955, resulting in a radical politicisation 
of workers’ experience, particularly in the automobile sector. As workplace conflict 
intensified and mobilisation took on new forms, anti-imperialist, nationalist, and 
democratic ideas took on new meaning in the “radicalisation” of the 1960s and 1970s. 
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The Formation of Working Classes in Chile and Argentina 
Working class formation was, as an historical process, as contested as workplace 
strategies of control. There was not an inevitable formation of a coherent working class 
against which firms and the state would orient their decisions, but instead it was at the 
nexus of work, resistance, and subjectivity that this formation was determined. As 
workers contested their experiences of discipline and firms sought to impose control, a 
societisation around the labour process emerged that, to varying degrees, produced 
workplace conflict. This was not necessarily “conscious”, but derived from experience 
in the workplace given meaning in engagement with prevailing ideas. As a result, 
workers in the Chilean textile sector and the metalworking and automobile sectors in 
Argentina constituted distinct working classes that the strategies of firms and the state 
had to be articulated against. Overcoming these working classes was a primary concern 
in the decisions of firms and the state. For example, it was not uncommon for the 
problems facing ISI to be linked to “reasserting the right of managers to manage”, 
“disciplining the militant labour movement”, or “inefficiency” in workplace 
organisation. Workers’ political influence, therefore, and the threat it increasingly posed 
to the strategies of firms and the state was given distinctive meaning in locally 
constituted processes of class formation around work, resistance, and subjectivity.  
In Chile, workers in the textile sector came to constitute a relatively coherent, well-
organised, and independent working class. Despite the imposition of relatively strict 
paternalistic control and later efforts to impose discipline through new managerial 
techniques and forms of workplace organisation, there was a relatively cohesive 
centripetal process of societisation that countered centrifugal efforts to fragment 
workers within and between the workplaces of the sector. First, rooted in the history of 
Chilean working class conflict, was an existing solidarity within and beyond the 
workplace. Second, this was concretely manifested in the changing labour processes of 
textile production. Paternalism, whilst acting as a relatively effective form of control 
during periods of relatively high levels of political repression during the 1930s and late 
1950s, intensified the homogeneity of experience. Third, this solidarity was enhanced 
by efforts to introduce disciplinary forms of reorganisation into a relatively conflictive 
political context. As a result, the intensified work processes and repressive practices 
required to implement such measures, combined with the personalised grievances 
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derived from earlier experiences of paternalism, strengthened the homogeneity of 
experience and concomitant workplace societisation. Finally, political ideas of socialism 
and meanings that were ascribed to them ensured grievances would result in a deeply 
radicalised process of politicisation. This culminated in the 1970s when the meaning of 
socialism was dramatically transformed by the demands of the working class.  
In Argentina, the oft-cited prominence of workers during the period of ISI was belied by 
their relative marginalisation linked to the less coherent, less cohesive, and, ultimately, 
less independent process of working class formation. In the metalworking and 
automobile sectors, there was a far more effective imposition of centrifugal forms of 
fragmentation in the form of a relatively thorough imposition of “rationalised” 
workplace reorganisation. This replaced the personalised authority of management with 
the discipline of the production process and helped to restrict the centripetal process of 
societisation. The differences with Chile, however, should not be overplayed. Despite 
the closer institutional collaboration with the state, workplace conflict did not dissipate 
as strongly as commonly assumed and was concretely manifested around the particular 
relations in production of these sectors, with foreign ownership giving workers a 
prominent target for their grievances. The explicit priority given to productivity 
increases, in conjunction with support of repressive political regimes during the 1950s 
and 1960s, intensified the homogeneity of experience and workplace societisation. By 
the end of the 1960s, therefore, workers, increasingly seeing their demands and 
grievances unmet by the prevailing forms of representation, mobilised with increasing 
veracity, with an increasingly radical working class beginning to emerge into the 1970s. 
 
Political Autonomy and the Influence of the Working Class 
The ability of workers to contest the strategies of firms and the state derived not from 
the political institutions that represented it, but, instead, from workers’ political 
autonomy from these strategies and institutions themselves. Workplace conflict was 
central to the consolidation of the working class as a political subject, pursuing aims 
within, but also against, the prevailing trajectory of ISI. As such, special attention has 
been paid throughout the thesis to the tension between the distinctive forms through 
which this autonomy was manifested and the constraints imposed upon it. In Chile, 
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workers were able to exercise a far greater degree of autonomy in contrast to those in 
Argentina. Their autonomy, manifested in the lack of constraint by the political 
institutions of labour, allowed for a more substantive political influence and the 
formation of a potentially revolutionary political subject. In Argentina, the 
fragmentation of the working class caused by the relative coherence of the political 
institutions of labour and the constraints they were able to impose prevented the 
establishment of a comparable political subject. The prominent influence of these 
constraints prevented the formation of autonomous political institutions of the working 
class, creating intractable conflict and the conditions for the violent breakdown of ISI. 
In Chile, efforts to mediate the radical autonomy of the working class were few and 
tended to result in only the further politicisation of workplace conflict. The Labour 
Code, implemented in stages between 1924 and 1931, the Popular Front, and the 
establishment of the CUT served to politicise rather than undermine this autonomy. The 
fragmented establishment of the political institutions of labour, the empowerment and 
short-term limitations that accompanied the fragile coalition with the state, and the 
relatively organic link that was formed between workers and this trade union federation 
consolidated solidarity within and beyond the workplace around a militant political 
radicalism. The political institutions of labour remained relatively weak and fragmented 
and, as such, were reliant on the potential strength derived from the autonomy of the 
working class. The prominence of socialist political ideas compounded this dynamic, 
giving an increasing radicalism to workers’ struggles. This culminated in the events of 
the 1970s, during which time the working class constituted a revolutionary political 
subject that transcended even the socialist UP. This revolutionary potential had been 
apparent in previous conflicts, but came to the fore amidst struggles over the meaning 
and direction of the socialist transformation. In contesting workplace discipline, 
workers came to establish political institutions of the working class – the cordones 
industriales – that began to transform the prevailing relations in and of production. 
In Argentina, efforts to mediate and restrain the working class were far more pervasive, 
placing significant constraints on the potential of its autonomy and refocusing the locus 
of conflict around the political institutions of labour. Initially, the establishment of these 
institutions relied on the potential strength of the working class to retain their influence. 
Yet whilst there was limited space for the radical politicisation of conflicts, these 
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institutions helped undermine the centripetal potential of societisation within and 
beyond the workplace. As has been argued through this thesis, it was their rise to 
prominence that prevented the resurgence of working class autonomy after 1955 and 
1969 from resulting in a wider confrontation over the relations of production. By the 
1970s, the working class in Argentina remained deeply fragmented. With tensions 
growing as the limits of disciplinary modernisation became apparent to workers and 
firms, the restricted autonomy of workers constrained the formation of political 
institutions of the working class. Whilst alternative political institutions did emerge, 
particularly in the automobile sector, they were quickly overwhelmed by the rising tide 
of violent conflict. As a result, whilst workers continually pushed against the prevailing 
relations in production, they were unable to confront relations of production. 
 
Towards an Alternative Trajectory of ISI  
 
In this final section, I will outline the third significant contribution of the thesis, 
showing how the framework I have developed that establishes a meaningful role for 
workers enables the construction of a “counter-narrative” on the trajectory of ISI in 
Chile and Argentina. In this perspective, its persistence and breakdown were the 
outcome of deepening workplace conflicts confronting attempts by firms, the state, and 
the political institutions of labour to exert discipline and control. Understanding these 
outcomes, I have argued, cannot come from refocusing on institutions, ideas, or class 
alone, as they only reproduce the limits on understanding the political influence and 
significance of workers. Instead, I have shown how the alternative integrated 
methodological framework I have developed can be applied to provide new insights into 
the trajectories of ISI in Latin America. I have shown how the extent to which workers 
confronted firms and the state, as well as their formation as distinctive political subjects, 
determined the persistence and eventual violent breakdown of ISI from within the 
workplace. The outcomes of these confrontations were mostly contained within 
prevailing relations of production, through the imposition of particular relations in 
production. However, I have also shown how varying degrees of working class 
autonomy were central to the articulation of potential alternatives to relations both in 
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and of production, which, in turn, produced responses by firms and the state that 
engendered the violent backlashes of the 1970s. 
 
The (Un)Expected Emergence of Industrial Planning  
The importance of the Depression in setting the course for the emergence of ISI in Latin 
America was not to initiate an “easy phase” of industrial manufacturing, in which 
rapidly rising output of domestic consumer goods increasingly filled the gap left by the 
collapse of the world market. Instead, as has been shown in these two case studies, its 
most significant impact was to relocate and intensify the political tensions that were 
emerging within continually growing sectors of industrial manufacturing. The 
emergence and consolidation of an easy phase of ISI has been shown in the thesis to 
provide a wholly inadequate starting point for understanding the changes brought about 
under ISI and their significance for firms, the state, and the working class. Resurgent 
workplace conflicts and their spread to the major cities posed an increasingly prominent 
threat. As such, attempts to reinforce repressive measures within and beyond the 
workplace were imposed to varying degrees. Strict managerial authority, restricted 
forms of political organisation, and direct repression were all attempted to constrain 
workers’ demands within and around the conflicts that ensued throughout these sectors.  
The manifest failure of these attempts at political control, however, led to the 
inadvertent emergence and consolidation of early forms of industrial planning. State 
intervention increased as a means, primarily, to address the emerging tensions within 
sectors that were experiencing increasingly rapid growth. In Argentina, this intervention 
provided a means to resolve tensions without resorting to overt violence. Partial 
negotiated wage settlements delivered through increasingly prominent political 
institutions of labour pacified the working class and sustained policies that did little to 
workers’ benefit. However, in Chile, without the existence of relatively supportive 
political institutions, or rather with the existence of those more concretely linked to 
radical political struggles of the working class, populist forms of ISI characterised by 
more favourable state intervention and a growing political influence of workers were 
established. Most significantly, however, in both countries it was the political 
institutions of labour that came to most directly mediate workers’ political influence 
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and, as a result, this led to the increasing pacification of workplace conflict and limits 
on the imperatives that drove firms and the state to adopt relatively conciliatory and, at 
times, even progressive measures to foment industrial growth. As a result, the 
pacification of the working class was necessarily short-lived. Therefore, rather than 
create new political tensions around innate contradictions or around inadequate 
institutions, the emergence of ISI led to the consolidation of existing conflicts and their 
relocation to these sectors of manufacturing that were rapidly increasing in significance. 
 
The Consolidation of Disciplinary Modernisation 
The limitations on the so-called “easy phase”, or rather the limitations of populist 
resolutions to the consolidation of prevalent political conflicts within and around the 
workplaces of industrial manufacturing, quickly became apparent. Whilst the 
persistence of these limitations has been the source of much of the condemnation of ISI 
in Latin America, they are poorly understood. Much of the growing state intervention 
that accompanied and encouraged the rapid growth of the manufacturing sector led to 
the consolidation of ostensible inefficiencies within many of the leading sectors – 
textiles in Chile, metalworking in Argentina – in their industrial structures and 
production processes. These “inefficiencies”, however, represented the basis for the 
consolidation of control as a means to resolve and repress workplace conflicts and to 
undermine the emerging political influence of the working class. Workers within 
manufacturing were deliberately fragmented across inefficient, vertically-integrated 
production networks where the largest firms at the top were able to exercise the strictest 
forms of political control, backed as they were by domestic monopolies, foreign TNCs, 
or the state. Yet the repressive measures required to sustain these networks from beyond 
the workplace were necessarily limited. As a result, the outcome was a resurgence of 
workplace conflict. Moreover, the political tensions that emerged in this phase were not 
the result of any “exhaustion” of consumer goods production or the inability of political 
elites to embed their policy ideas. Instead they represented the limits of these constraints 
of structural inefficiency and external repression to exert control over the working class. 
In both cases, the resurgence of workplace conflict engendered the implementation of 
new measures to deepen discipline and control within and beyond the workplace. The 
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emergence of “disciplinary modernisation” as a second phase in the consolidation of ISI 
was typified by renewed repression against the political institutions of labour and, to an 
even greater extent, the autonomous mobilisations of workers. Most importantly, this 
was accompanied by the intensification of efforts to impose disciplinary relations in 
production through new technology and management techniques focused on increasing 
productivity and reorganising the workplace, without addressing the structural 
inefficiencies necessary to earlier forms of control. In particular, these measures were 
introduced with most veracity in the leading firms. This explains why the locus of 
political conflict around ISI shifted in Chile, from smaller, more marginal silk weaving 
to the largest cotton weaving plants, and, in Argentina, from metalworking to the 
automobile sector. The growing homogeneity of experiences of discipline reintroduced 
a process of societisation that enabled workers to mobilise around their political 
autonomy rather than the political institutions of labour. The result of disciplinary 
modernisation was, therefore, a radicalisation of workplace conflict. Again, this was not 
a process that can be explained through intrinsic contradictions of the “exhaustion” of 
ISI, nor as the failure of political elites to embed ostensible “resolutions” to growing 
crises. Instead, this radicalisation was the direct outcome of firm and state strategies to 
deepen discipline within, as well as beyond, the workplace, the growing homogeneity of 
experience it produced, and the consolidation of working class political autonomy.   
 
The Avoidable Inevitability of the Breakdown of ISI 
By the mid-1960s, the trajectories of ISI in Chile and Argentina had reached a 
crossroads, as the process of radicalisation that had been an intrinsic feature of the 
earlier attempts to resolve crises through the deepening of discipline and control was 
manifested most concretely. The breakdown of ISI, therefore, was neither the inevitable 
outcome of internal contradictions within the “model” nor the inability of dominant 
social coalitions to impose their will upon subordinate classes. Instead, it represented 
the culmination of confrontation between two tendencies within the trajectories of ISI. 
On the one hand, firms, the state, and the political institutions of labour reached the 
apogee of their attempts to impose discipline and control over workers. On the other 
hand, the political autonomy of the working class was consolidated around its radical 
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politicisation within and beyond the workplace. Workers had continually posed a threat 
to the prevailing forms of authority. However, by the 1970s, the political tensions that 
had been engendered produced increasingly significant political mobilisations that 
represented both the contemporary political conjuncture and also, most importantly, the 
tensions between workers and the various constraints that had been imposed upon them. 
In Chile and Argentina, it was the threat posed by this resurgence of the working class 
and its potential to confront firms and the state as a coherent and cohesive political 
subject that led to the violent breakdown of ISI. The most interesting aspect of this need 
to resort to overt forms of repression was in highlighting the continual failure of these 
ostensibly powerful political actors – the established apparatus of the state, powerful 
TNCs, domestic monopolies, and their international political supporters – to impose 
discipline and control. It is this continual failure to adequately resolve or repress 
workplace conflict that allows a tentatively optimistic conclusion to this thesis. Whilst 
the resort to violence engendered a brutal period of repression and a dramatic reversal of 
many of the relatively progressive compromises that had been established throughout 
the decades of ISI, the necessity of violence for the interests of dominant firms and their 
political allies highlights the potential that existed in nascent forms of political 
organisation. In Chile, the cordones industriales, as political institutions of the working 
class developed from the concrete experiences and struggles emanating from within the 
workplace, offered a potential insight to the changes that these conflicts could have 
created. In Argentina, moreover, the radical forms of workplace organisation that were 
established around the automobile sector and some sectors of metalworking also 
emphasised the political potential of working class autonomy. These organisations, 
mobilised from within the workplace and reflecting the latent solidarity that persisted 
within it, challenged not only the Peronist political institutions of labour, but also the 
authority of some of the most powerful firms in the country and the authoritarian state. 
These examples, therefore, continue to be an important reminder of not only the 
scholarly importance of bringing the working class back in, but also the persistent 
political significance of Marx’s “grave-diggers” as autonomous political subjects. 
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